What stops transcendental idealism from falling into skepticism about the external world and solipsism?

Quantum mechanics disproves most of the old arguments for materialism

>t. Deepak Chopra

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>dude, you can't just like, directly interact with another individual, you have to interact with some arbitrarily defined matter between you two so that it reaches him
>no I will not explain how this rationally or practically benefits anyone
The Demiurge (not neo Platonic) has more stable and consistent ideas than you, that's it.

>idealism is when things are ideal

>pic
is supposedly true, my University physics professor literally started one of his lectures with that statement. Maybe it's because I'm not American but I rarely got the post modernist indoctrination in university people on Yea Forums claim happens.

>is supposedly true,
It ain't. 99% of anything that mentions the word 'quantum' is bullshit. Unless they are actually describing the probabilities of quantum particles like quarks and what not then it's bullshit.
Even 'Quantum Computing' isn't quantum.
Kantianism might be incompatible with later scientific discoveries, but anyone who says a vague statement like "Quantum Mechanics disproves it" has no idea what they're talking about and might as well be saying "The Riemann Hypothesis/Reynold's Number/Thicc PAWGs disproves it" or similar non-argumentative nonsense.

>"Quantum Mechanics disproves it"
Is correct because materialism put all their eggs in the basket of scientific determinism that was becoming really popular before the discovery of quantum mechanics, fundamentally disproving the ideas the ideas that relied on a purely newtonian reality.

Name one proposition of Kant's that's incompatible with one specific finding of Quantum Mechanics because we all know you're talking through your ass.

I can't because that wasn't even what I was talking about. I was just arguing against my presumption of OPs implication based on how these idealism vs materialism threads go.

Very bright minds criticized Kant heavily even while he was alive about this, and Kant's response was "They misunderstand me" instead of clarifying how exactly he was right and they were wrong. To this day Kantians think he's just right and claim they can prove it but it's not particularly convincing. The need to talk about things in themselves seems quite unargued for, the capacity to talk about them seems quite impossible given his claims that categories and concepts can only apply to empirical objects, and his own account of the truth of sentences seems so thoroughly ideal that the supposed objectivity of the thing in itself quite becomes a dangler in the whole account of Kantian truth. Of course Kantians will resist this but the truth is that it's Kant's fault for not properly proving to the world that his critics misunderstood him as he claimed.

Hegel squares this circle epistemologically: Ding An Sich is a product of consciousness to universalize the object of perceptions.

tldr

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If you're too lazy to even read the wikipedia or sep articles about Kant and instead expect other people to spend the time to to "provide[...] educational and simplified answers", I have two words for you: fuck yourself!

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you have absolutely no idea how quantum physics works. Just because we don't currently understand something doesn't mean it's random. Just because the world doesn't work as a Newtonian machine doesn't disprove materialism at all. Schrodinger's cat was originally created to show how stupid certain quantum physicists were, and anyone who believes that the cat is in some sort of magical state of both dead and alive is absolutely retarded

> materialism put all their eggs in the basket of scientific determinism
Materialism doesn’t require or presuppose any given model of causality. Read Althusser.

The deeply intersubjective character of consciousness and knowledge.
Also, read Husserl.

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Sounds like cope to me retard. Just google it, read it or quit shitting up the board.

I did read SEP and tried to find some essays on sci-hub, and then in my confusion asked for clarity. And didn't get it because of morons like you who don't have answers either.
See, all this time instead of actually discussing Kant, you've only tried to insult some stranger on the internet over something you wrongly assumed they didn't do. Is that a productive use of your time?

Plus, Schopenhauer was better

>skepticism about the external world and solipsism?
He doesn't deny the existence of some external objective "something" he just says we kant know what it is in its true essence "in itself."

Anywhere to start with him? He certainly seems easier to grasp without losing content.

>Does Kant give arguments to support things-in-themselves, or are they just wishful thinking?
He says sensory experience must have a cause, and that cause must be something external. Hence the external world. Where he departs from empiricism is the contention that what the senses produce is a re-production of the external world. Perception is cognition-laden and interspersed with various categories of reasoning that are sprinkled in by the mind, making for conditions in which the mind's contribution and the external stimuli's contribution cannot be evenly and cleanly separated.

I understand, but if we can't know the thing-in-itself, how do we know it is out there in the first place? Why shouldn't we identify appearances or sensations with things-in-themselves?

>He says sensory experience must have a cause, and that cause must be something external
I thought one of the main points of the CPR was that things such as "cause" cannot be applied to metaphysical statements outside the world of concepts that our minds imposes onto us, e.g. principle of sufficient reason for the existence of God. In other words, we can't say that "something external" has or is a cause. Is that accurate?

Not that user but I started with his essays and aphorisms

Quantum physics work 100% on deterministic principles, you are just retarded

>I understand, but if we can't know the thing-in-itself, how do we know it is out there in the first place? Why shouldn't we identify appearances or sensations with things-in-themselves?
Not that user but I don't buy that line of argument: Forensic Investigators are quite adept at telling if someone was murdered without, ya know, identifying the murderer or having sensations of the murderer. I don't need to know the source of a leak, but when I sense the wetness of a puddle on my kitchen floor - I know that somewhere in the kitchen there is something leaking that shouldn't - I don't need direct sensory data of the source of that leak, only the result of it.
Worse still it implies that the more reasonable assertion is that there is nothing out there, (because the question is not: what is the nature of things-in-themselves but are there things-in-themselves at all?) and I know all too well that as much as I have tried to 'change my reality' there does seem to be some exogenous force on my senses that is not generated internally of my locus of control or in my "subject", so there must be something else... the things-in-themselves, whatever form they take.

desu i couldnt go more than 30 minuets of The Metaphysics of Morals it got boring and the grimorium verum was more interesting

>reality is either random or deterministic
>we cant prove either
>but its totally one of those
Its neither

I don't think you understand how scientific claims work, if it was deterministic scientists would say that. But we don't have proof, so saying it is is anti-science. And until we do, we cannot say it is true.

>Schrodinger's cat was originally created to show how stupid certain quantum physicists were
And now, MWT which is a more absurd version of that is taken seriously by some scientists.

Whoops, looks like you confused reasoning about the phenomenal world with pure reason’s postulate of a noumenal world.
> I understand, but if we can't know the thing-in-itself, how do we know it is out there in the first place? Why shouldn't we identify appearances or sensations with things-in-themselves?
We don’t - that’s the point - its noumenal. We can rationally postulate it as the universal remainder of our reasoning’s analytic action over sensuous intuitions, but about the noumenon we can’t know anything, not even that it’s “out there,” because if we take this postulate in its extremity we find that we too must have a noumenal aspect that recedes and draws away from our empirical moments of experience. But therein we are free, because we have put forward an aspect of ourselves free from causal determination in the phenomenal realm.

>No philosopher in history has ever defended subjective idealism

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Kant doesn't even seem bold enough to assert its existence though. Feel free to contradict me if you have a direct quote where he states clearly otherwise. I understand that Kant asserts that existence is not a predicate, even though reality (existence) is one of his categories, however surely predicating reality of the thing in itself would be doing too much, because categories cannot apply to it. It can't be either negated, posited, nor unlimited, because that would be categorizing it according to the understanding. But if existence is not a predicate, ie not a category, then surely the thing in itself might be allowed to be given existence?
>I know that somewhere in the kitchen there is something leaking that shouldn't
You don't actually know that, you just assume it because it is common. Your idea of "wet floor" is either strongly associated with or contained within the idea of a "leak", not necessarily but just empirically due to common experience of the two coinciding. It could also be caused by magma deep under your house evaporating the ground water, which then bubbles up through the soil and pushes up through the floor somehow, entering your house from below, just to give an absurdly unlikely example.

>looks like you confused reasoning about the phenomenal world with pure reason’s postulate of a noumenal world.
Where?
>It could also be
You lost when you phrased it like that... because true to form it's a straw clutchingly improbable suggestion which doesn't present a strong enough argument to look for this being the cause.
Likewise in a either or: do things-in-themselves exist even if their exact nature is unknown, or is it solipsism. I'm gonna vote for the latter. Also why is it that whenever someone starts a counterpoint with a "what if..." or "maybe it's" or "it could also be..." invariably it's suggestion they pulled out of their ass? Note I'm not accusing you - I realize it's a rhetorical example to show the impossibility of certainty, but... god why can't people be more persuasive and stop wasting my time!?

>. I'm gonna vote for the latter.
*former
Fuck. I've had a lot to drink

> Where
The entire analogy betrays misapprehension of what the word “noumenal” refers to. The leak is noumenal with respect to the phenomenal drip. It’s just something we haven’t empirically encountered yet. The noumenon is an abstract postulate of pure reason.

The leak ISNT**

Well you clearly didn't read my entire post. Go back and read the stuff about not being able to 'change my reality'.
But more to the point which do you personally think is more likley?
>there is nothing external of the subject (you)
>there is something external of the subject (you)
You can only pick one, and can't qualify it. Answer it. to rephrase the question: Do you personally err more towards things-in-themselves existing in some form or another, or not at all?

You just have no idea what you’re talking about.
Kant is NOT saying that the phenomenal world is like a veil of appearance cast over an invisible landscape.
He’s saying that superadded to our conceptual apprehension of sensuous objects is the supposition, provided by pure reason, of their universality, which is the noumenal thing-in-itself.
This is not phil 101 where you try to answer “why is there something instead of nothing,” “is the world real or an illusion,” etc.
That said - I am not a subjective idealist, to answer your question. Neither is Kant.

>> there is nothing external of the subject (you)
I’ll add moreover that this is actually correct but needs to be understood in Hegel’s sense in order to be correct: there IS “nothing” outside the subject - outside the subject, Nothing is, Nothing is there. But not the Nothing which is simple non-existence or non-being, rather the simple negation of every Something, everything given sensuously to intuition.

Notice how no kantians have answered, but merely replied smugly and condescendingly. Is there a bigger hint that they themselves don't know?

> things-in-themselves existing
Contradiction in terms - things IN themselves do not EX-sist. That’s why they are IN themselves.

Things would remain in themselves forever if consciousness didn’t come along to draw them out of their inwardness into outward phenomenality. Kantianism is about the insistence that there is a necessary, knowable connection between this inner repose and phenomenal appearances, he’s not saying that we’re somehow mistaken or mislead by appearances. Actually, what misleads us is our attempts to rationalize appearances. This things-in-themselves don’t properly exist until observed, but “existence” shouldn’t be taken to mean “reality” - it’s not subjective idealism whereby the subject somehow unfolds the entire world out of itself - to exist is rather to be the synthesis of being-for-self with being-for-another.

All Kant is saying is that the noumenon is neither time nor space, as they form a synthetic unit.
Schopenhauer on the other hand says that the thing-in-itself is the will.

First of all: you're talking to two different persons (which should tell you it's not just the personal opinion of a single guy)
Second: even a five minute research in the SEP would have given you the following passage
> Kant’s argument, very briefly, is that the existence of objects in space outside me (“empirically external” objects) is a condition on the possibility of my being conscious of the determinate temporal relations of my inner states. Consequently, it is impossible to be a self-conscious subject without there existing objects in space outside of me, and in being conscious of the temporal relations of my inner states I am immediately conscious of the existence of these objects.
If you want to look up the whole argument in the KpR, go for the "Refutation of Idealism" (B276-288) which would not have been exactly hard to find, if you had just looked for it, too.

Next time, at least put the minimum amount of effort into it before you expect others to do your homework.

>This is not phil 101 where you try to answer “why is there something instead of nothing,” “is the world real or an illusion,” etc.
Why are you turning it into that then? I don't remember asking that question. I said that I can't control the things I see, therefore there's something else. You seem to agree with that, You claim Kant agrees with that too. I didn't attempt to get into an epistemological argument over what and how those things are. Only that pedantically spouting "what ifs" about the improbability of total solipsism is a fucking waste of energy.
I never claimed Kant was asking about that either, I was simply trying to tell that other I don't buy the argument that you need to directly have sensation of something to know there was something.
Really I should have just said "ALGEBRA!"

You didn't actually read my post and you have the gall to tell me to do my homework? Let's look back at the post in question >None of you fuckers could give me a clear answer why concepts were different to objects
Instead of answering it, you've invented a question I didn't ask and then decided I'm lazy for not researching this irrelevant question of your own invention instead of answering mine. A simple one of mere definition.
What is a object, what is a concept? Why are they different?
If a concept is a 'mediate representation of an object' then what is an object, and don't say the 'immediate representation of a concept' or something tautological. Explain it in the kind of pure English that can only come from a true masterly grasp of the material, not the kind of argot ridden rote-learning that shows that you don't understand it either:
What is a concept?
What is a object?
Why are they different? How are they different?
Do I need to ask it again just so you know that I'm not asking about the conditionality of temporal relations of a subject's inner states but asking:
>>>>>>>What distinguishes objects from concepts in Kantian terminology...

No, you simply think you are not asking about those things because you don’t know whereof you speak. You believe there is a “simple” answer that doesn’t include reference to temporality because you have a notion in your head of what these things should be, which we are failing to satisfy because they aren’t that. They aren’t simple. They aren’t isolated. They are complex and involved.

At the risk of beating you over the head with it: I didn't ask that... I asked:
>When discussing Kant there are two words "concept" and "object" what do each refer to and how does the meaning between the two words differ with respect to discussing Kant?

What is a concept and how does it differ from a object?