>Proposition 4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from each other, either by a difference in attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections.
What does Spinoza mean by affections here? Can anyone give an example of a substance, an attribute and an affection according to his thought?
I believe it's the archaic use of the word, like cause and effect (or in this case, to affect)
So affections basically means whatever it affects.
If a thing has the same attributes or affections as another thing, then it is only one and the same thing. This is because things are distinguished one from the other based on their attributes or affections
there is not a substance for spinoza, but the substance; there is not an attribute, but infinite ones
How can one observe the world without difference? That is, without Even and Odd. The Odd is merely an expression of the Even. The Even is merely expressed by the Odd. The Even and Odd are the same. There is only one true identity, 1=1.
0's and 1's baby
This thread got full of shit comments already and it's only minutes old. I'm not OP, but I also want an answer to this question:
>Can anyone give an example of a substance, an attribute and an affection according to Spinoza's thought?
Let me give you the real help you need: Stop reading Spinoza.
I like this style, but "are the same", I'm not sure that follows, at least not in a traditional semantic way. I think "expressions of the same thing" would follow..
I appreciate you.
>substance
a thing
>attribute
a nature of that thing
>affection
what that thing does to other things
Ice is hard, cold, slippery, melts into water and reduces surface friction and makes things colder by touch.
so two separated ice cubes are one single substance?
there is only one substance
so yes (I wanted to say)
But he concludes that after saying that substances are the same if they share attributes and affects. I need proof for that. In an atomist world like ours why would two different ice cubes be one single substance?
Affection means a gentle feeling of fondness or liking, so in this sense it would mean the thing is distinguish by a difference in its favoring preference to another thing
Does the universal substance love me? :3
Affection is páthos.
>Two or more distinct things are distinguished from each other, either by a difference in attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections.
This essentially means : different things are different ; now how can to things differ? By the two ontological levels that Spinoza admits: the attribute (substance) or the affection.
An affection is a mode, and a mode is nothing more than a modification/affection of the substance, it is a certain something of the substance. I would personally define it as 'a non-substantial thing which determines an attribute', or 'a singularity, differentially determined, within the unity of the attribute'.
>Can anyone give an example of a substance, an attribute and an affection according to his thought?
Substance : God
Attribute : Extension
Mode = Affection : A singular body
Because there is only one universal substance, the attributes of which are thought and extension. Two ice cubes are the same same substance with the same attributes as the glass they're in, the table the glass sits on, and the room they're in. Each of those things is distinguished not by its attributes, but by its affections.
This is bait.
I haven't read Spinoza but from what i can tell from your quote he was a brainlet, theres no such thing as two different things only the illusion and the distinction is the description not the concept, what a fucking overrated retard
but extensivity and thought are modes of substance
>but extensivity and thought are modes of substance
No, they are attributes of the substance
Seems like it's a non-essentialist modification of the Aristotelian doctrine of accidental properties?
>An accident, in philosophy, is an attribute that may or may not belong to a subject, without affecting its essence.
>Non-essentialism argues that every property is an accident
So, on this account, there is only one real substance: THE substance of God/Nature, and then its subordinate demi-substances. Rather than every individual "substance" (in the original Aristotelian sense, as anything grounded in a free-standing essence, like an individual thing or person), having accidents/affections, everything in the world is a mutually interacting bundle of affections in one greater all-substance (God).
That's if this guy's reading is the conventional one, anyway.
2 things are distinguishable by their properties and how they affect others. If they have the exact same properties, and the exact same effect on their surroundings, you can't distinguish them. Therefore, they are (or might as well be) the same thing.
>2 things are distinguishable by their properties and how they affect others.
That's totally not what Spinoza means here