Différance

yeah, this pre-verbal intuition exists. But the concept isn't really intelligible in this state, although you can feel its presence.

What do you mean by intelligible? Not to others, yeah, but that's obvious.

define intelligible

for example, when i invoke the word "bird" i can direct attention to a mental image of a bird, and that means that the concept of a bird is intelligible to me. You can't "recall" or invoke again consistently this pre-verbal intuition outside the context you get to experience it, unless you articulate it verbally. same with phenomenological experience - you can't experience it again unless you assign signs to the experience and invoke the signs later

It's not that there is no meaning, it's that for meaning to "happen" it has to be in a network of meaning structure.

>words don't have meaning on their own because they defer to the meaning of other words horizontally
This is just a simpleton version of an ancient realization and it applies only to the dictionary. Does he really believe this? Maybe I should skip his works.

When you walk around every day, you take the world for granted. The "average-everyday" way you do things is full of non-thought/non-linguistic ways of conceiving of situations. When you open the door to a room, you don't have to think about doing it, you're just focused on whatever reason you're going into the room (proximally and for the most part ;)

What is the complex version of this realization?

I can recall my "pre-verbal intuitions" as easily as I can recall my verbalised thoughts. For me, they are no different; only that the latter is expressible to other humans.

Could you articulate any of those intuitions as an example?

There isn't one. Their is a version conceived by those who aren't simpleton, ie the Borges version, but it's a simple concept

But I think there's a difference between concepts and habit. Certainly animals can walk and run but the conceptual stage doesn't end at the action stage. How a walk differs from a run can only be discussed at a conceptual level, and for that you would need words.

>You can't "recall" or invoke again consistently this pre-verbal intuition outside the context you get to experience it, unless you articulate it verbally. same with phenomenological experience - you can't experience it again unless you assign signs to the experience and invoke the signs later

I disagree. I think if I see a bird, point it out to someone, and later that day do a bird whistle, the image of the bird can be recalled. And, I wouldn't say that whistle is language.

This seems to make sense to me

You take for granted that learning how to open a door must first be learned (even if it is never taught to you); that is a concept, and if you do not agree with that, then a concept has no use value, even in rational thought. Concepts are structures of thought, but thought always happens in relation to our activity and so they are also structures of activity.

I used to think about the teleportation thought experiment a lot. "If scientists create a teleportation device that destroys you wholly and recreates you at a separate location, are you really the same as the recreated person?" From which I concluded, non-verbally, that my Self is nothing but a category. It took a while before I put this into words and it was only after I read Hume that I could articulate it with any clarity.

that's literally verbal articulation, if you had to put it in words

Well then any example I give is going to be met with the same retort. I can only give examples of "intuitions" I had subsequently articulated, unless you know a way of communicating via telekinesis.

Rather if I do agree with that, then "concept" loses distinction. I don't need to understand the concept of "breathing so I don't die" to actually breathe. I don't need to learn "opening a door reveals something" to open a door. I agree that you can do these things non-linguistically or even without thinking, but I don't think an action is a concept.

Babies must indeed learn the concept of object permanence for example, but no language is involved.

Nah, Postmodernists are just afraid of any concrete ontology, because it symbolizes the violent enclosure of Being, the "via rupta" (the road) paved by Otherness-- a fundamental rupture in subjectivity that leaves only "traces." So even a prior truths are thrown into question.

It's all just a bunch of fun metaphors with Derrida. To "believe" in Derridean ideas is not only paradoxical, but it's like New Age mystics who believe in "nothingness" or the Hegelian emphasis on the "negativity of the Sensible." How far epistemologically, politically, practically, will these idea get us?

We still haven't found the truth yet, but the Postmodernist decentralization of truth is firmly rooted in a bourgeois comfort of being able to continuously "subjectivate" at a whim. Hence everything is just the performative act of doing something, and everything is relative and "fluid."

Différence

t. brainlet schizophrenic

The first point isn't even Derrida's idea, it's as old as Saussure.

>mfw ad hominem

Plato's Parmenides

How do I actually into Derrida? He's brought up all the time in my literature classes but i don't know anything about him
Where to start?

could you elaborate more on this point?

>concrete ontology
What's this new meme?