Husserl is always criticized for reifying the transcendental ego and placing it "outside history...

>Heidegger came along and posited fully immanent Being as the condition of ALL beings, including consciousness, the ego, subjectivity, etc.
WTF he never says that

>later Heidegger
No later Heidegger cannot answer that. Post any sentence in Contributions to Philosophy if you really that sure.

Not sure why he needs to historicize Being in historicizing everything (that is, historicizing beings). This would only apply, I think, if Being is, but Being is not.

this is like saying "the dao/brahman/absolute is not a something, it is everything BUT a something!" while still predicating about it, even if indirectly. and at least the daoists/vedantists/idealists are openly theological in their discussion of the dao/brahman/absolute. heideggerians are claiming to be nonmetaphysical, linguistic only.

wittgenstein is more consistent because if you ask him what the ground of beings (meaning) is, he simply says "beats the fuck out of me"

Read his lectures on Nietzsche and Holderlin.

Being is becoming, and everything is always turning into its opposite.

Being is primordially becoming, but as such it turns into its opposite, i.e. crystalizes into a being. The destiny of Being is the same as man: death.

ok but that is a metaphysics of "Being" which
a) most heideggerians (like dreyfus mentioned above) would explicitly disagree was heidegger's position at any point
b) is a form of talk about beings

this is why he does that weird fucking poetry shit during his later work. he's trying to find a way out of that impasse. poetry isn't predicative in the strict sense of the term

a) Tell me how dreyfus etc would disagree? (disclaimer, I worked as dreyfus' assistant at berkeley)
b) if you're going to define 'metaphysical' as 'talk about beings', talking about how Being not being a being on a chinese cookbook message board is somewhat retarded

It seems like you're problem is you don't think non-metaphysical can be talked about

>poetry isn't predicative in the strict sense of the term
Forgive me, im having trouble wrapping my head around what you mean here. are you saying that poetry doesn't make assumptions about its referents?

you don't think dreyfus, who regularly insists that we can't know anything about the natural/metaphysical world unmediatedly, and who accordingly more or less reads heidegger as a transcendental philosopher (i think like his student blattner as well), would feel comfortable talking about being in the way you do in this post: ? i'm not being incredulous for rhetorical effect, i'm genuinely just incredulous

unless you mean this stuff:
>Being is primordially becoming, but as such it turns into its opposite, i.e. crystalizes into a being.
very metaphorically/poetically. but even then, such talk doesn't really answer the question being raised, namely how heidegger avoids the familiar problems of a analytic transcendental, i.e., how any such analytic can "know," unmediatedly, the nature of how it experiences beings mediatedly.

even husserl eventually becomes conscious of that problem, at least as far as i understand husserl. which is why he gradually takes a temporal turn in his thought, and starts to purge phenomenology of naively logicist/idealist eideticism. but then in husserl as in heidegger, the same question is again raised: if you go full historicist, how do you prevent historicism from dissolving the analytic itself?

i agree but i don't understand what he takes himself to be doing in the post kehre writings. if he's really trying to be fundamentally open, that's interesting, but if he's doing some kind of "being can only talk poetically, all thought is aesthetic" shit, i don't see how that a) is at all different from shit like derrida, and b) again, escapes strauss' critique that historicism historicizes away its own basis of validity.

so i really hope it's the former option, that he's genuinely trying to open an altogether new clearing? and that the "wait for the gods who have not yet arrived" isn't just a vague way of advocating for a limp ontological pluralism / aestheticism

sorry, somehow swapped two words around:
>... how heidegger avoids the familiar problems of a analytic transcendental, i.e., how ...
should be
>... how heidegger avoids the familiar problems of a transcendental analytic, i.e., how ...

Heidegger might say that all fundamental historical changes in man's understanding are products of the disclosure of Being itself.

heidegger would put in the other way around. talk about referents presupposes poetry in the sense of poeisis (bringing-forth)

i'm skewing towards the "ontological aestheticism" position (which is a nice term, btw). his work takes a somewhat "fatalistic" turn after the rectorate incident. being lets "without a why" and so one must take the stance of "releasement". so, heideggerian philosophy is merely a moment in the long history of being. it will eventually be overcome, but only by a "waiting" rather than an "acting". his philosophy will eventually lead to something else (in his words to "thinking").

i think this is the reading that allows one to at the very least skirt around strauss' critique (which is infinitely better than derrida's). he's giving a *history* of being, which takes the form of something like a narrative (hence the slide to poetry). the narrative will continue, but all that one can do is tell it, even if it goes on "without a why". this is the "piety" of thinking. it's something like a theodicy where you "justify the ways of god to men" (but with being instead of god)

i recommend schurmann for this reading of heidegger. he states this much better than i can. also, a relevant video below where he basically admits the straussian line of critique: youtube.com/watch?v=qouZC17_Vsg

(it's also useful here to see how nietzsche does very similar things, but psychologically instead of ontologically)

to add: for strauss heidegger's "theodicy" would be a blending of philosophy and revelation, which he views as fundamentally impossible. the two are in an "indeterminate dyad" that can only be approached "zetetically". this is strauss' stronger critique of heidegger, i think. the "history historicizes itself" critique presupposes a notion of both being and time which heidegger would reject. this is mostly directed towards vulgar historicists (which heidegger is not)

This is a good thread. Good posts all around.

>it will eventually be overcome
>his philosophy will eventually lead to something else
I feel very strange by this notion, I've seen zur sache des denkens(idk the translation) and he clearly suggest that "the end of philosophy" by turning language to thinking about being. There is no "something else" in his topic. This is one of the last book of him so you can't say he changed. Although I interpreted naively I am quite certain of this. What's your explanation on this?

just reading a review of this guy now:

"As a consequence, Schürmann’s deconstruction of the epochal history of philosophy leads to a topology of being.[11] Thus, the world as the constellation of beings that comes to presence does not point toward a hidden structure, a final reason, a secret teleology, but to its anarchic presencing to Dasein. The task of thinking therefore is not the “clarification” of Dasein’s existential conditions to access the transcendental site of a rational subjectivity (the line that goes from Descartes to Hegel, and from Kant to Husserl), and this would be an important difference between the phenomenological epoché and the deconstructive epoché, if we might put it this way. In Schürmann the epoché opens to an-arché and this an-arché interrupts the pros hen as a distinctive philosophical operation the inception of which is to be found in Aristotle’s Physics as the defining book of western metaphysics. This is possible, of course, because Schürmann reads the Heideggerian epoché as a sort of inversion of the Husserlian epoché, an inversion of the parenthesis that was meant, in the first case, as a suspension of the natural attitude. With that inversion, the parenthesis now suspends philosophical subjectivity and its transcendental intuitions, freeing the world from the infinite tasks of rational consciousness (translation and adjustment) and freeing thinking from the subject (transcendental consciousness)."

this synopsis, if it's correct, and way you read heidegger, seem to me to be exactly what strauss is critiquing. i don't understand how it answers or skirts around that critique. the description of schürmann seems like every bog-standard, post-positivist, neo-pragmatist, neo-liberal heideggerian i've met in universities.

>this is the "piety" of thinking. it's something like a theodicy
but this would be an ethics, and precisely what you can't do is derive an ethics from the hole where a metaphysics can (apparently) never be. how do you resolve this? how do you explain heidegger's intense concern with preserving and curating human potential, to the point that he was willing to justify total war for it, and attempt to found a very particular form of life in germany in the 1930s in defense of it? if schürmann (as a review by gadamer i just checked out suggests) "correctly reads heidegger backward," so as not to read being & time in a naive way but continuously in the light of his better-articulated late philosophy, you obviously can't explain heidegger in 1933 by saying "well, he changed his mind."

>the narrative will continue, but all that one can do is tell it
similarly, then strauss' question would still be: "then why even tell it?" if you say, "well, because i want to," you're a sceptic and presumably some form of egoist/hedonist. you cease to do philosophy. which is maybe fine, if that's what you really want to be doing. but you don't seem to want to be doing that.

>he basically admits the straussian line of critique: youtube.com/watch?v=qouZC17_Vsg
Yeah... so this is the thing I want to say

First, i don't think you understand derrida whatsoever. Strawmanning him as a therepeautic sceptic-nihilistic sophist isn't generous. Ya meaning isn't static and we have to center things in order to construct relative meaning, so what? This fits in nicely with heidegger's talk of phusis waxing and waning.
Second, heidegger isn't ever concerned about how we can know shit in the way you're talking about it. Yes everything is mediated, again so what: that mediation (i.e. the world worlding) is dasein/being: "dasein is its world existingly" as he says in being and time.

>if you go full historicist, how do you prevent historicism from dissolving the analytic itself?
You should rephrase this. dissolving the analytic?

>strauss' critique that historicism historicizes away its own basis of validity
shit isn't fixed. You trying to fix things (or our desire to fix things, that is define/delineate/demarcate etc) is a type of metaphysics of utilization that you seem blind of; Nietzsche>Heiddeger>Derrida's point is that you examine that desire to define that rages so hard in all of us; that makes something supposedly legitimate or not

schurmann taught at the new school, so he is constantly being appropriated (hehe) by exactly those types you describe. however, there's a very dreadful seriousness to his work that these nihilistically playful postmodernists don't have

also, i do accept strauss' critique, so i can't really give a proper heideggerian response. it does seem to be grounded at some form of "decisionism", wherein one blindly surrenders oneself to the whims of being. at bottom, it's a leap of faith

(((you)))
>but bad heidegger's nazi
ah I see where we are now

>tfw read B&T twice and this thread still makes no sense
i give up

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i disagree with a few things here, but mostly refer you to this post for my responses/open questions: actually if this is you: just don't reply to me at all, i'm enjoying talking to maybe-girardfag here. can't read and is stupid.

what do you mean by seriousness? there's a seriousness to the straussians, or they play at it anyway, but they're fucking morons. they don't know or think about any of this shit, not at one tenth the level strauss did. but i need to read more actual late strauss to see if there's anything "non-straussian" in there that could be an actual solution to the problem. there are letters by him at least hinting at openness to true metaphysics i think.

>it does seem to be grounded at some form of "decisionism",
this is what i think too, but it makes no sense to be decisionist for decisionism's sake. a nihilist doesn't make decisions in the schmittian sense, let alone struggle to make the "right" or "fateful" decisions, let alone decisions that will ruin his life and career. a real nihilist is just an opportunist, at absolute best.

frankly i find it hermeneutically incredible (in the real sense of "i just can't believe it") that heidegger was so fucking dumb as to be unaware of the sceptical dilemma, OR to be one of these quietist/therapeutic language philosophers, a rapidly multiplying and annoying breed he was well aware of. i agree that there may be a "leap of faith" element in his thinking, a kind of piety or theodicy like you say, but at this point i want to guess, or maybe just hope, that it's more mystical (in a very subtle way, almost entirely missed) than finitude-fetishizing. not even only because the latter is ugly, but because it's simply unphilosophical. you just can't explain a life as integral, intensely philosophically focused, and (meta)politically active as heidegger's by saying "well he was basically a post-philosopher, but he didn't like technology or something so he agitated occasionally for changes he wouldn't even see in his lifetime."

it's a lot more puffed up than it looks, if you read B&T twice there's nothing ITT you can't understand if you squint at it and translate it into B&T terminology.

addendum: sorry to if i seem combative or dismissive, i am genuinely not trying to be. i am just very interested in these questions and pissed off that answers are so hard to come by. i'm really annoyed with reading academic heideggerians all pretending to have reinvented the fucking wheel.

>Husserl is always criticized for reifying the transcendental ego and placing it "outside history,"
But he didn't reify it, that's the point. If reified it would have been in history. But there is no possibility of reification, only the human soul is in nature.

>Heidegger's hermeneuticizing and historicizing of Husserl's "Cartesian," ahistorical phenomenology was the necessary next step.
That's because he's a pseud that was more concerned by larping metaphysics than by logic and the theory of knowledge, which is why he and others don't understand Husserl.

>sceptical
Can I ask... why you use that term instead skeptic?

piety of thinking is from What is Called Thinking btw

You clearly havent read it lol

>Thus, the world as the constellation of beings that comes to presence does not point toward a hidden structure, a final reason, a secret teleology, but to its anarchic presencing to Dasein.
Imagine thinking this. This is why five years of stemfaggotry should be mandatory before even starting philosophy.

do you have any recommendations for readings of husserl? the more i feel like i "get" husserl, the more i read him as having abandoned the (to me, more interesting) eidetic phenomenology of the early period for a later immanent/hermeneutic/intersubjective phenomenology. it seems like a plausible reading that he felt threatened by the success of heidegger and lebensphilosophie, and tried to show that he had already meant to cover that approach all along. a lot of husserl commentators seem bent on "defending" husserl in this way, i.e., by saying "look, he anticipated heidegger!," rather than by saying "no, transcendental phenomenology is better than heidegger!"

it's not that i don't appreciate the hermeneutic approach, but i'd rather read a firmly transcendental thinker, interested in the real a priori structures/categories of subjectivity, than yet-another-immanence-philosopher.

no real reason, it's just the british spelling.

the opposite tendency is just as dangerous though, of simply deducing an "account" of the world from some unexamined set of ontological ground-concepts, or worse, modifying those ground-concepts/paradigms only haphazardly and semi-consciously for "pragmatic" reasons. an ontological critique of radical reflexivity is necessary for true science to come into its own, but i agree if it terminates in anti-science, it makes no fucking sense.

>finitude-fetishizing
I genuinely don't know what this term mean. Can you explain it?

honestly, regarding heidegger's "mysticism", i always fall back to reiterating biographical facts about his catholicism (which you probably already know), but it's obviously inadequate. but like you said, heidegger is clearly not a nihilist, he just has this weird religious element that just gets passed off as nihilism in our age (which is proof of the tremendous inadequacy of contemporary scholarship). i remember heidegger being called "the greatest modern Augustinian" by someone, and i think that's very apt, although i can't really put my finger as to why. strauss also repeatedly mentions heidegger's catholicism and he mentioned once how he blended philosophy and revelation in a very interesting way (and characteriscally leaving it at that). these are all quite scattered observations, but that's really the most i can do

also, the schurmann recommendation is really a minor quibble. i just prefer recommendations of heidegger done by men of faith ("fallen" or otherwise)

He wouldn't have. Heidegger abandoned his transcendental project as untenable.

The Husserlian transcendental ego is a difficult pill to swallow. It's disturbing and few philosophers come into contact with it, though they critique it abstractly.

>But then you end up in "therapeutic" linguistic philosophies like Derrida or Wittgenstein, which are (Strauss says) simply nihilistic, they are merely ancient scepticism rehashed.
Can you elaborate more on this? I personally love late wittgenstein and those therapeutic approach don't get too much of criticism. I need criticism on those.

Anyone else feels like Heidegger could be summed as an irrelevant mess ever since Deleuze published a paper?

>He wouldn't have. Heidegger abandoned his transcendental project as untenable.
Hey, Bill.

It helps to adjust to it as a kind of inversion, the same way Marx flipped Hegel's dialectic upside down. Immanence underlies every material strata from subatomic particle to galaxies, its not some transcendent metaphysical "outside" but rather the material conditions of emergence, or in other words, autonomous, self-organising matter, regimented soldiers, flocks of geese, snowflakes, etc.. Every potentiality is always already contained in the immanent plane, it only requires actualisation. Think of it as a diagram for an electrical circuit– it's not simply a representation of the circuit, because the particular arrangement of connections, breaks and variables must already exist in the world for a representation to function as a diagram. We did not invent the electrical circuit, we merely arranged everything according to a schematic that existed long before we ever did.

>We did not invent the electrical circuit, we merely arranged everything according to a schematic that existed long before we ever did.

Lmao, literally Platonism: Parisian fop edition.

read heidegger's analysis of the dasein in relation to nazi ideology, ur qualm is the only reason people like to make a big deal about his ideology in relationship to his philosophy

bump