Plato's Republic and the Tripartite Soul

>Though I don't remember too much about the difference between thymos and epithymia, I gather passion is seen as not necessarily wanting something, it can just boil up. Those with more passionate natures aim for higher goals and make tragic heroes. Just desire on its own, they're the lowest. No earnestness, no extraordinary desires, just food, sex and luxury
Why even make the distinction in the first place? It sounds like they're two extreme ends of the same "ends" spectrum.

Switch around ego and superego and you would be correct

Hm, I guess to start with, let's talk about those three words a little. I think (too lazy to check) the word for the reasoning part in Greek is actually logismos, or at some point it regularly becomes logismos; that word would best be translated as "calculating/calculative", and it's a funny term to use to represent reason in Plato since it's a narrowly mathematical term (whereas logos gets used everywhere, up and down). So the reasoning part, strangely, just seems to amount to arithemetical procedures. The second word, thumos, could be well translated by spirited or spiritedness (a bit in the sense of "that was a spirited game of x"). The word connotes the kind of liveliness that attends competition, but also anger and righteous indignation (both of which are also accurate translations of it). It's another strange choice of Plato's, since, while common in Homer, in Plato's time, the word orge totally replaced and thunos was more often reserved for horses. As for epithumia, it's surprisingly the most ordinary word out of the three, and just kinda means desire in the sense of "appetite".

As for the demarcations, they're a bit tricky for a few reasons. The most direct reason is best to note, but at one point, Socrates overtly admits their characterization of the soul isn't fully adequate:

435c-d
>"Now it's a slight question about the soul we've stumbled upon, you surprising man," I said. "Does it have these three forms in it or not?"
>"In my opinion, it's hardly a slight question," he said. "Perhaps, Socrates, the saying that fine things are hard is true."
>"It looks like it," I said. "But know well, Glaucon, that in my opinion, we'll never get a precise grasp of it on the basis of procedures such as we're now using in the argument. There is another longer and further road leading to it. But perhaps we can do it in a way worthy of what's been said and considered before."
>"Mustn't we be content with that?" he said. "It would be enough for me to present."
>"Well, then," I said, "it will quite satisfy me too."

So this bears directly on the soul, and we might ask: what exactly is inadequate? There might be a hint in the Leontius story:

439e-440a
>"But," I said, "I once heard something that I trust. Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus under the outside of the North Wall when he noticed corpses lying by the public executioner. He desired to look, but at the same time he was disgusted and made himself tum away; and for a while he struggled and covered his face. But finally, overpowered by the desire, he opened his eyes wide, ran toward the corpses and said: 'Look, you damned wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.'''
>"I too have heard it," he said.
>"This speech," I said, "certainly indicates that anger sometimes makes war against the desires as one thing against something else."

(Cont.)

Wrong. Plato was a fascist, therefore he was trans.

Now, the Leontius story is used to ostensibly show the difference between Thumos and Epithumia, with the story describing what is apparently the conflict between the two: Thumos is aghast at Epithumia's appetite for a vision of corpses. But this downplays an important element to the story: the corpses are the corpses of *executed criminals*. To see justice done or to have anger or revenge exacted are consistently the trait of Thumos; that Epithumia is so consistently, for its part, characterized as merely appetitive desires (food, drink, sex), makes it hard not to re-read the story and not wonder if Thumos, righteous indignation itself, isn't embarassed by the ugliness of its desire to see justice in its most frank and brutal appearance. So, it might be that there's not as strong a separation between Thumos and Epithumia as argued. One possible hint (a bit of fun wordplay) is that Epithumia is derived from Thumos. The other possible hint is the way the three main interlocutors in book 1 all seem to resemble the parts of the soul: Cephalus (whose name is literally "Head") spends his days calculating his debts, Polemarchus ("War leader") argues for a "friends-enemies" definition of justice and once refuted insists he'll fighf by Socrates' side, and Thrasymachus ("Bold in battle" or "Brash fighter") argues for the greediest and hungriest definition of justice. That matchup seems like what we expect, except it turns out that Thrasymachus' whole argument and demeanor imply the unity of Thumos and Epithumia.

(Now, what remains a question for me is how Logismos comes in here: Cephalus seems kindly, but his whole attitude about death and the possibility of punishment for unjust deeds unpaid seems to highlight that his calculations are tied up with the desire not to be punished. Maybe a stretch, but not wholly implausible.)

(Cont.)

But to go back to your questions about how to more precisely understand it, Plato seems to point to the philosopher guardian's education and its culmination in the vision of the Good as correcting the skewed understanding of the soul:

504a-c
>"You, of course, remember," I said, "that by separating out three forms in the soul we figured out what justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom each is."
>"If I didn't remember," he said, "it would be just for me not to hear the rest."
>"And also what was said before that?"
>"What was it?"
>"We were, I believe, saying that in order to get the finest possible look at these things another and longer road around would be required, and to the man who took it they would become evident, but that proofs on a level with what had been said up to then could be tacked on. And you all said that that would suffice. And so, you see, the statements made at that time were, as it looks to me, deficient in precision. If they were satisfactory to you, only you can tell."
>"They were satisfactory to me, within measure," he said. "And it looks as though they were for the others too."
>"My friend," I said, "a measure in such things, which in any way falls short of that which is, is no measure at all. For nothing incomplete is the measure of anything. But certain men are sometimes of the opinion that this question has already been adequately disposed of and that there is no need to seek further."

So I suppose that would be one way of torturously figuring out what the fuck's going on, but it does seem to be hinted that at least two supposedly distinct parts might not be so distinct. I would wonder if it could be shown more strongly that Logismos isn't fully distinct as well. Since Epithumia collapses into Thumos (because Thumos has appetites, but Epithumia doesn't have spiritedness), I'd guess it'd work the same way with Logismos, i.e. collapsing into Thumos? (The demand for precision that characterizes Logismos shows up first in Thrasymachus, of all people, who challenges Socrates to tell him "precisely" what justice is, and then makes a big ado about the "precise" meaning of ruler, and so on.)

(What'd be a bigger question then is what to do about the Symposium's account of the soul as being driven by Eros; in the Republic, Eros is shriveled into Epithumia as the mere urge to fuck, but there's no room for any account of philosophical Eros. Are Thumos and Eros the two basic parts of soul? Is Eros actually a part of Thumos? I dunno, shit's hard.)

Thank you for the drawn-out effort post. You've made my day.

I would argue that none of these divisions are *truly* distinct in a harmonized soul. What is logismos but the means by which thumos and epithymia harmonize and reach their most perfect, eternal state? What is the most perfect form of power but one that is able to last forever (and is not an exercise of brutish tyranny)? This dovetails well with Socrates's argument about why knowledge is equivalent to virtue, at least when it is perfect. There is no value in choosing anything lesser when you truly understand what virtue entails.
>(What'd be a bigger question then is what to do about the Symposium's account of the soul as being driven by Eros; in the Republic, Eros is shriveled into Epithumia as the mere urge to fuck, but there's no room for any account of philosophical Eros. Are Thumos and Eros the two basic parts of soul? Is Eros actually a part of Thumos? I dunno, shit's hard.)
This is a great question. Personally, I think that thumos and eros evolves into "irascibility" and "concupiscence" of the Thomists.

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As Socrates says, it's easier to understand if you look at the various constitutions or politeiai and what people characterize them. Timocracy or timarchy is the rule of those who love victory and honor (Timḗ), with Sparta or Lakedaimon given as an example. They are high-spirited (thymoeidḗs) and fitted more for war than for peace, and have neglected the true Muse, which has to do with speech (logos) and philosophy, and prize gymnastics above music/arts. The timocratic man is no longer concerned only with virtue but takes part in the nature of the money-loving. From here the politeia degenerates to oligarchy, which is by nature very unstable, and then to democracy. Oligarchy is characterized by those who love money, and democracy gives more vent to all the desires in the name of freedom. This is the breeding ground of tyranny, which is the worst politeia. The tyrant is waking what he was before only in dreams (Socrates mentions dreams which occur when what is reasonable and cultivated and rules over the animalistic and wild is asleep, through food or drink, and the latter break out. Then coupling with one's mother, or anything else, man, god or animal, causes no concern, and one restrains oneself from no food.) The tyrant is ruled tyrannically by Eros and doesn't restrain himself from any horrific murder or food or deed.

I don't see how logismos can be the whole story or collapse into thymos when the same dialog discusses the vision of the Good.

BRITISH ROBBER WHERE IS ATLANTIS

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>I don't see how logismos can be the whole story or collapse into thymos when the same dialog discusses the vision of the Good.
Why would the vision of the Good prevent it?

Have you read Phaedrus and the chariot analogy that explains all this?

Yeah. It's even more confusing thumos and eros are "ranked" on a more equal footing in that analogy. Or perhaps that's the point? Furthermore, I wonder what is the cure for "hubris", "recklessness", "rage", and other thumotic vices. Both dialogues focus only on the problems of appetitiveness.

Also, where does the charioteer get his directions from? Reminds me of Hume's critique of reason as being merely a slave to the passions.

The charioteer is the rational soul that controls the passionate and appetitive souls. The cure for their vices are rational control; the vice is concupiscence or letting the horses roam free.

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See also
libgen.is/book/index.php?md5=DC82C5802744EB8CA908D59EA3D5D9B8

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That's not Hume's critique, that was Hume's life

Its been a while since I have read Plato but the way I see it that desire passion and reason was exemplified as Aganemnom, Achilles and Socrates respectively. Appetite for riches and land, ambition for fame and glory, and love of wisdom.

Animals only have desire, while humans also have an ego that propels them to greater things. It is once one transcends ego that you get reason. Imagine a sun hidden behind clouds, always shining but light only breaks through once in a while. All 3 things are inert in a person but only through cultivation and learning can you tame your animal side and subside your ego, for reason to take it rightful place as the master and shine without obscurement

It is also tied to a theory of Platonic anatomy. Thymos is the origin of the now popular concept of "heart" as courage and the name of an organ where Platonists seated the passionate soul. Rational soul seated in the brain, appetitive soul is either seated in the stomach or liver (can't remember which).

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>Finally, what the hell is "passion", anyway?
Spirited will, courage

Because the vision of the Good implies some faculty that is not just spiritedness, as it involves or presupposes knowledge, and not just calculative as 511a-d distinguishes dianoia as a habit of geometers, among others, being between doxa and nous or noesis. I think logistikon or logos is just a general term for all in the soul that takes part in knowledge.

The chariot image of soul is so strange because the first claim about soul in the palinode is that soul is self-moving, but then we get the Chariot where the Charioteer strictly speaking doesn't move himself, and the horses are constrained by the charioteer, so there's a very real tension that doesn't so easily resolve to soul as self-mover.

The human charioteers are characterized by having Mind (nous, instead of any derivation of logos); the white horse might be thumos (it's honor-loving after all), but the addition of moderation makes that a little harder to square away cleanly. The black horse, which is presented as if it were appetite, instead seems to be Eros itself, and its description at 253e is peculiar in that it's described as having an ugly form, but pointedly, a snub nose as well; the ugliness, intransigence to goading, and the snub nose in particular all describe Socrates very well (this shouldn't be too surprising; the description of Eros in the Symposium in the myth Diotima tells also describes Socrates' traits; both the description of Eros as the child of Poverty and Resource and the description of the black horse also match up with Alcibiades description of Socrates at the end of the Symposium). What seems curious then is that the black horse contains mind just as much as the human charioteer, since it's by mind that the vision of the beautiful impels at all. So, as with the Republic, a seemimgly separate element is contained in another part, the mind of the charioteer in the black horse. That then raises a question about what the white horse is; in the context of the palinode's account of the lover projecting an image to the beloved, the white horse seems to match the projected image. But that would seem to make it a product of the black horse which already unifies mind and erotic (not appetitive) desire.

Lol actually that does correct my misremembering of whether the term was logismos; it is logistikon, but that term is still a narrowly mathematical term for calculating. But you are right that there would have to be something more than a capacity for arithmetic to grasp the Good. One possible recourse is that, being forced by Glaucon to discuss the philosopher kings, and so the philosopher, the prior account of soul, already said to be deficient, can be lightly moved away from. 505d-e suggest that the soul pursues the Good, but that pursuit doesn't make sense coming from logistikon. It *could* make sense coming from epithumia, since in order to pursue it must desire, but thumos seems as if not more likely, since epithumia seems bound to the goods of physiology instead of goods like virtue.

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Figure/Psychological Interpretation
The polis The community of ones psyche, personality, mind or soul; psychopolis
Citizens of the polis sub-egos, complexes, dispositions, etc.
Rulers Specialized sub-egos responsible for inner government; rational in nature.
Auxiliaries, soldiers Sub-egos concerned with protecting the ‘city’ from inner and outer threats, and enforcing laws of the rulers. These are also associated with: (1) seeking social recognition and honor, and (2) incensive passions like indignation and anger.
Artisans, workers Appetitive sub-egos concerned with gratifying desires, material gain, etc.
Sophists Sub-egos which deceive us with false reasoning, biased judgment, wishful thinking, etc.
Poets (of the bad sort) Like sophists, but associated with nonrational fancies, delusions, follies
Philosopher-king A special ruler sub-ego which seeks harmonization and integration of entire personality based on Wisdom, Virtue, and ones innate moral sense (vision of the Good)
Education of rulers Measures taken to develop the philosophical sub-ego(s): e.g., by dialectic, virtue, contemplation, music, etc.
Prisoners (Cave Allegory) Sub-egos ‘chained’ to faulty (distorted by self-interest) notions of goodness and associated false reasonings
Regimes Alternative systems by which psychopolis is governed
Spartan/Cretan Natural, wholesome following of instinct; playful, childlike, spontaneous, innocent.
Monarchy/Aristocracy Government by the best and most virtuous elements of ones soul
Timocracy Rule by honor-seeking or self-righteous sub-ego(s); may lead to over-control and rebellion by appetitive sub-egos.
Oligarchy Government by sub-egos concerned with material gain
Democracy Short-sighted hedonism; ‘if it feels good, do it’; no consistent course.
Tyranny Obsessive, destructive pursuit of single desire or appetite (e.g., addiction)
Men ‘Male’ elements of personality: logic; impersonal idealism; action and initiative; anger and aggression; the intellect.
Women ‘Female’ elements of personality: feelings, sensations; affections; the will.
Children Newly conceived sub-egos
Golden/Silver races Nobler (more virtuous, wise, authentic) sub-egos and thoughts
Bronze/Iron races Baser (less virtuous, etc.) sub-egos and thoughts
Intermarriage Sub-egos of differing nobility may interbreed, producing children of a mixed nature. We must test sub-egos to determine their quality, and cannot rely on pedigree alone to judge worthiness to be rulers.
Tyrant’s progress (Books 8 & 9) A non-virtuous regime tends to invite further weakening our virtue, wisdom, and discernment, so that the next regime is usually worse. There is a characteristic trajectory of decline through the regimes of aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. One may, however, avoid this descent by means of philosophia.

>Why even make the distinction in the first place?
You can't deny it's very useful. For characterising society and the mind. Again, it's phenomenologically absolutely true.

We must forget the hierarchical nature to the Republic. The plebs still have the other two parts of the soul, but in a lower form, and maybe Plato would say with less preponderance in the soul. Just think of what the word passion means in our language, it's not the same as desire, hunger or satisfaction. Anger itself isn't a desire, but plebs experience it for lesser reasons.

>passion
How would you define it? I immediately think of energy, enthusiasm, drive, motivation, etc.

How's the Bloom edition?

Can you explain the Noble Lie within these parameters? Parts of the soul deceiving other parts (so the soul would be deceiving itself) seems antithetical to the nature of wisdom. Can parts of the soul (i.e. the raw, hungering, desirous part) not be compatible with the Kallipolis unless subjugated by the deceiving of them?

Dry to read, but great for close study. Every once in a while I get a little annoyed with certain choices that could've been dealt with by being *more* literal, such as translating kalos as beautiful in every instance instead of using an older variant like "fair" or "fine" which don't necessarily alert a reader. But otherwise, solid.

Not that user, but I suspect one possible way to respond via the text is through an implication at 382a-d that it's permissible to lie if it's for the sake of bringing someone in line with the Good. It's trickier to tell how it works with the soul analysis since the true, the medicinal lies, and the noble lies are all discussed before the soul. If the later passages about the Good hold, then maybe it's the case that the identity of the Good and the True need not be the same? (The Good could still be a cause of the True while remaining distinct, I guess.) Oddly Nietzschean.

Re: lies used to control the "lower" parts of the soul or the city, there's a funny implication never explicitly spelled out that the Noble Lie is really for the guardian classes; they're chosen for their memory, and by implication, the moneymaker class will forget it. The "elites" are the target of the lie; having a lot of thumos means they're the most likely to become vicious out of love of honor or to be better than others, so they seem to require much more moderating.

>Chariot where the Charioteer strictly speaking doesn't move himself, and the horses are constrained by the charioteer, so there's a very real tension that doesn't so easily resolve to soul as self-mover.
Well charioteers have legs don't they, they're not cripples bound to the chariot as a disability device neccassry for movement, it's not exclusionary of autonomous self-movement of the rational soul absent of the chariot. The chariot is the whole soul (and body?), the charioteer and horses are parts. Iamblichus also saw the chariot-itself as a necessary part that would be replaced by an intelligable chariot as the soul's vehicle.

First off, nice digits.
Now that the urgent matter has been attended to, let's see about the important one.
There are two ways to go about this. The first and easiest one is to emphasize the metaphorical aspect of the analogy. As long as you get the gist of the explanation, the details do not matter so much, and you can dismiss the more ridiculous (to our modern sensibilities) of Plato's claims. The obvious issue here being that many of those more ridiculous claims are also found in his undeniably political works (the Laws).
The other option is to see (most/many of) the sub-egos as being fully concerned with their own particular object. While not necessarily obsessive by nature, their participation toward the vision of the Good is accidental. If the ruler is turned toward the vision of the Good, and manages to manipulate his base instincts through self-imposed fictions into acting toward that vision, then the whole is harmonious despite the flaws of the parts.
>Can parts of the soul (i.e. the raw, hungering, desirous part) not be compatible with the Kallipolis unless subjugated
Probably not in their first iteration or "generation", to pursue the analogy. Tempered and united with other passions, other egos, with time and education, I would say that even the basest parts of the soul can become Silver/Golden.

>Well charioteers have legs don't they, they're not cripples bound to the chariot as a disability device neccassry for movement, it's not exclusionary of autonomous self-movement of the rational soul absent of the chariot.
Lol but that's literally the whole point, a charioteer can't walk his way up to the hyperuranians, he's totally dependent on the horses and wings to get anywhere, he can make the horses move, correct them by whipping, or try to restrain them, but he doesn't move anything, he's not self-moving, otherwise he'd go straight to the hyperuranians and never come down.

>Iamblichus also saw the chariot-itself as a necessary part that would be replaced by an intelligable chariot as the soul's vehicle.
I'm not sure I see the import of that? Can you spell this out a little more? Where does he talk about this?

See the book hereThe importance is the given by the interpretation of the first part of your post, that a chariot and horses are necessary for the intelligible soul to ascend, which Iamblichus shares; that souls need a vehicle. The rational soul is the immortal soul that transmigrates, the status of the vegetative and spirited soul is less certain, they're shared with plants and animals after all, their need for the flights of the rational soul are not firm.

See also the dicussion Porphyry gives to souls here. Plato and Platonism weren't the rational autism of modern conceptions, they were ancient theories of knowledge that aspired to give accounts of anatomy, ontogeny, and other things now partioned off to biology and 'science' generally.

>...that a chariot and horses are necessary for the intelligible soul to ascend, which Iamblichus shares; that souls need a vehicle. The rational soul is the immortal soul that transmigrates, the status of the vegetative and spirited soul is less certain, they're shared with plants and animals after all, their need for the flights of the rational soul are not firm.
Hm, this is certainly where I depart with Iamblichus and the rest of the Neoplatonists, with this kind of reading. If I'm to read Phaedrus (or any work of Plato) and come away going, "oh, so the soul is somehow more than figuratively a chariot that ascends, got it", what makes philosophy at that point any different from any mere acceptance of a dogma or set of opinions? That there's sometimes more arguments? Consider the following characterization, towards the end of Phaedrus:

278c-d
>Socrates: If he has composed these things, knowing where the truth lies, and being able to assist, when he goes into refutative examination of the things that he has written about, and has the power, when he himself speaks, to show forth the written things as slight— such a man must not be said to be named after these things, but named after those things that he has taken seriously.
>Phaedrus: What names, then, do you distribute to him?
>Socrates: To call him wise, Phaedrus, to me at least seems to be a big thing and to be fitting for god only. But either philosopher or some such thing would fit him better and would be more harmonious.

Or the Symposium:

204a
>For here is the way it is, not one of the gods philosophizes, any more than he desires to become wise— for he *is*— and whoever else is wise, he does not philosophize either.

The Neoplatonists see a great harmony between Plato and Aristotle, and I don't wholly disagree, but one crucial difference the passages above indicate is that Aristotle philosophizes expecting wisdom to truly to be at the end, but Plato is much less certain, and even his "dogmatic" dialogues lend themselves strongly to the Socratic expression "what I don't know I don't even suppose I know."

I mean, am I supposed to take Atlantis as more than a figurative image to work with? Am I supposed to be convinced Atlantis really existed soley because Plato wrote it in the mouth of a character? What about the irony of Socrates insisting to Crito in Euthydemus that they both become students of a pair of eristic sophists? Do I read as a Neoplatonist and decide to literally look for sophists to study under?

>nice digits
Likewise
>and manages to manipulate his base instincts through self-imposed fictions into acting toward that vision, then the whole is harmonious despite the flaws of the parts.
>>Can parts of the soul (i.e. the raw, hungering, desirous part) not be compatible with the Kallipolis unless subjugated
>Probably not in their first iteration or "generation", to pursue the analogy. Tempered and united with other passions, other egos, with time and education, I would say that even the basest parts of the soul can become Silver/Golden.
Indeed, I suppose the first generations of desire must be initially deceived away from their loyalty to corporeal vulgarities by being forcibly instructed from the other part that virtue is that which will really yield to it the greatest fruit (as it's not initially convinced of this fact from continual experience) and it is that regime to which it truly owes its loyalty
Similar to how desire is transformed in Symposium from the lower sensual love of beautiful bodies, into the higher love for the beautiful itself and is brought into the greater service of the soul's project for virtue

>If the ruler is turned toward the vision of the Good, and manages to manipulate his base instincts through self-imposed fictions into acting toward that vision, then the whole is harmonious despite the flaws of the parts.
Doesn't this seem less likely? Consider:

>"Don't you know," I said, "that all gods and human beings hate the true lie, if that expression can be used?"
>"What do you mean?" he said.
>"That surely no one," I said, "voluntarily wishes to lie about the most sovereign things to what is most sovereign in himself. Rather, he fears holding a lie there more than anything."
>"I still don't understand," he said.
>"That's because you suppose I mean something exalted," I said.
>"But I mean that to lie and to have lied to the soul about the things that are, and to be unlearned, and to have and to hold a lie there is what everyone would least accept; and that everyone hates a lie in that place most of all."
>"Quite so," he said.
>"Now what I was just talking about would most correctly be called truly a lie-the ignorance in the soul of the man who has been lied to. For the lie in speeches is a kind of imitation of the affection in the soul, a phantom of it that comes into being after it, and not quite an unadulterated lie. Isn't that so?"
>"Most certainly."
>"So the real lie is hated not only by gods, but also by human beings."

It's more obviously plausible coming from someone else, but at least based on the Republic, what would you suppose would otherwise defend that interpretation?

>Are they an attempt to breakdown the otherwise "integrated" mind into more easily-understood composites? Or are they separate drives, each with their own wills? In Book IV, Plato's examples, especially the part illustrating thymos, shows the parts of the soul to be in conflict.
Yes. The city is like the man. And just as in cities where the profane rule, the soul of a man is worse of when his primary driver is desire. It a hierarchy. All drives has to be accounted for but the higher drives should have more influence over both city and man.
>Finally, what the hell is "passion", anyway? Is that emotion? If so, why is thymos emotive but not epithymia, given that our desires seem tightly linked to our emotional state?
The creative force and the desire for recognition. Will.
>I've often heard Plato's "justice in the soul" is achieved through thymos allying with logos to control epithymia, but what does that look like in practice?
Yes because just like in the city the profane are the many, contrary to the small elite. Just like the lowest drive is the largest.

I don't think you're meant to think about it so visually/literally. It's more phenomenological, and a reality which is experienced.
Shut the fuck up pseud. He explains it in the allegory of the city and you can easily visualize that. Really, the only thing you have to do to understand it is to think of the allegory.

>what makes philosophy at that point any different from any mere acceptance of a dogma or set of opinions?
I think this is where your falling down, they weren't Cartesian-Leibnizian rationalists, that's a modern projection read back into Socrates and Plato in the 19th century. They used rationalism, but yes they depended on a large collection of positive dogmatic beliefs. What makes philosophy different is that it's the beginning of rationalism and rational enquiry, but if you're asking "what was the Platonic conception of the tripartite soul" then you're going to largely get a set of dogmatic beliefs.

You're making a mistake by reading the dialogues as a rational treatise in the early modern or modern mould, they were guides and starting points to oral exposition and lessons of what were an occult group of daemon worshippers; a reformation of the Orphic mystery religion. You're reading them anarchonistically beyond their purpose and the intent of the author whose way of thinking is remote and different to yours.

>I think this is where your...etc.
This plays down both how ancient and how prevalent skepticism were; skepticism need not simply be Pyrrhonism, refusing to take any position, nor need we pretend it must share the particular narrow focus on epistemology as Enlightenment skepticism does. But this take also plays down philosophy's initial appearance on the world stage as the discovery of the difference between custom and nature, and the subsequent realization of how important the difference between knowledge and opinion is. These distinctions are already present in the Pre-Socratics, and they're present in Plato as well. The Academy was skeptical within two generations of Plato's passing, long before the Neoplatonists could claim to be taking up what they thought were Academic traditions.

The distinction between knowledge and opinion isn't merely that of "what's true" and "what's not true"; if that were it, then it's in common with modern anglo autist philosophy. Plato wrote eight of his dialogues to take place within the month and a half or so around Socrates' trial and execution. Opinion means the element by which the city and most men operate, the conditions both necessary for philosophy to arise, and sufficient to snuff it out.

>You're making a mistake by...etc.
I don't read them like treatises. They're not simply dogmatic, otherwise Plato would've been more forward and presented himself in the dialogues, and neither does he consistently focus on Socrates either to record historic convos (because they are crazy anachronisms everywhere) or to merely memorialize his teacher. Whatever they are, they're clearly at the least well-educated provocations, if Plato, per both 7th letter and Phaedrus, didn't commit to writing his own settled conclusions. Per almost every Neoplatonist commentary I've read, *they* read them like treatises. And while the Neoplatonists were certainly chugging the koolaid re: theurgy, that doesn't mean everyone in the first century of the Academy was; Meno's initial Mystery flavored version of recollection becomes later on the thoroughly rational:

97e-98a
>Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it.

I've quoted two key passages above from Symposium and Phaedrus describing philosophy as desire for wisdom due to our lack of it, and wisdom itself belonging to the gods, but not, and this is consistent with the Apology, us. Again, by the Neoplatonist reading you're inclining to, one would read Euthydemus and go study under the sophists afterwards.

But you can't construct a coherent version of the tripartite soul within a rationalist framework, yet Plato obviously did hold and posit a theory of a tripartite soul, so clearly he posited positive and dogmatic ideas here at least. There's no skeptic theory of a tripartitie soul, obviously much of Plato goes beyond mere skepticisim and if you were to reduce Plato to skepticism it would mean throwing out almost all of the dialogues, letters, and school, yet he wrote much more than “I know only one thing: that I know nothing,” an entire corpus exists, followers existed.

I return to the notion that reading Plato through a Cartesian-Leibnizian lens, as much of 19th century informed Plato secondary lit does, is wrong.

>And while the Neoplatonists were certainly chugging the koolaid re: theurgy,
Here again the approach is wrong, Plato worshipped daemons, believed the world was full of gods. The beliefs of the school were satirised by Aristophanes for being superstitious. They're not rationalist deists, you're projecting an anachronism onto Plato rather than accepting the school and teacher for what they were.

>Per almost every Neoplatonist commentary I've read, *they* read them like treatises.
Aristotle did too, and he was literally taught by Plato. I don't get why people like you fixate on muh neoplatonists and totally forget that half of their understanding of Plato comes straight from Aristotle's critique of Plato's doctrines, which are strongly associated with that of Pythagoras.

>But you can't construct a coherent version of the tripartite soul within a rationalist framework, yet Plato obviously did hold and posit a theory of a tripartite soul, so clearly he posited positive and dogmatic ideas here at least.
That's neither obvious nor clear; one could as easily claim that Plato obviously and clearly believes in a simple unitary soul, and whereas there's only two dialogues with a tripartite scheme, there's plenty that treat the soul as a simple one (Phaedo, Symposium, Meno). But again, I quoted the Republic *which itself says the account therein is flawed*. Let me add to that Phaedrus' equivalent:

246a
>So then, concerning its immortality, that's sufficient; but concerning its idea, one must speak in the following manner. What sort of thing it is, is altogether in every way a matter for a divine and long narration, but what it is like, for a human and lesser one; let us then speak in this manner.

So according to *both* Republic and Phaedrus, the tripartite accounts are less precise images, not doctrine. What's more, in the Phaedrus' case, you'd have to ignore what the whole second of the dialogue suggests: that the palinode is a piece of rhetoric meant to make Phaedrus into something more than a hedonistic lover of speeches.

>There's no skeptic theory...
I agree that there's must be more than repetitions on the Apology, but between the Apology itself and the apoeretic dialogues, we also have several dialogues consistently claiming that Socrates *does* know one thing: Erotics. (Symposium 177d, Phaedrus 257a, Lysis 204b-c, and Theages 128b) But by Symposium, that means he knows...his lack of wisdom. This can't be just set to the side, it's a consistent theme. If you said, "sure, but it can't *just* be Plato writing 35 dialogues on exactly that one subject," to which I would agree, but as per the treatment of writing in the 7th letter and Phaedrus, his dialogues aren't meant to say overtly what he thinks, but might nonetheless indicate something or other. That's fine, that work of constantly banging one's head against the dialogues *makes the reader like Socrates who still asked the same questions at the end of his life as if there were no progress or ultimate culmination he reached.*

As for followers, we know practically dick all about the Academy in Plato's day, and the most certain thing we can say is that it began as an informal meeting place for the remaining Socratics. We don't know how the dialogues were used or what Plato taught.

>I return to the notion that...
You keep saying this, but I'm not sure you know what you mean; you yourself are operating by modern canons of coherence instead of seeing what's in front of you: 35 dialogues that, as dialogues, can conceal as much as Heraclitus' sayings, dialogues in which Plato is never a character speaking for himself, the longest of which doesn't even feature Socrates, all treating the forms and soul differently.

>Here again the approach is wrong, Plato worshipped daemons, believed the world was full of gods. The beliefs of the school were satirised by Aristophanes for being superstitious. They're not rationalist deists, you're projecting an anachronism onto Plato rather than accepting the school and teacher for what they were.
Aristophanes literally accuses Socrates and the denizens of the Thinkery of being atheists, not superstitious; Socrates in the Clouds is depicted bragging about how Zeus "is not" but how Void, i.e. natural processes "are."

If there's anything I'm sure of, it's that Socrates, who's always complaining about the myths of the Olympians, and Plato, who's always writing them, don't believe in the civic gods. The Apology bears this out: at 26b-27e, he and Meletus argue about the impiety charge. Socrates *could* say he believes in the civic gods, but *doesn't*. More than that, he repeatedly and frequently uses the verb for "customarliy belief", "nomizein" and its forms x20 by my count from 26b up to 27c, at which point he drops nomizein entirely *only* to use hegeomai and derivatives x8 for his defense of himself as a believer of daimons. Hegeomai primarily means "to lead oneself" but also means "to believe" in the sense of having lead oneself to believe. I'm sure you're about to say that's a slam dunk for your case re: daimons, except as per Symposium again, *Eros* is the peculiarly Socratic daimon, *the recognition of his ignorance and desire for wisdom*. The unity of the daimon and Socratic ignorance in Symposium suggest the solution to the Apology. Further, Theages also makes the same connection; Socrates appeals to his knowledge of Erotics to possibly help Theages, and switches gears to only talking about the daimon when Theages thinks Socrates only brought up Erotics to mock him Socratic ignorance = Erotics = the daimon.

More than likely, Plato and Socrates believed in something closer to Aristotle's deity that doesn't have any personal interest in us.

The Academy and Platonism only became strongly associated with the Mysteries and such *after* shifting from the skeptic period.

>Aristotle's deity
You mean Aristotle's deities?
>The Academy and Platonism only became strongly associated with the Mysteries and such *after* shifting from the skeptic period.
Plato and Socrates were literally members of the Mysteries.

>one could as easily claim that Plato obviously and clearly believes in a simple unitary soul
No, you couldn't, because the soul only becomes divided in the later dialogues. It's also clearly seen not to be without some sort of division. The fact that a soul exists (which is what you're referring to) does not imply that it is internally divided.
>So according to *both* Republic and Phaedrus, the tripartite accounts are less precise images, not doctrine.
Less precise than what? They are the most precise versions given. Even Aristotle's division into 3 doesn't admit that it is perfectly precise. That's because (at least in Plato) they're speaking of that which is subject to change, see Timaeus, where nothing can be said absolutely about anything.
> This can't be just set to the side, it's a consistent theme
Yes, irony is a consistent theme in the dialogues when Socrates claims to have no knowledge after concluding the arguments of others.
>We don't know how the dialogues were used or what Plato taught.
It's the old game of "ignore all historic evidence which contradicts me." Have you simply ignored Aristotle or do you imagine that he was just making everything about Plato up because it doesn't fit with your beliefs?
>you yourself are operating by modern canons of coherence instead of seeing what's in front of you:
I've read the dialogues with an open mind, and simply cannot reconcile what I've read with the claims of your post. You've quoted a lot of selected examples, for example the frequency with which a given word recurs, but this has to be the most bugbrained method of text interpretation I've ever come across. It's almost subhuman, "Socrates used "common belief" 35 times to refer to the gods, therefore he is more likely an atheist."

>that it is
That it isn't*

>Aristotle did too, and he was literally taught by Plato. I don't get why people like you fixate on muh neoplatonists and totally forget that half of their understanding of Plato comes straight from Aristotle's critique of Plato's doctrines, which are strongly associated with that of Pythagoras.
Lol you just complained about me at reading the dialogues like treatises, now I'm supposed to read them like treatises? Which is it fella?

Aristotle is brilliant, *but if Aristotle reads the dialogues as doctrinal treatises* then he's either being polemical, rhetorical, or wrong, *again and again and again as per Phaedrus and the 7th letter on writing*. The most valuable thing he tells us about is the indeterminate dyad. Otherwise, this is just an evasion from interpreting the goddamn dialogues. If you want to argue about specific passages, how context effects the reading, the nuances of the Greek, sure, but I've been quoting and citing the dialogues directly and you keep arguing from either other authorities (Neoplatonists almost 1000 years after Plato or scholars of Neoplatonism) or from generalities (muh orphics and puhthagoreans) that you refuse to prove on the only grounds Plato gives us, the dialogues.

>but if Aristotle reads the dialogues as doctrinal treatises* then he's either being polemical, rhetorical, or wrong
Aristotle was literally taught by and spoke with Plato personally. It's not that he just read them, it's that he actually insisted that Plato and his students held positions (some of which ARE NOT even in the dialogues). My only assumption is that now you will shift over to asserting that Aristotle was just desperate to discredit Plato, even though in his earlier writings he even refers to himself as a follower of Plato.
>Otherwise, this is just an evasion from interpreting the goddamn dialogues
Plato's ACTUAL teachings are more important than the dialogues in this argument, which were at best just brain teasers to attract people to Plato's Academy, not the final result of his philosophy.
>If you want to argue about specific passages, how context effects the reading, the nuances of the Greek
All of that is subjective and based on the person reading it, I will obviously disagree with your interpretations, so it's meaningless, because I find the Neoplatonist and Aristotelian understanding of Platonic philosophy inherently more philosophically valuable and enlightening, which you clearly don't. We're speaking about historical realities, not interpretations, which means that authorities, mainly Plato himself, are relevant.

>You mean Aristotle's deities?
I'll be more forward then; his onotological causes he calls "god."

>Plato and Socrates were literally members of the Mysteries.
I wouldn't be shocked if we had certain knowledge of that they were at some point initiated, but 1) this is blindly accepting later tradition, and 2) not relevant to the material of the dialogues. Oh, I guess there's a reference to the Corybants in Euthydemus; the sophists are likened to them.

>No, you couldn't, because...
One certainly could; it's simple and single in the Phaedo, Meno, Symposium, Gorgias, etc.

>Less precise than what? Etc.
It's less precise than the "longer and harder" way of the philosopher's understanding, in the case of the Republic, and a "divine and long" account in the case of the Phaedrus. Do you just not bother reading any of the text in front of you? And the Timaeus justification isn't relevant *when they're discussing soul*; are you saying soul is subject to change?

>Yes, irony is a...
Gonna ignore Eros, eh?

>It's the old game of...
First off, it's awfully funny to complain "u ignorin duh evidemce" when you just asserted a "later" stance of Plato that no Neoplatonist would've taken seriously; congrats, you're a true modern.

I've already addressed Aristotle; again, you're confusing suppositions with evidence, of which, Aristotle still doesn't tell us any which way how the dialogues were formally used if at all; just what *he alone* took from them. And again, this still evades ever talking about the dialogues or passages I've quote from them.

>I've read the dialogues
Yes, "read", I'm sure. I'm sure using two entirely different verbs for "belief", one connoting custom, the other thinking for oneself, are totally irrelevant in the very dialogue where Socrates is put on trial for believing differently than the rest of Athens. Super totally irrelevant. Silly me.

Quit while you're ahead.

>Aristotle was literally...
Which tells us nothing else than that they spent a good deal of time together, strictly speaking. We don't know if Plato taught formally or had others do it, we don't know how he used the dialogues, *if* he used the dialogues formally, we don't know how much uniformity of opinion there was in the Academy or if there were disputes, and if so, how serious. We know the initial gatherers all had very different and assorted philosophical positions.

"Aristotle's early writings" nigga we literally know shit about when Aristotle wrote anything at all, his corpus is a mess. But hey, how about *quoting directly* if you think you have something, hm?

>Plato's ACTUAL teachings...
The dialogues are all. We. Have. We have a few references to the One and the indeterminate dyad, and that's it.

In any case, I know you're a nigger now, because you've slipped from having argued for taking the dialogues as collections of doctrines to saying they're not even relevant to our argument. *hint: they fucking are!)

>All of that is subjective...
First off, very "modern" of you, A+, great job. Second, you're defending your positions by...blowing your dick off? Weird move, but okay; this argument started over the interpretation of the dialogues, which you've not directly bothered to try at all in this thread. Insisting you still won't just gives me the impression that you are neither engaging with them, nor as much of a reader of them as you would have me believe. With great texts, the commentators are always necessarily lesser than the texts they comment on; you'd rather read Plato's commentators than Plato.