Wittgenstein annoys me intensely. He is a complete example of the saying...

A meme but the spammer thinks it's real

This, he simply couldn't contend with the Eleatic doctrine. Whitehead is only worth reading as a historical curiosity, as an example of someone who was bright but spectacularly wrong.

Yeah they went into the future and debunked him

What is it with Yea Forums and schizos?

warosu.org/lit/thread/S11663496#p11663609

How guenon?

based

from 'The Crisis of the Modern World':

The same trend is noticeable in the scientific realm: research here is for its own sake far more than for the partial and fragmentary results it achieves; here we see an ever more rapid succession of unfounded theories and hypotheses, no sooner set up than crumbling to give way to others that will have an even shorter life— a veritable chaos amid which one would search in vain for anything definitive, unless it be a monstrous accumulation of facts and details incapable of proving or signifying anything. We refer here of course to speculative science, insofar as this still exists; in applied science there are on the contrary undeniable results, and this is easily understandable since these results bear directly on the domain of matter, the only domain in which modern man can boast any real superiority. It is therefore to be expected that discoveries, or rather mechanical and industrial inventions, will go on developing and multiplying more and more rapidly until the end of the present age; and who knows if, given the dangers of destruction they bear in themselves, they will not be one of the chief agents in the ultimate catastrophe, if things reach a point at which this cannot be averted?

Be that as it may, one has the general impression that, in the present state of things, there is no longer any stability; but while there are some who sense the danger and try to react to it, most of our contemporaries are quite at ease amid this confusion, in which they see a kind of exteriorized image of their own mentality. Indeed there is an exact correspondence between a world where everything seems to be in a state of mere ‘becoming’, leaving no place for the changeless and the permanent, and the state of mind of men who find all reality in this ‘becoming’, thus implicitly denying true knowledge as well as the object of that knowledge, namely transcendent and universal principles. One can go even further and say that it amounts to the negation of all real knowledge whatsoever, even of a relative order, since, as we have shown above, the relative is unintelligible and impossible without the absolute, the contingent without the necessary, change without the unchanging, and multiplicity without unity; ‘relativism’ is self-contradictory, for, in seeking to reduce everything to change, one logically arrives at a denial of the very existence of change; this was fundamentally the meaning of the famous arguments of Zeno of Elea.

However, we have no wish to exaggerate and must add that theories such as these are not exclusively encountered in modern times; examples are to be found in Greek philosophy also, the ‘universal flux’ of Heraclitus being the best known; indeed, it was this that led the school of Elea to combat his conceptions, as well as those of the atomists, by a sort of reductio ad absurdum. Even in India, something comparable can be found, though, of course, considered from a different point of view from that of philosophy, for Buddhism also developed a similar character, one of its essential theses being the ‘dissolubility of all things ’. These theories, however, were then no more than exceptions, and such revolts against the traditional outlook, which may well have occurred from time to time throughout the whole of the Kali-Yuga, were, when all is said and done, without wider influence; what is new is the general acceptance of such conceptions that we see in the West today.

It should be noted too that under the influence of the very recent idea of ‘progress’, ‘philosophies of becoming’ have, in modern times, taken on a special form that theories of the same type never had among the ancients: this form, although it may have multiple varieties, can be covered in general by the name ‘evolutionism’. We need not repeat here what we have already said elsewhere on this subject; we will merely recall the point that any conception allowing for nothing other than ‘becoming’ is thereby necessarily a ‘naturalistic’ conception, and, as such, implies a formal denial of whatever lies beyond nature, in other words the realm of metaphysics— which is the realm of immutable and eternal principles. We may point out also, in speaking of these anti-metaphysical theories, that the Bergonian idea of pure duration’ corresponds exactly with that dispersion in instantaneity to which we alluded above; a pretended intuition modeled on the ceaseless flux of the things of the senses, far from being able to serve as an instrument for obtaining true knowledge, represents in reality the dissolution of all possible knowledge.

This leads us to repeat an essential point on which not the slightist ambiguity must be allowed to persist: intellectual intuition, by which alone metaphysical knowledge is to be obtained, has absolutely nothing in common with this other ‘intuition’ of which certain contemporary philosophers speak: the latter pertains to the sensible realm and in fact is sub-rational, whereas the former, which is pure intelligence, is on the contrary supra-rational. But the moderns, knowing nothing higher than reason in the order of intelligence, do not even conceive of the possibility of intellectual intuition, whereas the doctrines of the ancient world and of the Middle Ages, even when they were no more than philosophical in character, and therefore incapable of effectively calling this intuition into play, nevertheless explicitly recognized its existence and its supremacy over all the other faculties. This is why there was no rationalism before Descartes, for rationalism is a specifically modern phenomenon, one that is closely connected with individualism, being nothing other than the negation of any faculty of a supra- individual order. As long as Westerners persist in ignoring or denying intellectual intuition, they can have no tradition in the true sense of the word, nor can they reach any understanding with the authentic representatives of the Eastern civilizations, in which everything, so to speak, derives from this intuition, which is immutable and infallible in itself, and the only starting-point for any development in conformity with traditional norms

>diluting whitehead to babbys first sound mysticism coming out of hard stem autism
you can still read witty in a mystical way. i dont understand pseuds who read as if switching different soda brands. ngmi

Wow he literally said nothing in all these paragraphs.

The full quote is great:

> Logical Positivism is a topic rarely distant from my thought. Every mathematician and symbolic logician is, in his habit of thought, a logical positivist. Yet to some of the expositions I find myself in violent opposition — especially to the very habit of dismissing questions as unmeaning i.e. unable to be expressed in existing symbolism. Wittgenstein annoys me intensely. He is the complete example of the sayings: I am Master of the College What I know not, is not knowledge.
> Logical Positivism in this mood — its only mood — will produce a timid, shut in, unenterprising state of mind, engaged in the elaboration of details. I always test these general rules by trying to imagine the sterilizing effect of such a state of mind, if prevalent at any time in the last ten thousand years.
> The fact is that thought in the previous two centuries has been engaged in disengaging itself from the shackles of dogmatic divinity. Thus it unconsciously seeks new fetters, viz anything offensive to the Pope of Rome. But I see no reason to believe that the stretch of Bertrand Russell’s mind or of Wittgenstein’s mind, or of Carnap’s mind, has attained the limits of insight or expression possible in the evolution of intelligent beings. They are bright boys, good representatives of a stage of rationalization, but nothing more.

it's a bot. its not real.
do you seriously notice and record things like that but not realize whats going on here?
this is basically just a board for jews to talk to themselves with some bots for filler trained on the jews posts.

>warosu.org/lit/thread/S11663496#p11663609
I beg your pardon but
are you fucking retarded?

clearly it is a bot. that is the most parsimonious explanation anyway so you should probably deal with it instead of just assuming its a real person

Your the one who started the Whitehead meme in the first place.

This right here. He didn't (becuase he couldn't) address the Eleatic observation of the coincidence of thought and Being.

what does this mean? your thoughts are existents much like a tomato or a piece of furniture, but they aren’t pure Being itself

>thoughts ARE
You just answered your own question

Much in the way any object is. What’s remarkable in that?

Well.. you kind of have to admit he was retroactively dispelled by Parmenides and Guenon

Virgin Whitehead thread vs chad guenon refute

It's a shame really, lad had potential. He just couldn't contend.

I knew a man once who tried to contend with the Eleatic doctrine...we never heard from him again

>the saying, “I am Master of this College / What I know not, is not knowledge.”
It's not a fucking saying Whitehead, it's a rhyme passed down in the Balliol common room. It must have confused the fuck out of all the Cantab people.

It's also a clear mischaracterisation of Wittgenstein's picture theory. Guy's clearly still salty.

Yeah, I wouldn't talk with some low life like that either.

Well well well if jt isn't the stephan molyneux look alike

>schizo replies to post about schizos

ITT: unironic larpers larp as ironic larpers in order to dispel ironic larpers larping as unironic larpers

>guenon
Refuted by Heraclitus and Whitehead

Consequently for Whitehead, for he was retroactively defeated in the entirety of his doctrine by the Eleatic substance of Parmenidean simultaneity of thought of Being.