Ok I just finished this. I don’t understand why Hume thinks it’s sufficient to invoke “Custom” as the explanation for our belief in the principle of uniformity. If “Custom” is so consistently accurate in giving us information about the world then surely it’s more of an epistemic faculty than anything else. In that case, we have an inner epistemic faculty, unknown to us, which consistently provides us with truth. That’s seems almost to verge on the level of mysticism — and yet because he gave it a banal name like “Custom” he thinks he’s being circumspect. No, bro, your “Custom” is almost magic.
Also at the end he says all arguments not about mathematics or empirical experimentation are worthless, even though his own book has loads of claims not about mathematics or empirical experimentation.
Pretty good book overall though.
Ok I just finished this...
Sci fag seething manual.
>which consistently provides us with truth.
Hume is pretty overt about his belief that conceptions of uniformity and causality are illogical, hence the problem of induction. He uses “Custom” as a label of the human tendency to notice patterns and ascribe connections, recognizing its necessity in day-to-day life but also acknowledging that it rests on unsubstantiated ground.
But it doesn't consistently provide us with truth. That's the whole point. Your customary observations that one event joins another aren't necessarily reflective of the true nature of things. They're just a way that humans analyse and interpret events.
>your “Custom” is almost magic.
This isn't true at all. It's a refutation of "magic" really in that it takes these laws which are elevated to the realm of divinity back down to an experiential realm.
But it does consistently provide us with truth. Every time I’ve thought “the billiard ball will roll”, it did roll. If Hume is right and there are no logical or a-posteriori arguments to justify my belief that it will roll, and “Custom” is the only operating principle in this regard, then Custom is one of the more truthful faculties that we have.
m.youtube.com
Congrats, now we have precrime.
>one of the more truthful faculties
that isnt in question. its just not a tool we can trust with 100% certainty is the point
Yes it is. We trust it all the time with 100% certainty. My point is we have this hidden faculty inside us, which Hume calls Custom, which somehow manages to consistently furnish us with truth about the world. This faculty is not rationally analyzable, because it is not rational, nor is it empirical. It's some sort of mystical thing inside us which allows us to make truthful predictions about the world.
This is no different from the concept of a "third eye" or some mystical stuff like that. It's just that he gave it a banal sounding name so it doesn't sound as grandiose.
>notice patterns
Cool it with the antisemitism
>Yes it is. We trust it all the time with 100% certainty.
I don't, so you're wrong
Yikes… you didn’t get it, did you?
>filtered this hard by ball rolling man
oh nonono
>I don't, so you're wrong
Yeah you do otherwise you wouldn't have pressed the buttons to type this post because you wouldn't trust "Custom" to provide you with the accurate belief that pressing those buttons will cause them to appear on your laptop etc.
Please stop being arrogant. Say I didn't get it. What do you gain by insulting me? You could educate me instead, thus doing some good for your fellow man, or you could simply ignore me because you think I'm not worth your time. Either way is better than insulting me.
>Yeah you do otherwise you wouldn't have pressed the buttons to type this post because you wouldn't trust "Custom" to provide you with the accurate belief that pressing those buttons will cause them to appear on your laptop etc.
No, sometimes the keys don't press right. I don't trust them 100%.
When the keys don't work you presumably do not doubt the principle of uniformity but assume that there was something wrong with the keyboard or perhaps you didn't press it hard enough etc.
>In that case, we have an inner epistemic faculty, unknown to us, which consistently provides us with truth.
I’d read Kant if I were you
plato.stanford.edu
user, I own a cat. It's an outside cat, I let it out into the yard sometimes. Now, when he wants to go outside he taps his paw against the glass of the window loudly enough to get my attention and then I come and open it. The thing is, we're all like my cat. We can tap at the glass when the owner is in earshot or the action is visible to him but we have no idea what the owner is thinking. We just know tap glass for outside time.
>the principle of uniformity
What's that?
The belief that nature obeys certain laws and that the future will be like the past, that when you press the key on your keyboard it should function the same way as it usually functions, not blow your hand off or launch you into outer space or something else.
>blow your hand off or launch you into outer space
But it might do that. I have no way of knowing
>The belief that nature obeys certain laws and that the future will be like the past, that when you press the key on your keyboard it should function the same way as it usually functions
I definitely don't believe in this principle, not sure why you think I do. I believe in miracles, I believe in Jesus' resurrection, I believe in the Bible. I believe science is pretty good at predicting events as long as God wishes to keep the world uniform. But there's no guarantee regarding how long that will last, so no, you're wrong, "we" do't trust this with 100% certainty. Maybe you do, but you have no basis for it.
I believe it’s the idea that causes and effects are ‘uniform’, i.e., that for every cause there is a concomitant effect. This view is taken to imply that the laws of nature are causal, and it predicts that some some causally uniform sequence of events X at some time T will also be causally uniform at some other time T1.
Yeah, I don't believe in that stuff. Cause is transcendent.
I understand Hume's argument that we can't look into the "true" causes and powers of things, that causality is contant conjunction, etc. I think that's what you're trying to say with your analogy. But this is a separate issue -- our belief in the principle of uniformity, according to Hume, is neither rationally nor empirically derived. It is derived purely from "Custom", an irrational, non-empirical faculty that we have inside of us. But yet this Custom allows us to make accurate predictions of how events will unfold, consistently, whether or not it gets us to the "true causes" of things. How can an irrational force inside of us, be so accurate and truthful in informing our predictions?
>How can an irrational force inside of us, be so accurate and truthful in informing our predictions?
Why would it not? Intuition is clearly superior to rationality. Even if you're an atheist, intuition was developed over hundreds of millions of years, so I don't see the issue.
Well that's what I mean. We have a hidden epistemic faculty inside of us that is the basis for how we live and act and constantly furnishes us with truth but is neither rationally nor empirically derived. That's mysticism.
>intuition is mystical
Ok bro
Atheists usually say that anything which is not empirically verifiable or derived through the principles of logic and mathematics is bullshit. Hume says so himself
>If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
I don't see how his own principle of "Custom" is exempt from this, since it is neither empirical nor rational.
Doesn't mean intuition is mystical, it just means Hume wrote an edgy quote and the atheists you mention are ignorant
What do you think makes it distinct from so-called mystical principles?
That it has a natural explanation through evolution theory
Well it's prior to evolutionary theory because without it you couldn't come to the theory of evolution. You have to presuppose the veracity of Custom before you can get to evolution
I don't see the problem. You observe by means of empirical experimentation that intuition generally and intuition about causes specifically works pretty well. Based on that you start developing an understanding of the world which leads you to accept scientific principles and the evolutionary theory. It's true that it all starts with intuition, but you test it, and then you explain it with the tools you have.
>You observe by means of empirical experimentation
No but the point is it can't be justified empirically. If you say "the future will be like the past because it has always been so in the past" you're arguing in a circle. You're saying that because x has occurred in the past it will continue to occur in the future, but that's assuming what you're trying to prove. That's why I keep saying Custom is non-empirical and non-rational.
>"the future will be like the past because it has always been so in the past"
Who said anything about the future? It's just a statement about the past and how things came to be.
Making statements of necessity with respect to the past is the same as making any statement about the future. You cannot establish causal mechanisms in past periods objectively, you cannot establish causal mechanisms working into the future.
>You observe by means of empirical experimentation that intuition generally and intuition about causes specifically works pretty well
This is the wrong way around. Empirical experimentation is grounded in intuition, we determine that empirical experimentation is effectual thanks to our innate intuition. Which is also partly obvious because the sciences developed, historically, out of intuition, not out of empiricism as we now know it.
>Intuition is clearly superior to rationality.
>Making statements of necessity
It's not necessity, it's just a rational inference.
>we determine that empirical experimentation is effectual thanks to our innate intuition.
No, we do that by reason.
>It's not necessity, it's just a rational inference.
There's no difference. X implies Y is the same as Y follows of necessity from X.
>No, we do that by reason.
...Which is exactly what Hume disproved. Did you follow the arguments or not?
>There's no difference. X implies Y is the same as Y follows of necessity from X.
Of course there is. Necessity is apodidictic, inference is probable.
>...Which is exactly what Hume disproved. Did you follow the arguments or not?
How did Hume disprove that reason can validate the efficacy of empirical experimentation?
>inb4 FBI crime statistics prove pre-crime is real
The problem of induction IS about the future. You can’t prove the principle of uniformity through empirical or logical means. If you try to prove it empirically you argue in a circle. That’s what Hume’s whole argument is. That’s why he says it’s “Custom” instead of reason or empirical faculties.
>Of course there is. Necessity is apodidictic, inference is probable.
Without necessary judgements, you cannot even make statements about how things came to be, which is the point of what I just said.
>How did Hume disprove that reason can validate the efficacy of empirical experimentation?
By showing that reason is incapable of establishing relationships between sense data, as it has no access to the relationships of things. Only intuition ("Custom") can do that, and thereby validate empiricism, which relies on sense data being previously correlated in certain patterns by the intuition. In particular, the pattern of time, which is one thing following from another and another preceding, which cannot be established empirically without intuition first interceding with judgements about "before" and "after", which cannot be given empirically, because they are presupposed by intuition in order for empirical knowledge to have any basis. They are not presupposed rationally because reason cannot give us "before" or "after", except as a correlate, ie "x" (before) implies "y" (after), which is still only a correlate and not actually equivalent to time itself.
>You can’t prove the principle of uniformity
Because there's no such thing. You seem to think that just because we can't know something 100% then we must assume mysticism, which is nonsense.
>Without necessary judgements, you cannot even make statements about how things came to be, which is the point of what I just said.
You can make rational suppositions just fine.
>By showing that reason is incapable of establishing relationships between sense data, as it has no access to the relationships of things
Reason doesn't have to do that. Intuition does it, and reason validates it by observing that it works.
Dude, it’s not that you can’t know it 100% it’s that YOU CANNOT KNOW IT AT ALL THROUGH REASON OR EXPERIENCE.
Hume says we believe it because of “Custom” but you can’t justify custom through reason or experience either because it’s fundamentally irrational and non experiential. It’s more of an innate mystical quality (it seems to me).
>but you can’t justify custom through reason
Except you can justify as an evolutionary trait. You use rason to do so.
>It’s more of an innate mystical quality (it seems to me).
Sounds like you just really want to believe in mystical things.
>You can make rational suppositions just fine.
They are invalid as actual explanations of "how things work."
>Intuition does it, and reason validates it by observing that it works.
Then it sounds like all reason does is nod its head to what is given to it by intuition. In which case, reason and intuition are one and the same thing, or better yet, reason is the collared slave of intuition. I would say the more accurate description is that reason extrapolates from intuition, it does not validate it at all, because as already established by Hume, reason cannot see or describe things as they are, therefore it cannot validate the faculty of intuition, which would be like using the measured to measure the measurer. By extrapolate, I mean that it tries to combine what it views as common experiences and generalize from them into a more universal framework, which is always inherently flawed, because it does not contain any necessary connections, unlike the directly perceived relationships in intuition.
the inpass here seems like ascribing unknowing to mysticism. Hume does not suppose about the qualities of a prioi conception and how things seem rather uniform in interation. He explicitly does not go into the mystical or metaphysical. At the point where he can no longer follow a rational sequence of logic, he leaves it as that.
thats what seperates his custom from mysicism. A lack of supposition into the unknown. Hes not saying causation is true, just that it seems to be vindicated through experience. In theory given x, y SEEMS to happen. NOT given x, y happens in a logical, all bachlors must not be married kind of way. Kinda like the theory of gravity, even though it seems to hold in most every instance, is still refered to as a theory, as it cannot be proven. Hume simply acknowleged the theoretical as well as the practical.
>They are invalid as actual explanations of "how things work."
They are valid as long as they have predictive power and are in line with rationality and logic.
>Then it sounds like all reason does is nod its head to what is given to it by intuition.
No, reason can go beyond intuition through judgements. You don't have an intuition about how to travel in space, yet we managed to do that.
>it does not validate it at all
Yes it does by designing experiments and ways of evaluation.
>By extrapolate, I mean that it tries to combine what it views as common experiences and generalize from them into a more universal framework, which is always inherently flawed, because it does not contain any necessary connections
Sure, it's not perfect, but as long as it works it's fine
> unlike the directly perceived relationships in intuition.
Nope, these are not necessary either. Intuition lies to you too, have you never seen an optical illusion?
Is there a good english term for something that seems to be true, has been vindicated to the 99th percentile throuogh empericism, but is not fundememntally true in a logical sense? like copernican revolution stuff.
likely seems like to light of a word. would you say “practically true”?
Read about Laplace's demon.
Read Kant
Read Schopenhauer
If those readings provided with you any useful knowldege, you'd be able to share it rather than namedrop works
Lazy nigger, go catch your own fish.
You should follow your own advice instead of pretending to be well-read
Karl Popper would say that hypotheses with overwhelming evidentiary support are ‘highly corroborated’ or ‘not yet falsified’.
>Hume’s philosophy demonstrates that there is a contradiction implicit in traditional empiricism, which holds that universal scientific laws are in some way finally confirmable by experience, despite the open-ended nature of the latter being acknowledged. Popper eliminates the contradiction by removing the demand for empirical verification in favour of empirical falsification or corroboration. Scientific theories, for him, are not inductively inferred from experience, nor is scientific experimentation carried out with a view to verifying or finally establishing the truth of theories; rather, all knowledge is provisional, conjectural, hypothetical—the universal theories of science can never be conclusively established. Hence Popper’s emphasis on the importance of the critical spirit to science—for him critical thinking is the very essence of rationality.
>Except you can justify as an evolutionary trait. You use rason to do so.
The theory of evolution requires custom to be true. Custom is prior to the discovery of evolution. How can you justify custom in reference to evolution without begging the question and assuming the very thing you're trying to prove?
>We trust it all the time with 100% certainty.
THE POINT IS, WE CANT
>assuming the very thing you're trying to prove?
You're not trying to prove that intuition works, you observe intuition works, and then you use evolutionary mechanisms to understand how it came to be. There's no circularity: intuition exists -> observation shows you intuition works -> reason helps you understand how intuition came to be. You're not trying to use evolution to test if intuition works.
>They are valid as long as they have predictive power
They are not valid as knowledge. They do not even have "predictive power" (which is what you stated earlier, as you claimed that you cannot make statements about the future in a previous post), they only have the power of being descriptions of past events, without being able to properly link events together and thereby become explanations. This was what you stated earlier: "Who said anything about the future? It's just a statement about the past and how things came to be."
>No, reason can go beyond intuition through judgements.
No, it can only go beyond intuition through extrapolation and guesswork. Space travel is not a meaningful example. There is relative space on Earth and we can and did use the same principle for guessing about space travel.
>Nope, these are not necessary either
They are, because we can make those judgements, and do actually make them and use them, which is the basis for empirical thought. As I just mentioned, the basis of time, "before" and "after", which you haven't even touched upon. You keep repeating "reason and logic" as though that is somehow an argument.
>Yes it does by designing experiments and ways of evaluation.
Which is just different ways to nod its head at intuitive judgements. Again, experiments without intuition could not even say which moment is before or after, they would be completely worthless.
>Intuition lies to you too, have you never seen an optical illusion?
Optical illusions are not intuition, those are sensible illusions, in their own way however they still do conform to intuitive rules so that they do not really break anything at any level, they are not strictly speaking "lies" either, they simply present different objects to the sense.
These perceptions in intuition are absolutely necessary for empirical knowledge. We would not be able to even create hypotheses (the basis for all empirical knowledge through experiments) without an intuition of how things work, by perceiving intuitively that momentum passes from one object to another upon contact for example, we are therefore able to create a testable hypothesis about that. As for predictive power, how can you even prove that it has any? How can you discern empirically which way time flows (thereby allowing the idea of "predictive validity" to have any meaning at all) without presupposing the flow of time through our intuition to begin with?
>He explicitly does not go into the mystical or metaphysical
That's user's whole point. He doesn't "explicitly" go into the "mystical", instead he just replaces a word which is essentially mystical with another, he replaces "intuition" with "Custom." It's just handwaving and word games which is basically mystical when taken for what it is. It's a defining trait of mystics not to try to explain the unknown ("the ineffable"), so the second half of your post just corroborates that idea.
I keep asking you how you can justify custom empirically and you keep appealing to evolution. Now you're saying we can justify custom through "observation". Ok, but Hume spends his whole book disproving that.
>We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.
In other words, Hume is saying that if you say:
1) The future has always been conformable to the past in the past
2) Therefore, it will be conformable to the past in the future.
You are begging the question, because you can only go from (1) to (2) if you assume "the future will be like the past", which is the very thing you're trying to prove.
So again Custom CANNOT be justified empirically or through a-priori argumentation.