What does Yea Forums think about the filtering hypothesis...

Why do materialists have to resort to mischaracterising arguments that counter their views? Why do you expect people to even take you seriously if you're just going to argue against straw men?

>this literal zombie nigger is incapable of measuring his own consciousness
Stick with engineering

By this logic your electric motor is conscious, you retards haven't even finished highschool. Or is only the human brain endowed with the possibility to decrypt your waves into consciousness? You people are literally insane.
Not an argument, finish highschool.
>It's real in my mind
There are retards who have talked to Jesus in their mind, you are retarded, go submit to the next Jim Jones or Ron Hubbard.
Make an argument, but your arguments as the others replied above are either "it's real in my mind" or "my EV is conscious".

>finish high school
Nigger I'm 39.

Stick to fiction.

And still retarded, my condolences to your family.

>There are retards who have talked to Jesus in their mind, you are retarded, go submit to the next Jim Jones or Ron Hubbard.
Consciousness != mind. Learn to read.

Kastrup doesn't believe that the brain is a transistor. He asserts that such a view entails a dualist perspective, which he doesn't believe in. He doesn't believe in "things" that exist outside of consciousness. An individual's consciousness in his view is more like a whirlpool in a river. It is a type of activity in a field of consciousness.

I guess it beats being a faggot. I mean I'm not the one trading stds in bathroom stalls with other men at Princeton or Harvard but what do I know?

Materialism simply can't explain immaterial consciousness
COPE MOAR

Is he an advaitafag too?

>materialism can't explain something that doesn't exist
Agreed

The only way you could believe that qualia doesn't exist is because you don't experience them, seeing as this is the only way of knowing them, and nothing could be more obvious than their existence to people who do experience them. Essentially it is impossible to prove the existence of qualia to an NPC, which you have made absolutely clear that you are, so there is no point in talking to you. You are a fully existing philosophical zombie.

Relevence?

No, Kastrup’s metaphysics actually teaches a lot of things that would be criticized by Advaita.

> obvious
NTA but that's the thing about illusions - they have no foundation to them, but they are obvious. It's pretty much what makes them illusions.

You are living on Earth, and the Sun orbits it, because that is obvious to you. Or so you believe.

>He thinks the arbitrarily chosen unfalsifiable foundation to his metaphysics is superior to the unfalsifiable foundation of a metaphysics that specifically chooses its foundation because it's the only thing that can logically never be falsified, despite his unfalsifiable foundation only being currently empirically unfalsifiable, although it could logically be falsified and likely will be soon given that many physicists believe spacetime is doomed.

How could consciousness be considered an illusion? What does that even mean? The point of qualia is tha

The point of qualia is that even if we call them illusions, they still exist. Literally philosophy 101.

I knew it. Threads about philosophy of mind are preyed upon by the Candleja

You do realise that "illusions" still exist, right? They may not exist in the outside world, but there is such a phenomena called "illusions". Just as dreams may not exist in the outside world, but there is such a phenomena as "dreams". The same can be said of qualia.

>How could consciousness be considered an illusion? What does that even mean?
It means that there is no ghost in the shell, but the shell is built in such a way that it sees a ghost if it looks in a mirror.

>The point of qualia is that even if we call them illusions, they still exist.
Indeed. But that would mean that like any illusion, they exist only in our perception, and not in the internal workings of what forms the illusion. There's no need to fundamentally alter our perception to be rid of this illusion (why would we even need it?), but it cannot provide us with any meaningful insights into how our mind works, at all, and would rather lead us down a wrong path.

Saying that qualia are illusions doesn’t necessarily entail saying that consciousness is an illusion, for the reason that one position is that qualia themselves are just unconscious content that is being known as objects by a unified field of awareness, which would be the actual consciousness. I dont think that’s the position the other poster was trying to articulate but its worth pointing out this distinction.

>They may not exist in the outside world
Then stop trying to ground it in the outside world.

>Just as dreams may not exist in the outside world, but there is such a phenomena as "dreams"
Yeah, but you don't try and explain a human being through the contents of his dreams, do you?

It sounds like an age old idea made novel so it can be sold. I prefer the memetic argument, when one wants to discuss valid 'reincarnation', as this is; all ideas about consciousness are born from fear of death and our losing the most central aspect of ourselves. But even without teleology, metaphysics or physics, if you want to get physical about the objectivity of consciousness - our consciousness (or it's artifacts) is axiomatically made up of memes, so when you die the memes continue to live, as nonphysical ideas, or cosmo-chronological tardigrades/cockroaches. If what matters most is just some abstract/vague/qualic - ultimately metaphysically disembodied 'seat of consciousness' - idea about consciousness existing... somewhere....sometime... as the ever-permeating expression of the monad or something, we're already there. When someone mourns they integrate some of your radiating memetic remnance into themselves, and partially fuse into you (as you do them.)

>he thinks qualia disprove physicalism
I guess (You) were the npc the whole time

>all ideas about consciousness are born from fear of death and our losing the most central aspect of ourselves
But the most central aspect of my being is my dick.

Might explain why I am not bothered by physicalism tho.

>It means that there is no ghost in the shell, but the shell is built in such a way that it sees a ghost if it looks in a mirror.

Whether there is a ghost in the shell or not, it is irrelevant to the fact you can describe red in physicalist terms to someone who has never seen red, and this would lead to that person knowing red as someone who experiences it knows it.

>Indeed. But that would mean that like any illusion, they exist only in our perception, and not in the internal workings of what forms the illusion. There's no need to fundamentally alter our perception to be rid of this illusion (why would we even need it?), but it cannot provide us with any meaningful insights into how our mind works, at all, and would rather lead us down a wrong path.

It's not the qualia themselves that provide insight into how our mind works, it's the fact that explaining what causes qualia with physical facts does not help someone to know qualia if they haven't experienced the qualia in question, given that the definition of qualia is the something it is like to experience X. This therefore proves that a physicalist approach cannot explain everything, because there is a part of our world which cannot be described with references to other things, and this part is phenomenal experience. Every other part of our world can be sufficiently explained by references to other things, although eventually they will lead back to qualia.

Either way, I'm tired of arguing with an NPC, because I'm making the same points over and over again. I can totally understand why you have your perspective: what I'm saying must make no sense to a zombie. Have fun not experiencing anything.

This is what happens when you think reading Richard Dawkins qualifies you to have philosophical opinions.

>you can describe red in physicalist terms to someone who has never seen red, and this would lead to that person knowing red as someone who experiences it knows it
Ah, that's pure word games on what is "knowing" and what is "experience" and what contains what information and whatnot, and I don't see how it is relevant.

> because there is a part of our world which cannot be described with references to other things
That sounds more like a limitation of our perceptive and communicative capabilities, than anything. What does our capacity to explain anything has to do with qualia? If we cannot draw a map of it, than the territory exists/doesn't exist? It's kinda irrelevant.

>Either way, I'm tired of arguing with an NPC, because I'm making the same points over and over again
Nah, this is the first time you made this particular point. Your previous point was that it's impossible to have experiences and not believe that qualia exist. Which kinda rests on a hugeass assumption but pretends that it doesn't.

>Ah, that's pure word games on what is "knowing" and what is "experience" and what contains what information and whatnot, and I don't see how it is relevant.

That qualia exists is the only thing you can know for certain. Are you a fucking retard? Someone who has experienced red "knows" what it is like to experience it. Someone who hasn't doesn't. The reason you can't grasp this is because you are an NPC.

>That sounds more like a limitation of our perceptive and communicative capabilities, than anything. What does our capacity to explain anything has to do with qualia? If we cannot draw a map of it, than the territory exists/doesn't exist? It's kinda irrelevant.

It's not a limit of perception, it's a limit of materialism. I KNOW I experience things, and so therefore there is such a thing as qualia that exists, but it is by the definition of qualia impossible for materialism to describe it. Anything else that exists could POSSIBLY be described, even if we are not yet aware of its existence.

Holy fuck how many times are you going to fail to understand this? Are you moron?

>That qualia exists is the only thing you can know for certain. Are you a fucking retard? Someone who has experienced red "knows" what it is like to experience it
I just pointed out that it's all a construct of what meaning we place on "knowing". If the experience of red simply has any content that cannot exist in a language, then the difference will persist regardless of existence or nonexistence of qualia - some of the information is simply lost in translation. Arguably, some information is lost in translation of any phenomenon into any language, but for some reason you don't see that as an argument for existence of qualia in everything that can ever be communicated, and consequentially transcendental nature of absolutely everything.

I also think you messed up your negations on the first take there
> it is irrelevant to the fact you can describe red in physicalist terms to someone who has never seen red, and this would lead to that person knowing red as someone who experiences it knows it.

>I KNOW I experience things
So does a computer. I mean, at least it can be programmed to answer this way, and it will make perfect sense in it's internal logic. But (you) are not that way, of course, (you) just KNOW it.

>It's not a limit of perception, it's a limit of materialism.
How so? You don't explain that part - you just refer back to the axiom, without elaborating on.
>but it is by the definition of qualia impossible for materialism to describe it
Most philosophers of mind do entirely agree that the formal concept of qualia IS indeed a dig at the physicalism and nothing else, so they successfully ignore it.

>Anything else that exists could POSSIBLY be described
That's also an extremely strong and retarded claim.

>and this would lead to that person knowing red as someone who experiences it knows it.

No one actually believes this, right?

He made a typo, don't be mean.

>What does Yea Forums think about the filtering hypothesis? Essentially that the brain filters consciousness activity which is in reality unbound and goes beyond space and time. The brain is like a radio that is tuned to a certain channel, namely your personal consciousness, so that brain activity and consciousness are not the same.
Is this thesis vulnerable in any way? Is it possible to falsify it? Chances are, it's a load of speculative theorizing that is impervious to facts. Either that or, if his terms are well-defined and his mechanisms well-described, this theory was already falsified by neuropsychology, which has many examples of very specific changes in the mind caused by very specific brain damage. If he can wave all of these facts away by saying "yeah, the receiver got damaged bro, so the signal is different", then his speculations are suspect. Why can we map the workings of the mind to the structure and functions of the brain with such precision and predictive power? If the metaphor with the radio is of any use, then the radio does not need to be so closely similar in structure and function with the radio waves, that's nonsense. And if he would claim in response to this that when you take psychodelics you are, like, tuned to a totally different frequency bro, then this is useless brophilosophy that's pandering to the Internet crowd and wrong on the facts.
>Kastrup doesn't believe that the brain is a transistor. He asserts that such a view entails a dualist perspective, which he doesn't believe in. He doesn't believe in "things" that exist outside of consciousness. An individual's consciousness in his view is more like a whirlpool in a river. It is a type of activity in a field of consciousness.
It's possible to concoct a perfectly encapsulated (epistemological) idealism that would be resistant to philosophical arguments. And it seems like this is what this guy is going for. But there's a reason why idealism is not taken seriously anymore, a little thing called the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in describing and predicting the behavior of extramental phenomena (a.k.a. science).

At a quick glance, you can see that this Kastrup guy spends more time gallivanting around the Internet and pushing out self-published books, than engaging with actual philosophers. This is always a red flag.

>It's possible to concoct a perfectly encapsulated (epistemological) idealism that would be resistant to philosophical arguments
It's not just possible - it's easy. Just leave all the internal contradictions outside the parentheses.

There are many meanings of the term and I specified which one I meant. Not sure what your point is.

>Not sure what your point is.
That I agree with you.

You're not sure what your point is? Ok, then.

You can't blame them. They were fated to be this retarded from the dawn of time.

>MUH qualia YOU NPC, you will never understand what I'm talking about
The last refuge of the lazy brainlet. They will pretend like actual human beings cannot see colors the way they do. All to avoid admitting to themselves that there just might be something they don't understand and it might just take some effort to take their understanding a bit further than entry-level. No, the brainlet will be satisfied in the delusion that his mind is special and those who disagree must lack insight into fundamental facts.

>fundamental facts.

Qualia are fundamental facts? How does that fit into your materialist world view?

>That's also an extremely strong and retarded claim.

Uh user, that's literally the claim that materialism makes.

>Uh user, that's literally the claim that materialism makes.
Uh user, it is not. Mind being an epiphenomenon of material processes does not require said epiphenomenon to be capable of describing absolutely everything that may or may not exist regardless of circumstances. In fact, I don't know any forms of materialism that are grounded on every extant phenomenon being a priori describable.

It seems more like Kastrup's argument is built on qualia seeming like an illusory non-entity for physicalism while it it meaningful and relevant for him - and he described the opposing argument AROUND this opposition using the antithesis to his point as the base, while in practice it's not the foundation - it's merely one of the consequences, and an irrelevant one.

In other words, it's a strawman.

>Qualia are fundamental facts?
This literal word salad is something I said, according to the brainlet. Qualia in the concrete, qualia in the abstract, what's the difference, right? Literally too dense to argue with, especially because it's the exact attitude I attacked in the quoted post. Willfully ignorant and proud of it.

>I just pointed out that it's all a construct of what meaning we place on "knowing". If the experience of red simply has any content that cannot exist in a language, then the difference will persist regardless of existence or nonexistence of qualia - some of the information is simply lost in translation. Arguably, some information is lost in translation of any phenomenon into any language, but for some reason you don't see that as an argument for existence of qualia in everything that can ever be communicated, and consequentially transcendental nature of absolutely everything.

If I describe to you the physical process that causes heat to occur, then it is possible for you to understand this process. There might be other details I could add, but ultimately those details are all possible to describe in physical terms, except phenomenal experiences of heat.

>I also think you messed up your negations on the first take there

Just a typo, you get the picture.

>So does a computer. I mean, at least it can be programmed to answer this way, and it will make perfect sense in it's internal logic. But (you) are not that way, of course, (you) just KNOW it

I don't know how this is relevant. I'm not denying computers can have phenomenal experiences, and if they can it makes it no easier to describe such experiences in physical terms.

>How so? You don't explain that part - you just refer back to the axiom, without elaborating on.

I've actually already explained this multiple times. There is nothing in the materialist worldview that describes how conscious experience supervenes on the physical. The physical might imply the existence of awareness, but as I have already shown, this is distinct from phenomenal experience.

>Most philosophers of mind do entirely agree that the formal concept of qualia IS indeed a dig at the physicalism and nothing else, so they successfully ignore it.

Not an argument.

>That's also an extremely strong and retarded claim.

It's the claim that materialism makes. If X cannot be explained in physical terms, it must not supervene on the physical. Or in other words, it is possible to imagine a physically identical world where X doesn't exist. As shown, the experience of the colour red cannot be described in physical terms to someone has never experienced it to the point that the explanation would give them the same knowledge as experience of it. Or in other words, a person who has studied neurology for all their life but never seen red would not know what it is like to see red. This proves that qualia cannot be "known" by physical explanation, and if materialism says that everything physical can be understood by physical terms, then it must not be physical.

Anyway, we're going in circles now. I've made the same arguments over and over, and you seem to be so far from understanding them that you think invoking AI is relevant. So I'm finished with this argument, have a nice day.

>There is nothing in the materialist worldview that describes how conscious experience supervenes on the physical. The physical might imply the existence of awareness, but as I have already shown, this is distinct from phenomenal experience.
Oh, look, Chalmer's language suddenly appears, looks like this user did some googling in the meantime. You do understand all the implications of Chalmer's account that he himself admits, right? Everything that doesn't involve consciousness is causally closed, and that includes your utterances and your beliefs. Your qualia do not cause your beliefs about qualia, your beliefs about qualia are exactly the same, and have the exact same origin, as that of your zombie twin. Everything you said about qualia justifying your worldview is therefore self-defeating. Loser.

holy cope

I've read all of Chalmers work and fully accept his world view.

I for one, excitedly anticipate the anguished seething of hylics in response to the publishing of David Bentley Harts upcoming book on philosophy of mind.

churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/plan-for-a-book-on-the-science-of-mind/

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Ok, so I automatically get the reply to the paradox I outlined, because you're just going to parrot Chalmers in addressing it. It's not a contradiction, you say, it's a "challenge" to be "resolved in the future"? Allright, if and when Chalmers resolves this "challenge" I'll have your answer too. Of course, until then you'll have to refrain from mentioning qualia, because it's provably fruitless. Ironic that you go around calling other people NPCs if you have no mind of your own though.