Any philosophers that successfully have refuted Kant’s epistemology?

Fichte
Schelling
Hegel
Schoppy
Husserl
Cassirer (Neo-Kantian with some extensions)
Heidegger

Plenty of Neo-Kantians who articulate Kantian critiques against them.

There is no such thing as an argument in your post.

What are the necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge?

What are the genetic origins of mind and nature?

>stefan molyneux basedboy face

None of them even touched against any of the points in Kant's first Critique. The Second and Third Critiques' claims on morality and beauty can be debated, but the main claims of the first Critique, which are that humans think in terms of categories, have no knowledge of things-in-themselves, and that there are no a priori necessary truths outside of logic or mathematics still hold up.
Kant's Leibnizian claims about the unity of apperception or his uncompromising acceptance of Newtonian mechanics and Euclidean geometry may be debated too, but rejecting those is not equal to rejecting the foundations of the first Critique.

Big Brains on Yea Forums, Can you tell me why it is not a good answer that saying Einstein refuted Kant?

Arguably all post-Kantian philosophers are in some kind of critical relation to him. I guess you could say a few of them take up his transcendental program, clear away some things that appear as juvenilia to us today (like its categorial scheme derived from 18th century rationalist metaphysics), and heighten its essential concepts, for example some of the "back to Kant" people were extremely Kantian in their phenomenalism and scepticism about the noumenal. But most people at least take themselves to be trying to escape from Kant.

The real problem with the escape from Kant crowd though is that most of them end up more like the former group, the Kant-perfecters, without realizing it. Most Heideggerians, Wittgensteinians, Derrideans, and so on, claim loudly to be critiquing a "metaphysics of presence," "Cartesianism," etc., but all they're really doing is critiquing Kant's CATEGORIES, in fact (rightly) critiquing the possibility of presentational or intuitive knowledge of categories at all, and insisting that all knowledge is discursive and therefore linguistic-historical. They will then apply this "everything is discourse!" view to the external world and claim to have overcome Kant's dualism, but all they've really done is reify Kant's dualism ten times over.

A few people who do this will make the additional step of making the genuine metaphysical claim that the world really is, i.e., metaphysically, constituted AS discourse (or whatever they prefer, as long as it's subjective consciousness), and therefore that our knowledge of the world is nondualistic. But this is a monumental and consequently brittle metaphysical claim and it immediately loops back around to being prey to Hume's criticisms of rationalism, which are subsumed under Kant's philosophy (which is the logical conclusion of both Descartes and Hume).

The alternative to simplistically reifying discourse in this way is to begin very openly and explicitly with a metaphysics, or with metaphysical intent. This is what a lot of the immediate post-Kantians tried to do, like Schelling and Hegel. (Fichte is a bit more ambiguous - he is read as both a proto-Schellingean/Hegelian metaphysician and a pragmatist Kantian.) The problem here is that, unless you buy strong right-Hegelian absolute idealism or Schellingean Naturphilosophie, you wind up in some kind of watered-down discourse philosophy again, like a lot of 20th century philosophers who assimilate Hegel as the philosopher of historicism and/or Schelling as the philosopher of the symbol, but take the actual metaphysics of neither thinker seriously.

Of these renewed metaphysical responses to Kant's limitation of discursive knowledge (and the implicit follow-up critique of a "metaphysics of presence," which then limits discursivity even more to linguistic immanence), which can all be summed up simply as modern scepticism, involved the possibility of a) other intellectual faculties and/or b) the cultivation of existing intellectual faculties to higher levels of insight. This is already in Kant: he talks openly about the possibility of "intellectual intuition," which is really just an 18th c. way of phrasing Platonic noesis (and any similar idea of unmediated knowledge of metaphysical forms or verities). He simply discounts it, reasonably enough if he had never experienced it, or if his experiences of it had been recognized by him as such. He talks about mystics etc. like Swedenborg with some sympathy - I think in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, he favourably contrasts outright mystics with rationalists, who don't even claim to have mystical intuition of universals/forms, but simply presume that universals are trivially accessible in normal acts of cognition. At least the mystic is aware of the exceptionality of attaining to such higher knowledge. But Kant just doesn't think such mystical intuition legitimate at the end of the day. He doesn't think it's been done, or that if it has, it certainly hasn't been made accessible to responsible critical/scientific inquiry.

So those are your options, more or less. You can be an arch-Kantian; you can be a crypto-arch-Kantian/Cartesian discourse philosopher who loudly claims not to be a Kantian or Cartesian; you can reify discourse philosophy as a metaphysics post hoc; you can do systematic metaphysics in the old style (but then you fall prey, rightly, to the critiques of both the Kantian and the discourse philosopher, who will accuse you of "dogmatically" hypostatizing language without justification, or at least with only as much justification as any who has come before you, be it Leibniz or Spinoza or Avicenna); OR you can inquire into higher or alternative forms of "intellectual intuition" (mysticism, noesis, various forms of intuitionism, whatever).

For my money, the last approach is the most promising, but if you do it you should be aware that just when you think you've accomplished something, the spectre of Kant is going to appear and ask you to convince him of it too. If your response is "But Immanuel, one of the things I've discovered is precisely that noesis is initiatic, therefore self-transformative, therefore initially self-destructive; your preconception that the knowing subject is a static entity, a 'function' through which data is fed to produce valid cognitions, inherently blocks the real possibility of conceiving an organic subject capable of higher forms of knowledge that would sublate its previous forms of knowledge," you should be aware that his response would probably be "OK, I'm willing to try out your initiatic experiments to a reasonable degree, but you have to understand that I can't spend eternity following your specific sect of your specific mystery religion. Not only could that theoretically go on forever, with you simply saying 'it hasn't clicked for you yet, keep going!' any time I complain, but what is to say YOUR specific sect of YOUR specific mystery religion is the correct one? This other guy is telling me to do a whole different set of initiatic procedures, and so is this guy, and so on. Also, if these procedures are efficacious, why have they never been brought into scientific consciousness and made a 'common possession'? You're telling me that initiation is inherently elitist, inherently restricted to aloof sages? Even if that's true, it would be morally repugnant to me, alien and 'oriental'-seeming to my Enlightenment sensibilities." Just make sure you have an actual response to that. Scoffing and saying "lmao this dumbass Kant doesn't even spirit-talk to Muhammad/Buddha/the Speusippean neo-Pythagorean number-forms/the Absolute/the universal form of 'tree', like I do on a daily basis! If only he had stuck around in my particular cult of my particular religion for 26 years instead of just 25, he would have had the breakthrough to ultimate and final knowledge like me and the other 292 guys who agree with me!" might work for you, but it's not exactly going to rehabilitate wisdom traditions any time soon.

how do knowledge of mathematics/logic fit in here? are these still phenomenal and not noumenal?

Kant-perfecter. What a good term! It's a term that clearly expresses what's in my head I cannot explained.
Can you tell me where you got this term(this idea)?

A = A

Sorry, two typos in this post:
>Of these renewed metaphysical responses to Kant's limitation of discursive knowledge ... involved the possibility ...
should be "Of these renewed metaphysical responses ... the BEST involved the possibility ..."

And
>He simply discounts it, reasonably enough if he had never experienced it, or if his experiences of it had been recognized by him as such.
should be, "... if his experiences of it had NOT been recognized by him as such," i.e., if he had maybe had glimmers of higher insight but didn't recognize them.

The term I just made up as a dumb joke, the idea I guess is just the standard Husserlian/Heideggerian/etc. idea that Kant himself was only really perfecting ideas with certain conclusions already latent in them since at least Descartes, if they were worked out and made determinate. It's the basic idea that there are "operative" concepts (Eugen Fink's term), or just stable preconceptions, in any given philosophical exposition, as contrasted with the "thematic" concepts at the surface. I was just reading Whitehead for fun and he mentions something like this (on p. 49 of the corrected edition of Process and Reality):
>Hume, accepting Descartes' account of perception (in this passage), which also belongs to Locke in some sections of his Essay, easily draws the sceptical conclusion. Santayana irrefutably exposes the full extent to which this scepticism must be carried.
You can see that he thinks Santayana (in the book Scepticism and Animal Faith apparently) bore out the ideas ALREADY latent in Descartes' presuppositions to their logical conclusions. This basic idea pops up everywhere. You might like Popkin's books/articles on scepticism and Burtt's book, Metaphysical Foundations.

Peirce, though I'd call it a serious disagreement it's still more of a refutation than most names mentioned here.

That man is not Kant

>He thinks the Kant goblin was the real Kant
You understand nothing

>since at least Descartes, if they were worked out and made determinate. It's the basic idea
My god, I thought the same thing too. Although I'm never sure about this. Who theorizes this basic idea, Descartes and Kant, is much more closely related than philosophy now explains?

Although I'm great with your response, I think something is wrong here.
>the spectre of Kant is going to appear and ask you to convince him of it too.
Isn't this an impossible thing to do? like literally? One of the triggers that led me, a STEMfag, to read philosophy was the idea that "you can't '''disprove''' anyone who believes in Moon Hoax in any way. The only thing happens, is strictly speaking, is either persuation or ignoring." and this can be exactly happened to Spectre of Kant. That Kantghost will never agree.
And this idea leads to this.
You said there will be "higher or alternative forms of "intellectual intuition"," and you explained very long-ly that it must be dogmatic. But I don't think this is a good analogy. The only thing I thought about reading the history of science was that they were completely retarded. From the Kant point of view, they were incredibly dogmatic. (I mean, just look at Richard Dawkins)
There is something that dogmatic in Kant's sense but still systematic, still non-neosis, still "good" philosophies. Like you just listed Spinoza and Leibniz.
I genuinely think Kant did a wrong thing at depicting Science. Philosophy should be always dogmatic in Kant's sense.
Dogmatism is obviously dangerous. Dogmatism is complete monster, living next to philosophy. But I also don't think there is a way to get rid of dogmatism for sure. I think there is nothing we can do but constantly remind that philosophy is "indulging in brilliant feats of explaining away." (I'm too afraid to say 'we should not do Kant's way')

WOW
CAN*T DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT
HE THOUGHT A = non A
BUT HE WRONG

Dogmatism isn't so much a blanket that everything gets covered by as much as it's a high degree of certainty in regards to one belief or one premise. It's possible to be dogmatic in one's belief in God just as it's possible to simultaneously be at doubt about weather or economic forecasts.

Immanual Kant in English/Danish literally transltes to "i am a manual with edge"

>The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality ‘A’ is not equal to ‘A’. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens—they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the question is not of the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar—a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this true—all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves. A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself “at any given moment”.

>Aside from the extremely dubious practical value of this “axiom”, it does not withstand theoretical criticism either. How should we really conceive the word “moment”? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that “moment” to inevitable changes. Or is the “moment” a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’ signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist.

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Well, Quine handily disposes of the analytic-synthetic distinction. I would add that it isn't sensible to treat the 'form' and 'content' of experience as discrete aspects since no knowledge is possible without both.

His observations/refinements on empiricism and skepticism were fine, but his attempts to infuse idealism were flawed and he established no certainties in this regard.

>Who theorizes this basic idea
Burtt might be your best bet. The last century since Burtt is pretty much people reinventing the wheel. People articulated it even before him too, obviously, but he sets it out really nicely and it's a fun read. Pic related is the first page, for reference.

>Isn't this an impossible thing to do?
>The only thing happens, is strictly speaking, is either persuation or ignoring.
I definitely agree with the pragmatic outlook, like in On Certainty:
>§206. If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same."
>§495. One might simply say "O, rubbish!" to someone who wanted to make objections to the propositions that are beyond doubt. That is, not reply to him but admonish him.
>§609. ... If we call this "wrong" aren't we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs?
>§611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.
>§612. ... At the end of reasons comes "persuasion." (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)

But I think the possible outcomes aren't persuasion/ignoring, but agreement/persuasion/ignoring, where agreement means "one party seeing what the other means," and persuasion meaning something undesirable in this case (since we're talking about real metaphysical truth, so coercion or pragmatic agreement for accomplishing some end are irrelevant).

I don't think Kant would necessarily be incapable of coming to agreement with you, and not even because (like Wittgenstein is saying in OC) all knowledge presupposes an openness to adjusting one's preconceptions anyway. I mean it in the sense that I think Kant was just a decent philosopher and a logician who only discounted intellectual intuition because he thought he had good reasons for doing so. He even seems to regret it a fair bit in the CPR, to me anyway.

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>you explained very long-ly that it must be dogmatic.
I don't think intellectual intuition would be dogmatic, because it wouldn't be a "pure idea of reason," which is a discursive idea in Kant, unjustifiedly/unjustifiably claiming apply to for the world in itself. If intellectual intuition were real, presumably it would be indubitable, although how exactly that works is another question (maybe involving paradoxes). But I DO think that any metaphysics in the traditional sense, like Spinoza's or Leibniz's, is "dogmatic" in the specific sense that Kant means by dogmatism - i.e., ideas of pure reason purporting to legislate for the thing in itself. Some Spinozist might not be dogmatic in the colloquial sense of being bull-headed or something, but I think Kant's epistemological critique that Spinozism is "dogmatism" definitely applies at the logical level. That's why he is kinder to the outright mystics in the Spirit-Seer writing than rationalists of the Spinozist/Leibnizian kind.

I definitely agree about the weird balance between dogmatism and openness in general though. I just read Whitehead's intro with that line you quote, and I didn't find anything I disagreed with re: epistemic pluralism, pragmatism, etc. I think it's very Wittgensteinian too - Wittgenstein (in OC e.g.) is radically doubting whether you can ever make certain, dogmatic statements with finality, but he doesn't therefore want you to go around like a Korzybski-ite never using the word "is," to remind yourself constantly that you can never REALLY say "I know this is the case" or simply "This is the case" with finality. By all means go around being dogmatic, just be ready to break it up at any time. Although I don't necessarily like the "asymptotic" idea of knowledge which Whitehead mentions, that the dialectic goes on forever ("bad infinity").

For the sake of brevity, I suggest you try learning to contradict yourself in a single sentence rather than a paragraph.

That guy is not Kant.
Stop posting him here.
I don't remember that guy's name but he's not Kant.

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Jacobi

Skeptical realism rejects representationalism

You're presupposing "a pound of sugar" to be a necessarily material reality.
Also how could you say the pound of sugar keeps changing if it is never the same pound of sugar? The occurence of change implies something stable which is undergoing the change.

strange, no one has pointed out the philosopher in the room. correlationism BTFO

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No. There’ve been plenty of people who simply take opposing positions but most philosophers in both major traditions accept the basic tenets of CPR. Kant is probably the most influential philosopher next to Aristotle in this regard, and it’s really hard to overstate his ubiquity and influence, hence why it pisses me off any time we try to have a thread about him on Yea Forums and people either reference his metaphysics or try to take up a tone of refutation they nicked from some other thinker when nine times out of ten that thinker is totally working with the Kantian paradigm and would most always admit that. I think Ayn fucking Rand is the only person areogant enough to think she’s sidestepped one of the actual titans of thought. Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Kripke, even someone as batshit as Rorty or Derrida accept some level of Kantianism to get any of their projects off the ground.

I was going to point this guy out as unique in relation to but, one, it’s a failed attempt, sorry, but the guy has to develop his own system first, and, second, his whole is appeal is in presenting the mere possibility of stepping outside of Kant, which, again, he has yet to prove he is able to do. I imagine this is why he won’t publish again for a very long time. I’m sure he’s deeply aware of the severity of the task at hand.

Why do Kantians care about Kant's physical manifestation so much. Isn't that a little inconsistent with his philosophy, both in terms of the deontological ethic of radical honesty and also in the matter of Kant as Ding an Sich?

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Seething dogmatic rage

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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critique_of_the_Kantian_Philosophy

Again, show me the counterposing system. Not one of these autists have had the brainpower to do it so far. Brassier is your only hope, or negerastani if he would stop caring about so much ephemeral bullshit and so-called “research.”

This is your brain on materialism.

Probably the most interesting post I’ve ever read on this board.

Quine wrecks the analytic-synthetic distinction upon which the transcendental deduction rests. It's that simple. Kant is amazing and important but he, like most philosophers, was wrong. Idk why people kept answering after this.

1. put down the adderall.
2. learn that knowing and then using jargon doesn't make you more likely to be right, if anything it probably decreases the chances as you jerk yourself off uncritically to the phrases of past thinkers.
3. Kant is wrong read quine lmao

desu end it all, even if this is bait

What contradiction?

>quine refutes kant
>quine is totally not working within and compounding the kantian system
brainlets actually believe this

Kant's system explained the antinomies, it didn't invent them. This is the whole point of the Critique of Practical Reason lmao

You can work within the Kantian epistemology and still refute his ultimate conclusions

That paper is horribly built upon the false premise that anything that is true is analytic, and that nominal truths are equal to conceptual or substantial truths.

Because Kant's transcendental aesthetic has to do with how objects have to be for them to be knokws to us, or rather how they have to represent themselves to us for us to be able to know them. Even if you go close to some gravity well or travel at the speed of light, where time or space is acting in strange ways that might seem to contradict the transcendental aesthetic, you wouldn't percieve it in that way.

Its like me saying "screens only display RGB lights", and someone coming to me with a video recorded with an infrared camera and being like "okay then explain this, this is showing infrared radiation, which is outside of the spectrum you think screens can represent, pixels btfo"

>OR you can inquire into higher or alternative forms of "intellectual intuition" (mysticism, noesis, various forms of intuitionism, whatever).
I'm not sure you understand what "intellectual intuition" is for Kant. Anyway no, to him intellectual intuition is categorically alien to us, and we can't imagine entities possessing intellectual intuitions either. This is not being an "arch-Kantian" btw, if you don't accept those premises (which are clearly stated in the Trascendental Deduction) you're not in the Kantian in the first place. At that point you might as well pick a metaphysical system at random from the philosophical tradition, too bad Kant already shot down most of their principles in the dialectics part of the first Critique.
>you should be aware that his response would probably be "OK, I'm willing to try out your initiatic experiments to a reasonable degree
Nope, his response would definitely be " I have already proved in the Trascendental Deduction that no such knowldge is possible for us". If you want to shot him down you have to shot down the Trascendental Deduction first.

sophists

Causes in nature are always physical. Space and time are not physical objects but forms of experience. Thus, space and time cannot affect physical objects in the way that relativity posits.

Put simply, to speak of bent or curved space constitutes a paralogism.

Diderot

shut the fuck up

this post is correct (i wrote it)

Bergson already cleared that up when he debated Einstein, and Bergson didn't even think Kant was right
>hint, relativity is an epistemological theory, not a physical one

Voltaire

According to Bergson Kant failed to think time as qualitatively different from space. Kantian time is just a fourth axe of space. While for Bergson space is the medium in which this can be counted, while time is a continuous changing medium, i.e. la durée. Duration changes qualitatively, while space only differs quantitatively.
Time and Free Will by Bergson is where he first makes his move against Kant and refutes this core difference. Later on in Introduction to Metaphysics and Creative Evolution he elaborates on this concept of time and even constructs an epistemology on it, which is the method of intuition.

I know, I said Bergson didn't think Kant was right, but Bergson's objections to the theory of relativity work equally well to defend Kant against Einstein

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>But Immanuel, one of the things I've discovered is precisely that noesis is initiatic, therefore self-transformative, therefore initially self-destructive; your preconception that the knowing subject is a static entity, a 'function' through which data is fed to produce valid cognitions, inherently blocks the real possibility of conceiving an organic subject capable of higher forms of knowledge that would sublate its previous forms of knowledge

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Eh, not really but I can't be bothered to longpost on this topic. Anyway, Kant is easily compatible with relativists notion of space-time unless you assume that time is quantized (this would really mess up simultaneity, destroying the ideality of time with it). Retconning Kant to modern notions of causality is instead borderline impossible, unless you're willing to rework either the categories or their principles.

>I have already proved in the Trascendental Deduction that no such knowldge is possible for us
he didnt though

You and your argument are pandering to non entitities by arguing on behalf of a non entity for the sake of a non entity. >Which is the correct way for EVERYBODY?!?!
>The answer must belong to a cult of intuitive magic
>ok how do we know the “correct” one for the non entity(s)

This has always been the problem with scholasticism. You are all slaves.
I appreciate your great big brain and those really cool words, but in the end your saying- who has time for all that?
I’d like to point out the “who” in that question doesn’t is no one, that munch is determined. You need to reread Derrida and stop postulating like your on top of it

why doesn't brassier want to fall into hegel's trap of absolute correlationism (or maybe process philosophy)? also iirc doesn't he uses laruelle's conceptual apparatus to show that he can? im not sure either if he is able to or has, though i do know that using non-philosophy may not be the most productive start

langan is arrogant enough too, but he appears to take influence from ayn rand so same shit

>he didnt though
Well, that's what you would have to argue if you want to respond to Kant.

>we can't imagine entities possessing intellectual intuitions either

did you read the first critique

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Kierkegaard

Imagination and concievability are different things. You don't have a schemata for intellectual intuitions, nor for the phaenomenical recognition of rational entities with intellectual intuitions. You can think about them, sure, and you can also think about God. That's different from imagining

>"the only clue we have is that is there is a God or primordial being, it would have to have original intuition. The reason is that such a being's cognition must be intuitive, but it could not intuit anything sensibly, as this would be a limitation, which a God could not have"
>yfw Advaita Vedanta escapes Kants criticisms because when it posits the Primordial Being as the inner Self of all beings it answers Kants question of how anyone could possess intellectual intuition by fulfilling Kants requirement that such a being would have to be God

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How about Meillassoux?

Nevermind

Wait, did Parmenides and Guenon BTFO Kant??

>A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself “at any given moment”.
"and I will offer no reply to this utter BTFO"

>>yfw Advaita Vedanta escapes Kants criticisms because when it posits the Primordial Being as the inner Self of all beings it answers Kants question of how anyone could possess intellectual intuition by fulfilling Kants requirement that such a being would have to be God
That's not an "escape", if you argue it this way it's a mere "no u".

He literally does immediatly after, mentioning the two possible meanings of "at a given time". Can you read?

That's... concincing. What ars some good counter-arguments to this?

>Kripke [...] accept[s] some level of Kantianism to get any of [his] projects off the ground.
May you explain what you mean by that?

Imo Kripke is as far away from Kant as you can seriously get. If there are indeed propositions which are true "necessary a posteriori" or "contingent a priori" Kant's whole conception collapses since his assumption that space and time have to be intuitions a priori isn't necessary anymore.

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>necessary a posteriori
what does this mean

lpbp

Idk how you got the “then” part out of that “if” statement. If you actually know the sources we’re referring to here then you know the stakes of making a statement like that. Kripke is luntangling and nuancing epestemic confuaions brought about by usages. It’s all still within the parameters of Kant’s critique.

it doesn't mean anything, it's something that he probably heard in an undergrad lecture or youtube video and is uncritically repeating it.

Read anons pic related. You can do it in a day. Or just google the theory of direct reference.

Bad faith. Kripke is easily the most important philosopher in the anglo tradition in the last hundred years. Only an absolute brainlet would doubt that.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_posteriori_necessity
Sorry, if my English is a little bit rusty and weird - I'm not a native speaker.

You’re not a native and you’ve read Kripke? Kuddos to you man.

Kant claims the following two things:

(a) P is a priori iff P is necessary.

(b) P is a posteriori iff P is contingent.

Kripke gives counterexamples and he is obviously right. Consider the following:
(P1) 'Hesperus' is a proper name that refers to the evening star. 'Phosphorus' is also a proper name and it refers to the morning star. But the evening star and the morning star are the same planetary body (Venus). So both names designate Venus
(P2) If both names designate rigidly, they designate the same object (Venus) in every possible world. Therefore (by the definition of 'necessary') 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is necessarily true. If it is the case that in all possible worlds the identity claim “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is true, the statement is necessary
(P3) The fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus was discovered by empirical observation. So it is a posteriori knowledge. Knowing that Hesperus is Phosphorus cannot have been discovered a priori. Using scientific instruments and empirical research, it was concluded that both Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same object. This is a posteriori knowledge.
(C) Therefore, it is possible for knowledge obtained a posteriori to be necessary. That Hesperus is Phosphorus has been shown to be both necessary, because the names pick out the same thing in all possible worlds, and a posteriori, because this claim was discovered by empirical research.

So Kant is wrong and this whole shtick falls apart, another way.

Where does Kant claim a and b, beyond the mere implication via standardized Modern logic? Literally show me a passage.

>That's not an "escape"
Well, the main criticism of Advaita that I've seen by Kantians is that the Atma-Bodha or 'Self-Knowledge' which it holds to be central to liberation and which Advaita holds to be possible only through immediate spiritual realization roughly comparably with 'intellectual intuition' is that its not possible because such a thing would conform to the categories of thought and as such be a representation and not the reality and/or noumenon. This appears to be Kant admitting that the idea of intellectual intuition is plausible in the case of a God or Primordial Being.

Hence, the teaching which forms the center focus and basis of Advaita fulfills the requirement by which Kant regarded such intuition to be plausible as the inner conscious presence in all beings is held to be that same Primordial Being; and the criticism that such Self-Knowledge would have to conform to the categories of thought and as such not be reality no longer really applies according from the possibility that Kant laid out; or at the very least a loophole is created, and this is unsurprising because to say otherwise would be to imply that the boundaries and limitations of the mind/intellect would apply to or be able to limit God, their creator. This already sort of aligns with Advaita anyways, as Shankara wrote in the 8th century that anything that appears in the intellect as an object of thought is only a representation and not the supreme reality, and that the Primordial Being is the inner Self of living beings who illuminates their intellect like light does an object as something separate from it; and this God attains liberation via a spiritual realization roughly equivalent to intellectual/original intuition which bypasses the normal workings of the mind and sensible intuition.

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I was that the bit you quoted from: didn't mean anything. I like Kripke :)

And also “counterexamples” dont explode the accounts of rudimentary logic, but merely open up the possibility of alternative accounts or alternative ways of knowing (which, of course, is what kripke is really barking up via intuitionism). It sounds like you’re swallowing the Kripke pill a little too hard when even he admits his suggestions only merely bring back the possibility of Cartesian dualism, which of course Kant situates withjn his system.

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these aren't laws of logic lmao have you ever taken a logic class? These are claims about the modality of knowledge.

I don't have my copy of the critique handy, but it's not controversial that Kant held this view. See: plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/modality-epistemology/ and go to the section on Kant.

Logic is the study of formal systems and especially the consequence relation. Thinking that it has anything to do with debates around modality is so telling that you're in over your head.

>I don't have my copy of the critique handy, but

for some reason i really like that this combination of words is being said completely unironically on Yea Forums. i don't even mean this as a bad thing. it's like walking by two people talking and expecting them to be saying some stupid shit, and you catch one of them mid-thought saying "well now, i haven't read tacitus in quite some time, but i seem to recall him saying..."

yeah not shit it’s called hyperbole for dramatic effect dont get all fucking picky with my bitchboi. yeah no shit and im asking you to show me how kripke is radically apart from kant and/or refutes kant? how do instances of referring that supersede traditional notions of analyticity explode the concept all together? how the fuck does the function of intuition and naming eliminate the two a priori sensible intuitions of space and time? i really just dont get how you cant see kripke situated within kant’s framework insofar as kripke could just be enumerating counterexamples approaching the breakdown of the categories (which is fine, kant admits the fact of this) OR expanding the definition of certain faculties which really would just fall under certain mechanism already described by kant. but also hey lets not even get started on the fucking controversy of kripke and how underwhelming N+N actually is. I’ll take Kant’s complex system any day over “hey look, i feel a way about things!” but that’s goalpost moving and ibviously im being lazy and you’re being lazy. not covvinced by your initial statement though i reanimated to look back into kripke as contra kant.

Okay nigger calm yourself down obviously I was overspeaking you got one yay here’s a cookie. As for being in over my head you can right fuck off. I dont see you swinging anything around substantive other than piggybacking off another’s discussion.

>(a) P is a priori iff P is necessary.
>(b) P is a posteriori iff P is contingent.
I don't know if this is actually what Kripke thought, but that isn't Kant's distinction between a priori and a posteriori. Kant claimed that the distinction between the two lies in whether knowledge could be had about the truth of a claim prior to experiencing it. The distinction you are talking about here is analytic/synthetic, but even this isn't right: analytic vs. synthetic is determined by whether the conclusion is contained in the premise. In this case, the notion of Venus is contained as a premise in the notions of Hesperus and Phosphorus, therefore it is an analytic judgement. It is a priori in the Kantian sense because you do not need to experience Venus or Hesperus or Phosphorus in order to verify they mean the same thing, because, as it is an analytic statement, the conclusion is already contained in the premise (even if you are blind and have never seen Venus, if you understand the meanings of the words you know the soundness of the argument). I would imagine Kripke can't be that retarded though, so maybe this is just you fudging his take.

please recommend a convenient synopsis of how kripke sucks, i've always just assumed he sucks

Look at Richard Rorty’s NYRB essay review. Also any refutation of rationalism ever. And the fact that the motherfucker has never done anything ever with his most profound thoughts mostly because he’s autistic as shit.

or LRB, sorry

The general European philosophical view of knowledge as being derived from both observation and logical relations does not seem to be present in Advaita, just like the intrinsically hylomorphist view of humans and other objects (that is to say, believing that there are separate objects/bodies which the universe is made up of, each one of which has its own identity) present in the work of Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Kant seems to be absent from Shankara's work.

It'd be impossible to even formulate the vast majority of the premises present in Kant's critique through the Advaitist framework.

>ctrl+f
>no spengler

It's not in the concept of venus that it's both the morning star and the evening star. The terms are coreferring, but they are intensional as they don't preserve truth value when substituted for each other. For example, Gallileo (this is a fictional example, don't sperg out) could know that the morning star=venus, but not know that the evening star was venus. So, the sentence "Gallileo believed that the morning star was venus is true," but "Gallileo believed the evening star was venus" would be false. So it's not the case that the morning star=the evening star is a priori, analytically true, even though it's necessarily true.

A. Learn English
B. You would right if you knew how to A

hahahahahaahhaahahahahahahahahahahaha rorty is your evidence, contra-kripke. I've never been that big of a fan but if rorty says he's wrong then he must be right lol

>necessarily true
Again, not Kant's standard. You are arguing that if someone didn't actually understand what a particular word meant, or that they didn't understand that two words were actually referring to the same thing; but neither of those disprove Kant's system. He didn't argue for anything like perfect knowledge, he was well aware people can be mistaken...
>fags are gay
>but in the 1600s fag meant sticks
>so in the 1600's fags weren't gay
>therefore logic btfo

Have you read the article? It literally just points out junctures at which Kripke is blatantly puffing up his approach, which just happen to be the usual suspect approaches for any rationalist critique (e.g., intuition doesnt count as true knowledge, counterfactuals are not as straight forward as this salesman would like them to be, there are other options besides “muh intelligible entities”). And Rorty happens to be writing for a nonspecialist public so it works well as a recommendation. Now, if I’m being as much of a scope hog as possible I do literally mean ANY NON RATIONALIST APPROACH IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, not just Rorty, so everyone from Hume all the way to whatever pragmatic fuck is staunching up the university halls today (Brandon i guess is popular). While I did initially sing the praises of Kripke in all honestly it’s like Scott Soames and a few autistic sperglords who do still unrequietedly defend the man to a T. His influence is vast, but his account has long since been challeneged.

>This appears to be Kant admitting that the idea of intellectual intuition is plausible in the case of a God or Primordial Being.
Unfortunately Ideas are not plausible, only concievable. You can think about them, but in the absence of a related schemata, that would be it.
This would reflect on the rest of your post. The theory you've exposed can probably be formulated in coherent terms, but without a schemata this concievability would not constitute knowledge, since we simply could not possibly know wether the concept we're forming actually refers to something. In this sense there's no loophole in the first Critique that could lead to the establishment of ANY theological system.
One last note: what you've described sounds very similar to the move made by Fichte from Kantian philosophy. Kant, of course, personally rejected that move, so you also know that Kant was personally against the argument you've just made (and that it's not just a crazy interpretation of mine).

I beg to disagree.

If you really oversimplify the CPR it's basically a response to Hume's problem of induction (it's much more of course, but like I said, I'm oversimplifying).
Since Kant assumes, there are necessary truths (real sciences) like the truths of mathematics, he has to explain how they're possible. They can't come from experience, since there are no necessary truths a posteriori according to Kant. Therefore, they already have to be in our mind - we don't become aware of something, we apply something to the things instead.
If space and time were "things" outside of us, propositions about spatial or temporal things couldn't be necessarily true, but at least some of them obviously are (as you can see in mathematics). Therefore, space and time have to be intuitions a priori. Out of those intuitions the categories result and so on.

If Kripke is right there's no necessity for space and time to be intuitions a priori - we could also experience them without putting the possibility of for example mathematical thruths in jeopardy. Therefore, the very base of Kant's conception wouldn't be necessary anymore.

(Of course, there's a second foundation for Kant's assumptions which is his opposition to Berkeley's arguments about space - but a lot of people think he doesn't reproduce Berkeley's position very well, and I'm not a big expert on Berkeley, too, so I can't judge that.)

Nietzsche called him chinaman from königsberg.
That should do it!

thanks for this recommendation

>Just when it seemed that the dialectic which Kant began had culminated in universal acceptance of the relaxed pragmatism of Wittgenstein and Quine,
>Philosophers raised on Frege and Russell are so habituated to this Kantian way of thinking that the very idea that some properties of a thing are necessary ones – properties a thing could not lack while remaining the same thing – has seemed merely a Gothic curiosity, the last enchantment of the Middle Ages.
>The coarseness and brutality of this sort of semantics can only be appreciated by those who have lived in lotus-land, exulting in their Kantian-Goodmanian freedom to create worlds.

love these lines, rorty is a nice writer

>kripke: ‘a direct intuition of the rigidity of names, exhibited in our understanding of the truth conditions of particular sentences’ (page 14)
>Kripke’s usual strategy, however, is not to look for knockdown arguments. Instead, he appeals to the greater ‘intuitive’ appeal of his view. He asks his reader to cleave to untutored intuition and resist the false sophistication of the schools.

what the fuck, i still don't understand kripke then. is he really pointing to some kind of ultra naive realism?

That would only be fair if he was just a cosmologist.

This is the sort of refutation I’ve been waiting to sink my teeth into. Thanks user. Now I’ll have to re-read the relevant sections on both, but I’m not convinced the upshot of Kripke’s count is a bonafide security of “mathematical truths” and other high-level abstract entities, namely space and time, right? His account works as far as naming and reference is concerned, not for the actual ontological content of the entities referred to. It’s still restricted to the Fregean-Russellean scope, shit like “gold” and “atomic no. X” and “hesperus” and “venus.” Akin to the gold or the Hesperus examples, how would we begin to experience space and time necessarily a posteriori? I can’t wrap my head around that further move.

Kripke just really, really, really wants us all to be Cartesians so he can justify a life spent doing weak math.

What is his epistemology? Give me a quick rundown.

lol are you fucking serious dude. CPR is 700+ pages.

A few posts at the top of the thread explain it quite well.

he wrote his own quick rundown user

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Most of it is arguing against metaphysical dogmatism, or attempting to think of how different things can fit into his system, not an actual explanation of his epistemology, which is mostly present in the Introduction, Transcendental Aesthetic, and Analytic.

>I’m not convinced the upshot of Kripke’s count is a bonafide security of “mathematical truths” and other high-level abstract entities, namely space and time, right?
Absolutely. He doesn't attack Kant directly and he doesn't mind space and time and if they're intuitions a priori at all. He aims at something completely different.

>The general European philosophical view of knowledge as being derived from both observation and logical relations does not seem to be present in Advaita
It is included though but they it is just denied that they really exist as objects in absolute reality, which they consider God. Advaita doesn't deny that there is an empirical world, they have a theory of elements where the elements are emanted from God to form a conditionally-real hylomorphist world of different bodies where each body operates under some kind of substance dualism where there is something called a 'subtle body' which houses the intellect and which exists formlessly in the subtle realm of manifestation, the subtle body receives the input of the organs from the outside world as presents them as representations in the mind, like Kant, it is critical idealist in this regard and stills affirms the empirical existence of the world perceives by the sense. Shankara in his works attacks late-Yogachara thinkers for rejecting the world represented in the mind as not being real or existing empirically, as being completely unreal and non-existent. However, Advaita also accepts on the authority of the Upanishads that the inner conscious Self which witnesses the activity of the intellect as something separate from it is the same unchanging God that the elements appeared to emanate from, and that with meditation on the essence of the scriptures that are likewise an emanation of God, that the Self can return to the state it always exists in as eternal Bliss by essentially waking up from the dream of otherwise.

"Four factors are involved in an external perception (according to Advaita): the physical object, the sense organ, the mind (antaḥkarana) and the cognizing self (pramata). The cognizing self alone is self-luminous and the rest of the three factors are not self-luminous being devoid of consciousness. It is the mind and the sense organ which relates the cognizing self to the object. The self alone is the knower and the rest are knowable as objects of knowledge"
iep.utm.edu/adv-veda/

Advaita isn't the same as Fichte and doesn't try to establishment any system based on the similar points about the mind as laid out by Kant like Fichte did. It's foremost concerned is the correct exegesis of the Upanishads which is why Shankara often criticizes early Hindu schools for not fully aligning with them. There is a philosophical aspect because Shankara also often writes about how a lot of Advaita doctrine accords with basic phenomenology and there is an ontological argument for Advaita found in the Mandukya Karika although all of that is secondary, Shankara attacked 'logicians' as fools and wrote that relying on reasoning independent of scriptures is ultimately fallible.

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I think it will have something to do with a retrieval/discovery of an extrasectarian, post-'enlightenment' spirit which will not be a random picking out or misunderstanding/overriding/disregarding of particularity and traditions a la Traditionalism, but acknowledging in some way philosophia perennis without being able to hew to some presumed meaning of philosophia. This involves interrogating the ordinary and disregarded, the normal that seems to call for more and more impossible escapes until we get to Kant and us post-Kantians who can only conceive of a god/alien or larping as alternative. How is this standpoint related to everything else we do and are? Where does it begin really, what does it draw from? Why does Kant call Plato's philosophy Schwärmerei as opposed to Aristotle's Arbeit? How much does he really even understand the latter? These seem like questions the twentieth century has allowed us to ask. There is an 'internal' dialectic here that I think makes leading with initiation in response to Kant an error. You're right, we shouldn't be satisfied with the 292-internet-message-board-poster dialectic instead. So Stanley Rosen, phenomenologists like Scheler, thomists/neo-aristotelians like de Koninck, weirdo german idealists like Baader, historians, the ancients themselves have relevance here before we have made something like the appeal you mention, even if we are led to something like it thereupon.

it's amazing that you still don't know what logic means

yeah his theory of language isn't right but there's just about universal convergence that he's right about there being a posteriori necessity. i'm surprised you know who scott soames is lol

>you don't understand Kant
>y-you don't understand logic!
did it help you feel better about yourself user?

you've made this same mistake of thinking that claims about the modality of knowledge are claims about logic. Which no one who has ever taken would think.

I used the word logic once in a meme to mock you, please tell me all about the claims you derived from this

I can explain, again, what logic is but I don't think it will work. Giving counter-examples to Kant's schema aren't counter-examples to logic. It's not complicated.

assumed it's the same person

I agree that universals are unlikely to exist in the concrete, but that isn't really the point imo. Logic is based upon apparent consistent relations in our experience, but from there it becomes an abstract self-referential system in which universals are valid and useful (like math). The efficacy of such logic in aiding us to understand and manipulate the concrete -- even if it relates abstractly to that reality -- has been well demonstrated.

So yes, it's important to understand that when we view objects as identical, we're actually talking about a trope (they aren't truly identical, but they share much similarity). It's also important however, to acknowledge pragmatic equivalence and avoid gross contradictions, which our abstracted logic helps us to do.

'Kantian system' is rather aggrandizing. Philosophy arrived at the impasse of empricism being the only conduit to knowlege + technical caveats of sketpicism long before Kant. He just organized and refined the language. The aspect that does define his 'system' -- which is his brand of idealism -- was something he utterly failed to demonstrate. Furthemore, countering an argument with its own language is often efficient and does not equate to adpotion of that argument (which should be obvious).

Yes, our perception is fundamentally rooted in experience of space and time (no matter how much subsequent perceptual variation occurs between and within individuals). However, this observation does not actually demonstrate the existence of any kind of 'transcendental form', as that would require divorcing the 'form' from the 'content' of experience -- an assumption which there is no probable justification for.

Wrong. His position is that knowledge isn't possible without experience. Kant also knew this, but instead of ham-fistedly justify idealism with spurious distinctions, Quine observes that all knowledge (and truth) is ultimately synthetically derived. Even abstract analytical functions are rooted in experienced relations and collateral information, and so the whole analytic/synethic distinction is
a pointless misdirection.

>ctrl f
>Bolzano
>zero results
Not surprising coming from such a cesspool as Yea Forums but come on.
This is your answer OP. Bolzano is the anti-kant.

>google search
>town in italy
A real show stopper, user.

>If both names designate rigidly, they designate the same object (Venus) in every possible world.
Terrible example considering they don't. The two names refer to sensory aspects that could be very well not refer to the same object. There are worlds where the two names/sensory aspects that are related to two different stars.
If you can consistently imagine two sensations being related as well as not the objects you tie them to can't be identified of necessity. Besides, two different sensations in general can always be conceived in different objects.
Of course you can decide to rigidly attach names (as symbols) to objects through possible worlds, but in that case you lose the semantic content originally put in the words. I realize kripke autism is more concerned about the symbols, but 99.9% of people spontaneously understand 'morning star' and 'evening star' to be the relevant bits and these can perfectly be separated in a possible world.
Even with sensory content of the same essence, the morning star and evening star cannot be identified necessarily.

>Rand didn't btfo Kant at all by withdrawing back into the Aristotelian naïve realist paradigm which had been so strongly criticized both by Kant's predecessors (Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Hume) and Kant himself.
Except She did because They were wrong with criticizing it and each and every one of them has been un time outed as a brainlet.

I should have known a thread for pseuds wouldn't even have heard of him.
Stick with kant in the end, he's adequate for your level.

Unironically yes.

What is his epistemeology?

sum it up

Also, regarding Rant and Kand:

>both converge in naive realism
>both are bestially misanthropic
>both are criminally philistine in their ignorance of dialectic
>both are extremely morally prescriptive
>both are anti-theist
>both are hypocritically anal
>both are ugly and feeble

Which is which again?

Kant proposed an unfalsifiable pseudoscience that was BTFO by the scientific method along with all continentals, so no one cares about him outside of scum academic philosophers who need to perpetuate his teachings to steal money from naive students

Probably the most ridiculous samefagging I've read on this board

Regarding Kant:

>both converge in naive realism
Kant isn't a naive realist tho
>both are bestially misanthropic
Kant's Moral Law poses practical love towards other rational entities as a duty.
>both are criminally philistine in their ignorance of dialectic
Care to expand on this? Also what do you specifically refer to when you say dialectics? Platonic philosophy? Hegelian?
>both are extremely morally prescriptive
How can a moral law not be prescriptive?
>both are anti-theist
Kant rejects the polemical use of the Idea of God (you can't say that a theist God does not exist), and also accepts said Idea as a foundation for practical reason.
>both are hypocritically anal
As hom
>both are ugly and feeble
Who cares

haha oh wow i didn't realize how basic these philosophers were

>implying nonlinear model necessitates 'randomness'

>dogmatism
you can't stop the manifestation and proliferation of a priori knowledge since it is the spine of your existence.
this is a sphere and everything turns to meet itself again, this has all happened before and your body is not so willing to forget as your mind.
true dogmatism comes from genetic purpose applicable to yourself. just because your genetics are weaker and feel the imposition of others' purposes, false dogmatism to you may be, doesn't mean you can eschew the concept of dogmatism and go on living.
you want to negotiate it because it doesn't apply well to your psychology, you don't even consider it in relation to your genetics, perhaps because you are so devoted to denying a priori knowledge.
yes you are a 'leftist', you deny the role of genetics making the man.
what you think is noumena is not, there are intermediaries governed by the celestial bodies. true noumena is in the voids between, their histories, their expulsions lost maybe forever, none the less retaining the ability to coalesce as the celestial bodies have done, and the celestial bodies retain the ability to disperse to the void, and there is discourse between them constantly and for ever.
A thing's presence is knowledge of it. If it manifests proximately then this is significant. That every aspect of its expression is perceived is irrelevant to perceiving the whole, because the whole already touched you earlier, at some point you were bound in the womb with this thing, and you know it and need only a reminder.
some people lack the dogmatism to accept this. might will make right.

what follies you come into disregarding the necessity to ascribe a physical cause to your thoughts

>what is the ultimate significance of morality?
morality is the system of bias imposition toward a race-purpose - mental, genetic, 'noumenal'/'pre-genetic'
the ultimate significance of morality is victory in battle over inferior morality, forcing the inferior to divulge secrets to its preservation, assimilating them, and forcing the inferior to accept your will and modify its morality to benefit yours

there is no end, it goes around forever as the stars coaelsce and collapse and mix and coaelsce again and so forth. There is no end to time in this realm

Serious answer:
There are no arguments that have refuted Kant, because he is right (you can't prove a true statement false).

dumb retard

shut the fuck up your post is completely wrong and based on absolute nothing other than some arbitrary scenario that was created as a fudge factor for unphilosophizing retard number crunchers

THIS is how its done
this leads to the truth

>relativity is an epistemological theory, not a physical one

The statement "causes in nature are always physical" is false.
QFT and QM are local, stochastic, non-realist, and continuous, but they are not physical.

those aren't causes of anything you retard they are a method for accounting of things that cause things what are you fucking retarded

The point is there is no "thing that causes" the stochastic nature and collapse of a particle during measurement of it, it's an objectively nonphysical thing that causes a physical action. So the statement "all things in nature are physical" is empirically wrong. What are you, fucking retarded?

More precisely, "causes in nature are always physical"
No they arent, there are many things in nature that are nonphysical and nonrealist but cause physical changes in the universe.

>just believe QFT
>there are many things in nature that are nonphysical and nonrealist but cause physical changes in the universe
>don't give any examples just believe QFT

The examples are every single experiment ever done testing the theories of QFT and QM.
there has never been a single piece of evidence that contradicts QFT. It along with GTR are the most thoroughly tested scientific theories ever and they have NEVER been contradicted. QFT is a nonrealist, stochastic theory.
So you have to accept that there are nonphysical causes to physical systems. Reality isn't solely physical.

there's no proof their conjecture is valid
absence of proof of invalidity is not proof of validity

>le meme science boy
fuck off

Metaphysics has to follow from physics.

>he unironically says this while trying to justify physics with metaphysics
sure why not

This post here doesn't salvage physicalism, user.

>I'm right trust me
finally the mask is off, you dumb animal

I'm right because physicalism isn't empirically supported you dumb animal. Getting angry at this and arguing semantics doesn't change this fact.
You are presupposing physicalism must be necessary a priori but it doesn't need to be and evidence indicates that it isnt.

>i observed something and made up a story about how it happened
>trust me bro I verified it empirically

>trying to call me angry because I called you out for having no support and no argument
>ur angry so you cant b rite lel i win
this is business as usual for these animals

The closest thing is Chomsky who in some ways is a development of Kant, but really reaches back to Hume and creates something new. His generative grammar type stuff is a lot further reaching than people often realise.

On the continental side you have Derrida to some degree, also Shopenhauer and Nietzsche and maybe Freud (cannot remember my Freud well enough off the top of my head). Schopenhauer reverses Kant p much and Nietzsche riffs on this a lot. In some ways they're a throwback/return to the Platonism of Timaeus.

Ok you're grasping at straws now.
There is a litany of research on this and on how physical explanations aren't possible due to predicted vs experimentally verified energy values in the state position of particles. This isn't just conjecture.

I have literally all evidence from all experiments ever conducted. Every physics department in every university over the past 100 years. You have nothing but "B-but that can't be true where's the argument" I'm giving you the reason right now retard.

you are utterly mired in semantics and have totally lost sight of any purpose
>LOOK AT THE DATA
not an argument in any case

should have ended this with fuck off, you're literally retarded

YOU are the one mired in semantics you projecting brainlet.
IF the causes of quantum phenomena were purely physical then there would be energy and mass differences in the the findings of the experiments because the energy and mass would change the values of the state position. We find that this does not happen, proving that there are behaviors that are not explainable using physical mechanisms.
This is not semantics, this is not conjecture. All you have is denial because your metaphysics is not supported by the evidence. Physical systems at the quantum level are empirically affected by non physical things. This is not conjecture, retard.
The only counter argument you have for this is "that can't be true! You can't make metaphysical arguments using empirical observation" which proves you're a fucking projecting retard pseudo intellectual.

>physical
>not semantics

>the energy and mass would change the values of the state position
prove it

you have no argument you're just blithering

>I CANT SEE IT THEREFORE IT DOESN'T EXIST
you need death swiftly

???

If you mean to define "physical" as anything other than "mass and energy" then you're using a definition that is not what physicalism is anyway, and you're proving yourself wrong.
>>the energy and mass would change the values of the state position
>prove it
Bell already did. What Bell's theorem shows is that local realist theories predict correlations that are smaller than the larger correlations predicted by quantum mechanics (and seen experimentally). So local realist theories are excluded. This was proven back in the 70's.
From here people may say "but non local variables could be a physical explanation!" However then General Relativity steps in and shows that there is no such thing as FTL communication between objectse in the universe, meaning that non-local theories are also falsified.
Thus we accept that the universe is local and nonrealist.
>>I CANT SEE IT THEREFORE IT DOESN'T EXIST
>you need death swiftly
It not being physical doesn't mean it doesn't exist you literal fucking sniveling moronic retard. That's the fucking point - there are things that objectively exist that are nonphysical. Physicalism can not explain the behavior (they tried and were btfo in the 70s), that does NOT mean they don't exist, it means there are things that DO exist that are not physical.
You can't even understand the core of my argument and yet you're trying to debate that it must be wrong. Genuine question, what's the highest level of formal mathematics training you've achieved?

>but non local variables could be a physical explanation!
>General Relativity
and what meme justifies that one, and so on

>there are things that objectively exist that are nonphysical.
>still no example

im done

I just fucking gave you the example you sniveling fucking retard. I JUST GAVE YOU the example, that energy values of the particle do not correlate with physical experimentation if it's caused by a physical mechanism, I JUST GAVE IT TO YOU YOU FUCKING PSEUDO INTELLECTUAL RETARD.

>Genuine question, what's the highest level of formal mathematics training you've achieved?
tries to appeal to authority and then rages
dirty rotten animal and nothing more

the energy value is not a thing. its an inference. you don't know what the thing is and you're trying to define it completely with partial information and block out any other possible explanation with braindead dogma and zero argument

If you're arguing that energy isn't a thing and just an inference than you're arguing against physicalism you moron. "Appeal to authority" isn't a valid counter, because this isn't a case where argument from authority is being used fallaciously.
Also, we do know what the thing is, QM is not a partial theory it completely explains the mechanism of quantum behavior and has literally never been proven wrong a single time in the millions of experiments that have been conducted. You're the one arguing braindead dogma ("physicalism MUST BE TRUE NO NOOOO WHAT DO YOU MEAN IT DOESN'T HOLD UP TO SCRUTINY") and you've not made a single argument other than saying that I'm being "semantic" (when you are the only one here arguing from semantics, thus you're projecting).
You refuse to accept the argument from actual evidence. You will never make it and you will never find truth, enlightenment, fulfillment, or happiness.

you refuse to contextualize your 'evidence' because you do not understand it at all

>QM is not a partial theory it completely explains the mechanism of quantum behavior
>it completely explains itself in its own terms only and exclusively
impressive magic, where do you learn this wizard

>outed as a brainlet
>unlike Rand
kek, Rand posting is a meme right?

not him but Hempel's dilemma comes into play here

You refuse to accept the implications of the evidence so you pretend that the flaw is in contextualization rather than a flaw in your metaphysics.
In the fact that there is not a single behavior that isn't explainable by the theory and there has not been a behavior that isn't predicted by the theory ever observed in any of the millions of tests that have been conducted in universities around the world.
The behavior is completely formalized and it completely predicts experimental results with NO contradiction ever found out of millions of experiments.
>b-but muh problem of induction

Synthetic knowledge, e.g mathematics, has an entire school behind it called intuitionism. To get at the root of where mathematical truth lies is important because it forms the bedrock of the most certain knowledge available to us.

There's an interesting book called Where Mathematics Comes From that claims math originates from basic embodied perceptions and interactions with the world. Math is a metaphoric abstraction of our dealings with objects. Math would therefore be empirically derived even if it is intuitively understood, being purely deductive in nature unlike any other empirically derived knowledge, which is inductive.

Under this interpretation then, Kant was right that math is synthetic, but it is not a priori. We abstract math from our bodily relations with the world.

In one sense, math is the product of the mind subsuming the world, binding it to an array of notations and signs, and intuitively manipulating those signs as correspondents to real world objects and relations.

Kant was therefore right that the mind structures knowledge, and that our perception of the world is filtered. Color for instance does not inhere in objects, but is added as a purely cognitive overlay on top of them. But is there any exception to these facts?

>In one sense, math is the product of the mind subsuming the world, binding it to an array of notations and signs, and intuitively manipulating those signs as correspondents to real world objects and relations.
>But is there any exception to these facts?
Just going to reply to my own post here and point out that there is a whole section of math that deals with purely idealized objects and constructs. Non-euclidean geometry, imaginary numbers, and so on. How do we arrive at these constructs if there are no perceptible and interactable real world analogues?

>not a single behavior that isn't explainable by the theory
>absence of proof is proof of absence
>we were only looking for certain behaviors so we must have found them all even though there's a discrepancy in the energy values we measure

I would have to say that math may be grounded on experience, but once the foundations are established, and the mathematical primitives defined, the whole deductive mass of mathematics builds on itself iteratively and recursively, through a kind bootstrapping investigation of its internal content, which subsequent to being derived from worldly experience, then fissions off from it and becomes its own "pocket universe" with its own laws and rules.

math being created from observation and then taking on a purely theoretical life of its own is an example of what this post talks about - of the "noumenon" being uncovered by fragmentary knowledge

Nope, it’s over mang. Kant ended epistemology, we can only move into other fields from here.

First af all, the collapse of the wavefunction is a mathematical function and we don't know exactly what it represents in the concrete.

Secondly, what would it even mean for something to be 'non-physical'? Spacetime, gravity, energy, even thought and ideas are all physical processes. What would distinguish a non-physical 'thing' from these? There is no evidence for anything non-physical, and it could even be viewed as an absurdism... Like thinking that 'nothing' can actually exist.

this is what i would have posted if i gave a fuck

All evidence supports physicalism... That isn't empirical support? Sure, you can claim that we can never be 100% certain, which will always be the case... But it certainly is empirically supported, while there is a complete lack of evidence for anything non-physical.

...

>Spacetime, gravity, energy, even thought and ideas are all physical processes. What would distinguish a non-physical 'thing' from these? There is no evidence for anything non-physical, and it could even be viewed as an absurdism...
Even aside from the materialist ideology and begging of the question and the hefty dose of scientism, this is still problematic.

your critique is utterly hollow

Non-local theories are not falsified. Maybe brush up on your no-communication theorem. Non-local variables/shared quantum states =/= information transmission.

Relativity did not disprove Transcendental Idealism but it did alter it. Kant posits that space and time are conditions of our mind. Einstein posited that this ideal spacetime reality can be influenced by motion and therefore also gravity. There is the classic anecdote of two people, one in a moving rocket and one on the surface of a planet (this was altered to be two twins, one on a mountain and one in a valley, by Hawking in his book). The spacetime reality of each individual is different due to the influences of motion and gravity. Thus each individual has their own a priori ideal spacetime reality however these are influenced by other forces. Both theories play off each other.

Sure got btfo'd by your massive intelect.

If I may add to your response: in Einstein's metaphysics, idealities like space and time can be affected by physical phenomena like motion and gravity. Space and time are not the conditions for physical phenomena but phenomena themselves, which belong, presumably, all in one hyperspatial, hypertemporal flux (or what have you). Since most physicists are metaphysics-blind, most people do not realize that Einstein's theories are metaphysically absurd and that the spacetime of relativity is in a completely different category than Kant's transcendental aesthetic, which is transcendental precisely because it is not an object of experience but its formal basis. Kant would never have accepted that space and time could be altered in such a way because for him they are transcendental (i.e. conditions of the presentation of alteration).

>All evidence supports physicalism
Except memes and beliefs changing the world.

not even a physicalist but you don't think they worked "belief" into their system? do people even read about positions before arguing against them or just do their best based on what they can glean from the name

Hmmm, interdasting

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This is furthermore evident from the fact that Einstein begins his investigations by clarifying that by "time" he means some **physical event**, i.e., the ticking of a clock. What he fails to make clear, or fails to understand, for that matter, is that what Kant meant by time was **not** the ticking of a clock, but the condition for the passage of such events, which, as should be clear, means that time itself is **not** an event. That the rate of a ticking clock quickens or slows down still requires an explanation, but it cannot be the slowing or quickening of time itself, because such an argument is completely nonsensical unless time is a rate (i.e., a the regular repetition of an event)--but then time itself would require another ground (hyper-time) which would then take the place of time as it is concieved in transcendnetal aesthetic.

P = NP

You should read the chapter on Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic in Dermot Moran's book, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology

You can learn about a lot of the figures associated with this way of thinking. Weierstrass seems interesting.

TELL ME HIS EPISTEMOLOGY OR ILL FUCKING KILL YOU

"We can't say anything true about stuff we see or feel, but we can about triangles or numbers."
There, just saved you +600 pages of reading.

A progression of events (or you can view it as movement) is exactly what time is. Time is an aspect of space, and there is no evidence or logical necessity for a 'meta-time'. Whatever the base state of existence is (the cause of spacetime), it is either timeless or spacetime is an aspect of its nature (which itself is causeless) that becomes 'inherited'.