ITT: People who btfo'd Parmenides and Shankara using pure logic

ITT: People who btfo'd Parmenides and Shankara using pure logic

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show me one (1) portion from any of Plato's dialogues that btfo Shankara, Parmenides is a different story because his works dont survive fully intact so we can't know whether or not there were other aspects of his thought that would rescue him from a btfo'ing

Here's this fragment from the Theaetetus dialogue:
>Soc. I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light-there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which "becoming" is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers-Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this.

Plato's Sophist 249

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>People who btfo'd Parmenides and Shankara using pure logic
Redundant, they btfo'd themselves

or better 248a to 249d

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>hard mode: explain how

that doesnt btfo Shankara at all

>For heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?
That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.
>But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?
How can we?
>But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?
But how else can it possess them?
>Then shall we say that it has mind and life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?
All those things seem to me absurd.
>And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.
Of course.
>Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.
Exactly.
>And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.
How so?
>Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?
Not at all.
>What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?
By no means.
>And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.
Certainly.
>Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honor to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal motion; he must quote the children's prayer, “all things immovable and in motion,” and must say that being and the universe consist of both.

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it actually does

how?

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>how?

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>being afraid to rephrase or summarize the argument in your own words, the onus of which is upon you, knowing that it will expose you as not knowing what you are talking about

Any instance of change or duality necessarily refutes a system that claims reality is non-dual. Adding the magic of maya on top of that to explain away change using a non-explanation is a massive cope.

That's not an argument or a refutation though because any instance of change or duality according to Shankara is only peceived through the intellect, which is subject to the Plato's cave of Maya, and hence empirical observations obtained through it cannot be counted on to provide accurate inferences about absolute reality, this is a very basic point

If reality is nondual there cannot be an intellect and things that it perceives. That's two things, a dual opposition between intellect and what it perceives. Stop btfo'ing yourself.

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diogenes

Advaita affirms the empirical and conditional reality of phenomena and the subject-object duality but denies that they enjoy absolute reality; they use the metaphor of the rope mistakenly perceived as a snake as an example of how something which presents itself to the mind and senses as real can still be unreal in reality
>If reality is nondual there cannot be an intellect and things that it perceives.
The intellect (which is not the Atma) is taken to be a product of Maya and is regarded as conditionally real but ultimately unreal. There is no contradiction because the intellect/mind is held to not actually exist in ultimate reality, there would only be a contradiction if the intellect and its notions were regarded as ultimately real, in which case they would violate the non-duality of absolute reality, but since they are not regarded as absolutely real there is no contradiction. You appear to have made the mistake of thinking that Advaita holds the intellect to be absolutely real.
>That's two things, a dual opposition between intellect and what it perceives. both of which are a product of Maya and hence they dont violate any non-duality since they are both accepted as ultimately unreal. All you have done so far is just show that you dont understand what you are trying to refute.

>Implying Plato understood Parmenides

A distinction between absolute reality and non-absolute reality is a dualism. Btfo'd yourself again.

Advaita includes a conditional dualism within itself which gives way to an ultimate non-dualism. Conditional reality only appears due to Maya, and when one fully realizes the truth and is liberated only absolute reality remains, the conditional reality vanishes and its revealed that it never really existed to begin with. You have still failed to refute anything

>Conditional reality only appears due to Maya
Exactly, you fuckin dingus. See and It's literally "fuckin magic, ain't gotta explain shit".

That misusage of the word "absolute" seems like the night in which all cows are black that Hegel used while criticizing Schelling. If both reality and the reasons behind the way phenomena present themselves to the human mind cannot be explained together by the means of a philosophical system, then this system does not explain the totality of everything that there is.

>the night in which all cows are black
Could you explain what this means? I see people reference it all the times and im too brainlet to get it

That's not a bad thing though, Maya can be viewed as the magic of God,, the magic by which He seems to project this vast world while in actuality remaining the only existent thing.
Advaita is pretty different from Schelling so I dont think that analogy applies
>If both reality and the reasons behind the way phenomena present themselves to the human mind cannot be explained together by the means of a philosophical system
Advaita does explain both of those things though