So this book is yet another attempt to explain consciousness in materialist terms...

It's shouldn't suprise me that when I make a post criticising materialism on a board full of dualists and idealists, it brings out the tiny handful of materialists on the board. But surely your little posse would want to represent itself a little better than this?

>No, the argument I'm making is not that there are no physical explanations, it's that there cannot be a materialist explanation, because consciousness does not supervene on the physical.

And again show me a consciousness without a material component.

>The point of my argument is that it shows that the materialist view is unable to make a distinction between between conscious beings and philosophical zombies. So in fact the materialist view has little defense against solipsism.

I think you're conscious since I can talk to you and you pass what amounts to a Turing test. How do you prove I'm not a p-zombie since you think there are qualia inaccessible to material inspection or communication? Seems like you're the solipist here.

> consciousness does not supervene on the physical
you keep saying this like it's axiomatic lol
what do you actually mean by 'supervene on the physical'?
not an argument, p-zombie

>sai gaddam
GODDAMN!

>By which I mean you can logically imagine a physically identical world with human beings that do not experience qualia
Can you really? If I place a red object in front of someone and ask them what color it is, they'll say red. How can you explain this logically without qualia?

A robot could tell what color something was and say red

Prove that programming a robot to analyze colors is fundamentally different than the qualia of color.

>you keep saying this like it's axiomatic lol
what do you actually mean by 'supervene on the physical'?

Well, can you explain how phenomenal, conscious experience supervenes on the physical without conflating awareness with consciousness (the two are distinct, given the fact that we can imagine awareness that is not conscious. For example, we can say that a robot with light censors is "aware" of light, but it is not necessarily having phenomenal, conscious experience of the light).

>not an argument, p-zombie

Can you articulate why it isn't an argument?

The very fact you cannot prove this with a physicalist explanation shows there cannot be a materialistic explanation of consciousness.

The physicalist explanation is that they aren't any different. Your brain has extra abstract information processing, but at the end of the day its a computer with light sensors hooked into it.

The idea that a computer could be conscious does not explain how consciousness supervenes on the physical.

I've asked you twice and you've yet to give an example of consciousness not "supervening" on the physical. Point out a consciousness without a material component and you win the argument.

>the two are distinct, given the fact that we can imagine awareness that is not conscious
Can you show me a conscious without awareness? Or is 'conscious' just the word you use to describe the story your brain generates about the things you're aware of?

It's good to know there's only one of you same fagging all over this.

I already responded to this here:

isn't me and I already responded to here

Yes, and I already responded to that too. Do you want to repeat the whole argument again?

Except you didn't.
>by using a physical explanation for it, as you would explain how friction causes heat, for example.
The physical explanation is partially covered in the book you read, plus maybe some neurobiology textbooks. The full explanation is still being discovered.
>It is saying that such a world would be logically coherent, even if it was physically identical to our own.
It's only logically coherent if you assume consciousness to be epiphenomenal, which is the faulty assumption your whole worldview rests on. A materialist would argue that a physically identical world would produce the same qualia.

Attached: file.png (493x137, 9.91K)

I swear that you must be an NPC not to believe in your own consciousness.

>Yes, and I already responded to that too. Do you want to repeat the whole argument again?
You responded by repeating the same argument you started with >No, the argument I'm making is not that there are no physical explanations, it's that there cannot be a materialist explanation, because consciousness does not supervene on the physical.
which again point a consciousness without a physical component. You obviously can't hence all the dancing around.

I believe that my brain has physical circuits that abstract sensory data into the experience of conscious, and that the process of abstraction creates a feeling of separateness between the world and my internal model of it. Only an NPC would argue that the land should conform to the map they make of it.

>The physical explanation is partially covered in the book you read, plus maybe some neurobiology textbooks. The full explanation is still being discovered.

No, that describes a set of physical events correlated with consciousness.

>It's only logically coherent if you assume consciousness to be epiphenomenal, which is the faulty assumption your whole worldview rests on. A materialist would argue that a physically identical world would produce the same qualia

You're missing the point. The point is that the physicalist couldn't explain why it is LOGICALLY incoherent to imagine an identical world with philosophical zombies, without explaining how the consciousness supervenes on the physical, which materialism has never been able to do.

>The point is that the physicalist couldn't explain why it is LOGICALLY incoherent to imagine an identical world with philosophical zombies, without explaining how the consciousness supervenes on the physical, which materialism has never been able to do.

Can you read? He already said

>A materialist would argue that a physically identical world would produce the same qualia

It's logically incoherent that an identical world would fail to produce the same qualia

Consciousness supervenes on the physical in the same way a computer's software supervenes with it's hardware. It is logically incoherent to imagine a world with philosophical zombies in the same way it's logically incoherent to imagine the website Yea Forums without the web.
>No, that describes a set of physical events correlated with consciousness.
This is bad faith arguing. I can use this logic to say all phenomena is epiphenomenal, and we're merely observing physical correlations. Friction doesn't cause heat, it's only physically correlated. If the only bar is imagining, then I'm imagining a world with heatless friction right now.

>It's logically incoherent that an identical world would fail to produce the same qualia

It's not logically incoherent if you can't explain how consciousness supervenes on the physical.

Again point out a consciousness without a material component. That's the 4th time I've asked and you keep dodging.

Consciousness supervenes on the physical in the same way a computer's software supervenes with it's hardware. It is logically incoherent to imagine a world with philosophical zombies in the same way it's logically incoherent to imagine the website Yea Forums without the web.

To keep things clear, let's keep discussion of supervenience global rather than local. We can describe websites in purely physical terms. You cannot explain the experience of the colour red in purely physical terms. Refer to the "What did Mary know" thought experiment.

>This is bad faith arguing. I can use this logic to say all phenomena is epiphenomenal, and we're merely observing physical correlations. Friction doesn't cause heat, it's only physically correlated. If the only bar is imagining, then I'm imagining a world with heatless friction right now.

It can be physically explained how friction causes heat, and this would be understandable even to someone who has never experienced heat. Can you physically explain your experience of the colour red by describing the behaviour of your neurons? Would someone who hasn't experienced the colour red be able to understand from this what the experience of the colour red is like, simply by learning how neurons behave when such an experience occurs?

Because it's a nonsequitur argument, as I've already explained. It's never been proven that any consciousness has a physical component.

>It can be physically explained how friction causes heat, and this would be understandable even to someone who has never experienced heat. Can you physically explain your experience of the colour red by describing the behaviour of your neurons? Would someone who hasn't experienced the colour red be able to understand from this what the experience of the colour red is like, simply by learning how neurons behave when such an experience occurs?

Electromagnetic radiation with the dominant wavelength of approximately 625–740 nanometres. If someone can understand heat from a physical explanation they will be able to understand red from that

>It's never been proven that any consciousness has a physical component.

Except that every example of consciousness we can point to has a physical component. Can you prove that matter can't give rise to consciousness without assuming that it can't?

>If someone can understand heat from a physical explanation they will be able to understand red from that
Not that poster but no, that's wrong. Understanding that "this color is associated with this wavelength" tells you absolutely nothing about what it's like to perceive red as distinct from another color, quantifying something in numerical terms provides no information as to the QUALITATIVE experience of that, since the qualitative experience of red isn't a number.

Understanding a qualia is not the same as experiencing it. What you're describing is a quirk of language. In the same way, you cannot make someone experience shitposting or dubs just by describing the physical processes that enable them.
Let me stick a hook in your brain, and you can tell me how much it affects your conscious. If this is mere coincidence, then so is the heat produced by friction.
And expanding on this, you could explain red to a blind person by taking the idea of extracting information from the senses in the same way they already extract spatial information through touch, Then you could describe color as one such type of information, and so on. No, this isn't the same as actually 'experiencing' red. But language is just information about qualia, not the qualia itself.

You don't understand. He explicitly said
>It can be physically explained how friction causes heat, and this would be understandable even to someone who has never experienced heat
If heat can be explained in that QUANTITATIVE way red certainly can be explained to the wavelength of light.

>Except that every example of consciousness we can point to has a physical component.
No, those are all just things that people are attempting to associate with consciousness but without actually showing any relation of identity or causation between them and consciousness.

Again refer to this user's comment This is bad faith arguing. I can use this logic to say all phenomena is epiphenomenal, and we're merely observing physical correlations. Friction doesn't cause heat, it's only physically correlated. If the only bar is imagining, then I'm imagining a world with heatless friction right now.

Understanding a qualia is not the same as experiencing it. What you're describing is a quirk of language. In the same way, you cannot make someone experience shitposting or dubs just by describing the physical processes that enable them.

The fact that the only example you could come up with involved conscious experience completely invalidates your point. Yes, exactly, "you cannot make someone experience X just by describing the physical processes that enable them". And theres the rub.

>Let me stick a hook in your brain, and you can tell me how much it affects your conscious. If this is mere coincidence, then so is the heat produced by friction.

It's not a question of coincidence. The problem is that the relationship between brain and consciousness doesn't explain phenomenal experience. A physical explanation of how friction causes heat, however, would be entirely conclusive.

>Understanding a qualia is not the same as experiencing it. What you're describing is a quirk of language. In the same way, you cannot make someone experience shitposting or dubs just by describing the physical processes that enable them.

The fact that the only example you could come up with involved conscious experience completely invalidates your point. Yes, exactly, "you cannot make someone experience X just by describing the physical processes that enable them". And theres the rub.

>Let me stick a hook in your brain, and you can tell me how much it affects your conscious. If this is mere coincidence, then so is the heat produced by friction.

It's not a question of coincidence. The problem is that the relationship between brain and consciousness doesn't explain phenomenal experience. A physical explanation of how friction causes heat, however, would be entirely conclusive.

>It's not a question of coincidence. The problem is that the relationship between brain and consciousness doesn't explain phenomenal experience. A physical explanation of how friction causes heat, however, would be entirely conclusive.

This goes to something Dennett said. An explanation of something has to at some point refer to something else or it's not an explanation. You can't explain red by referring to other red things. You don't want to admit that consciousness can be explained by matter so you've given up on consciousness having an explanation.

>The problem is that the relationship between brain and consciousness doesn't explain phenomenal experience. A physical explanation of how friction causes heat, however, would be entirely conclusive.

A physical explanation of consciousness with the same level of predictive capability as the statistical mechanics explanation of heat would certainly explain consciousness. To think otherwise is to just refuse that consciousness could be explained.

>This goes to something Dennett said. An explanation of something has to at some point refer to something else or it's not an explanation. You can't explain red by referring to other red things. You don't want to admit that consciousness can be explained by matter so you've given up on consciousness having an explanation.

But you're looking at it backwards. The point is that I would still have a phenomenal experience of the colour red even if I had nothing else to refer to it. Someone who was deaf, dumb, and illiterate would still have phenomenal experiences, despite not having any concept of language, because experiences gives us knowledge (and it is not incorrect to call it knowledge, as someone who has always been blind clearly doesn't "know" what is like to see) even if we have no way of referring to them. There would still be something it is like to be someone who does not have language and has no concept of explanations. But this is only the case with phenomenal experiences. With everything else, as you say, you can only understand things by explanations that refer to other things. So in this sense conciousness is fundamental, and cannot be explained materialistically.

>A physical explanation of consciousness with the same level of predictive capability as the statistical mechanics explanation of heat would certainly explain consciousness. To think otherwise is to just refuse that consciousness could be explained.

It could explain awareness, but it cannot explain consciousness. Note that awareness is distinct from consciousness. We can say that are car with parking sensors is "aware" of nearby objects, but that prove it is having phenomenal experiences of said objects.

that prove doesn't it is having phenomenal experiences of said objects.*

No you're looking at it backwards. You still refuse to admit that qualia can be materially referred to. The deaf, dumb, and illiterate person could still be prompted to point out red objects through examples. That you avoided the obvious example of color blindness is telling as well. The supposedly inaccessible qualia of color is being mediated by the very material defect in a person's eyes.
There is no physically disconnected qualia or consciousness. Every example of qualia or consciousness that we have is connected in some way to matter. The lack of explanation you claim exists between matter and consciousness could equally be attributed to conscious existence from one second to the next.

>We can say that are car with parking sensors is "aware" of nearby objects, but that doesn't prove it is having phenomenal experiences of said objects.

If I say you're aware of this conversation but not conscious of it how would you refute me? Your position is indistinguishable from solipisim.

>I can use this logic to say all phenomena is epiphenomenal, and we're merely observing physical correlations. Friction doesn't cause heat, it's only physically correlated.
This may surprise you but this is an actual philosophical problem that Hume addressed and determining whether causation actually exists is trickier than you're assuming. For the materialist the problem with consciousness is doubly tricky because their worldview deliberately brackets out phenomenal experience to explain things in purely abstract terms.

>There is no physically disconnected qualia or consciousness
You have no idea of the actual link though. You don't know whether matter creates mind or mind creates matter. The physical brain could just as easily be a projection of mental states as the other way around. The fact that there exists a correlation between thoughts and the physical processes of the brain is a long way from proving that mind is a product of physical processes only (and then you have the issue of how "mind" is actually physical at all)

It doesn't surprise me and it's not a point in your favor if when confronted with a physical explanation of consciousness you have to retreat to well no one can really explain anything. Incidentally you may also be interested to know Hume also had something to say about consciousness and identity see his bundle theory. For Hume consciousness without properties doesn't exist.

>No you're looking at it backwards. You still refuse to admit that qualia can be materially referred to. The deaf, dumb, and illiterate person could still be prompted to point out red objects through examples.

You are missing the point of the argument. The point is that while everything else must be understood via references to other things, we do not require references to experience qualia. However, every attempt to describe qualia will involve references to other things, and so will inherently fall short of explaining it.

>If I say you're aware of this conversation but not conscious of it how would you refute me? Your position is indistinguishable from solipisim

I would say that I can't prove it to you, but it seems highly likely to me that human beings are conscious, simply because I am human and I'm extrapolating from there.

>The physical brain could just as easily be a projection of mental states as the other way around
It's all just a dream bro. Give me a break if this is the type of argument you're retreating to I think I've made my point.

“Tell me,” the great twentieth-century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein once asked a friend, “why do people always say it was natural for man to assume that the sun went around the Earth rather than that the Earth was rotating?” His friend replied, “Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going around the Earth.” Wittgenstein responded, “Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?”

>You are missing the point of the argument. The point is that while everything else must be understood via references to other things, we do not require references to experience qualia. However, every attempt to describe qualia will involve references to other things, and so will inherently fall short of explaining it.

You conveniently cut off my statement about color blind people. They don't have experience of the qualia of red since their eyes don't have the receptors for it. How could they experience red without having a reference? This is in direct contradiction to you claiming we don't require references to experience qualia.

>I would say that I can't prove it to you, but it seems highly likely to me that human beings are conscious, simply because I am human and I'm extrapolating from there.

So let me get this straight, the person that has been arguing that matter can't explain consciousness is telling me that since my human form is similar to his I must be conscious too?

A famous example that shows the error of trusting in intuition. You would do well to consider it

You conveniently cut off my statement about color blind people. They don't have experience of the qualia of red since their eyes don't have the receptors for it. How could they experience red without having a reference? This is in direct contradiction to you claiming we don't require references to experience qualia.

How could they experience red they did have a reference?

>So let me get this straight, the person that has been arguing that matter can't explain consciousness is telling me that since my human form is similar to his I must be conscious too?

Please tell me more about why you think it is so difficult to prove that I am conscious.

You think materialism is less intuitive than idealism?

>How could they experience red did they have a reference?

If you're color blind you can't experience the qualia red since you don't have a reference. This contradicts you saying we do not require references to experience qualia. You're wrong

>Please tell me more about why you think it is so difficult to prove that I am conscious.

It's easy for me to say your conscious since I believe in the ability to identify consciousness in matter and communication. You don't and are the one indistinguishable from solipism here

>You conveniently cut off my statement about color blind people. They don't have experience of the qualia of red since their eyes don't have the receptors for it. How could they experience red without having a reference? This is in direct contradiction to you claiming we don't require references to experience qualia.

user, the entire point he's making is you can't know qualia with or without a reference, unless you experience. That's the definition of qualia.

And the point I'm making is that there is no qualia without a reference to something which he disagreed with. Qualia and consciousness are a consequence of matter. If you don't believe so give me an example not connected to matter