I've written a piece explaining why I think it can be parsimonious to believe in a god...

I'm not sure what your arguement is
>universe is observable
>therefore the idea that we will (obviously) only observe the universe in which we exist to observe it requires a divine being
>who has the Christian characteristic of having an untouchable essence
>which is likely because solipsism is absurd, and if solipsism isn't true why can't a creator exist
The answer is because a creator inherently has characteristics an individual is never allowed to have. The absurdity comes from demanding that humans be incredibly limited due to sudo-Christian x materialistic positions while also having the one singular unlimited God.

That argument seems completely circular but I don’t really feel like thinking about why

I read the first sentence and then stopped, you seem to focus too much on sounding like you're saying something insightful.

This is incorrect. The many worlds hypothesis is invariably necessary to the anthropic principle, so long as the principle is countering the idea of a "fine-tuned" universe. The very basis of it is that the existence of other universes invalidates the fine-tuned hypothesis.

Additionally, it might be a 100% chance that we are living in a universe amenable to human life, but the point is that it there is not a 100% chance that the universe should have ever supported human life.

This is what the philosopher Nick Bostrom articulates this point well:

>First a few words about the supposition that our universe is in fact fine-tuned. This is an empirical assumption that is not trivial. It is certainly true that our current best physical theories, in particular the Grand Unified Theory of the strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces and the big bang theory in cosmology, have a number (twenty or so) of free parameters. There is quite strong reason to think at least some of these parameters are fine-tuned—the universe would have been inhospitable to life if their values had been slightly different.1 While it is true that our knowledge of “exotic” life forms possible under different physical laws than the ones that hold in the actual world is very limited (Feinberg and Shapiro 1980; Smith 1985; Wilson 1991), it does seem quite reasonable to believe, for instance, that life would not have evolved if the universe had contained only a highly diluted hydrogen gas or if it had recollapsed before the temperature anywhere had dropped below 10,000 degrees (referring to the seeming fine-tuning in the early expansion speed) (Hawking 1974; Leslie 1985). What little direct evidence we have supports this suggestion. Life does not seem to evolve easily even in a universe like our own, which presumably has rather favorable conditions—complex chemistry, relatively stable environments, large entropy gradients etc. (Simpson 1964; Papagiannis 1978; Hart 1982; Carter 1983; Mayr 1985; Raup 1985; Hanson 1998). There are as yet no signs that life has evolved in the observable universe anywhere outside our own planet (Tipler 1982; Brin 1983).

I believe that I am.

We all have deep seated anthropocentric bias, that tell us we are a defining feature of the universe.
Would you have to bring up fine tuning or the many world hypothesis to explain the very specific shape and composition of a rock? yet its existance is just as unlikely as yours.

Yawn. Same basic first mover shit dressed up in fancy language. If God was necessary to fine-tune the universe who fine-tuned God? Of all the possible Gods how did we get so lucky as to get a competent one interested in creating a universe just for us?

I'm not a Christian and I'm not arguing for a YHWH type god.

No it isn't.

If the universe was fine-tuned, then there was something that fine-tuned it. That's all I know, because to claim otherwise would be contradictory.

You don't even understand what I said. I gave a direct argument that the many worlds hypothesis is not necessary for the anthropic principle.

>
Additionally, it might be a 100% chance that we are living in a universe amenable to human life, but the point is that it there is not a 100% chance that the universe should have ever supported human life.

Amenable=supports human life. The fact that we're here typing this means that 100% the universe supports human life. That is the anthropic principle.

Your quote from Bostrom doesn't mention the many worlds hypothesis at all. It even mentions differing differing laws of physics which goes against your assertion that the many worlds interpretation of quantum physics is necessary to the anthropic principle since one of the differing laws would be quantum physics.

think of a particular snowflakes or whatever, there are countless thing that can only exist under very particular cirmcumstence and laws of physics, yet you don't see them as evidence of fne tuning because you already assume that life and human are inherently specials.

The requirement for a creator who is special and not like other people is that he has a special nature or position that no one else can reach. Maybe not the extreme Christian "All powerful God" vs "All dependent man" but the solipsism stuff clearly points to a special God with attributes that supposedly cannot be reached. The question is, why? Why is this necessary? Because we can't remember "the first action" that may not have been needed for things to exist at all? Or my preferred theory, that people get too giddy over praising Monotheism over Polytheism that they ascribe unnecessary singularities to metaphysics (one start, one place, one source etc).

I don't see why particular snowflakes are relevant. It's a question of types. The conditions that lead to the existence of rocks are not as improbable as the conditions that lead the existence of humans.

This is not especially profound. Just a consequence of deductive reasoning that people get tied in knots about

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Why is it necessary to believe that other people are phenomenally conscious?

>The conditions that lead to the existence of rocks are not as improbable as the conditions that lead the existence of humans.

Yes they are. The particular molecular configuration of a rock is enormously improbable. It's only when you privilege aspects of humanity and write off the complexity of a rock as meaningless that you think humanity is improbable relative to a rock.

the category of human is something arbitrarily defined, I could chose to call all snowflakes with this very specific shape "Thing A" and I would be right to say that the existance of "Thing A" is just as improbable if not more, than humans.

Again, individual rocks are not relevant. What is relevant are types. It is not improbable that rocks exist as a type. It is improbable that conscious beings exist as a type.

You perscribe reality as functioning based on no one, a "soulless" material reality that has no one operating it. You make 0 actions you are not aware of or cannot become aware of, things you own or posess might but you yourself do not. Why not extend this nature to externally observed phenomena onstead of positing an absurd existence capable of everything you do but doing so without being aware. A reality without consciousness that exists and does things demands more explanation than you yourself Id say.

Ok, replace "human" with "conscious being". Same outcome, unless you're a panpsychist.

Panpsychism is based and literally undisprovable.

>It is improbable that conscious beings exist as a type.
And it is improbable that the type of rock exists. The fine-tuning argument doesn't even try to get to the level of biology it stops at the level of basic matter since science is far from advanced enough to work out the consequences of differing physical constants past that level. If humans are fine-tuned then rocks are equally fine-tuned.

Unless you are asserting non-physicalism, counscious being just emerge out certain very specific matter arragement, which are no more improbably than other very specific matter arrangement.

>Amenable=supports human life. The fact that we're here typing this means that 100% the universe supports human life.

I agree with this, but you don't seem to have understood my point, which is that there was not a 100% chance that the universe would support human life. This is why every interpretation of the anthropic principle that I know of has used the many worlds hypothesis as a basis, unless it wasn't countering the fine-tuning argument. If you can point me to any exceptions, I'd be fascinated to see them. But even Wikipedia attests to this. Sure, I get it, wikiledia isn't a good source, but feel free to provide better ones that counter what it says.

>The weak anthropic principle (WAP), such as the one defined by Brandon Carter, states that the universe's ostensible fine tuning is the result of selection bias (specifically survivorship bias). Most often such arguments draw upon some notion of the multiverse for there to be a statistical population of universes to select from. However, a single vast universe is sufficient for most forms of the WAP that do not specifically deal with fine tuning.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle?wprov=sfla1

Self-organising and propagating systems (e.g life) are much rarer than other systems.

Huh? Cant there just be more non MWT universes besides the observable one? Both in space and time

Conscious matter is seemingly far rarer than unconscious matter. Unless of course we assume panpsychism.

I actually do find it a very compelling theory.

What about viruses

only because of how you arbitrarily define them

There could be, but for the reasons related to the problems such a hypothesis poses for probability that I outlined in my OP, I have suggested it is not necessarily an hypothesis free of holes.

Still relatively extremely rare compared to all the other matter in the universe.

I don't think they could be considered to be anything but rare, no matter how loose the definition.

Also fine tuning already assumes the god hypothesis to be probable in some way. If counscious beings are improbable, wouldn't an infinitly more complex counscious being beeven more improbable.

How come we presume conscipusness cna interact with matter and vice versa but never consciousnesd interacting with more consciousness? Wouldnt the first duality hamper reality a lot?

so are "thing A" snowflakes, there are countless rare things that can only exist in very particular conditions. The choice to single out counscious being as special is arbitrary.

First interesting counterpoint that someone has made on this thread. Thanks. I'll have to think about that one.

God is usually not seen as anothet conscious being in religion but at least in Christianity as an apex of all good attributes with some weird metaphysics on his knowing action and essence.

>I agree with this, but you don't seem to have understood my point, which is that there was not a 100% chance that the universe would support human life

>Most often such arguments draw upon some notion of the multiverse for there to be a statistical population of universes to select from. However, a single vast universe is sufficient for most forms of the WAP that do not specifically deal with fine tuning.

You're getting confused. The multiverse and the many-worlds interpretation are two different things. The multiverse is a metaphysical style assumption while the many-worlds interpretation is an interpretation of an empirically verified physical law. Even worse it's unclear how the fine-tuning argument would work without the multiverse since possible worlds are what makes up the multiverse. If there were no possible worlds besides this one there would no question about why the physical constants were the way they are.

But the point is that none of those things are able to ask the questions we're asking now. What's strange is knowing that the existence of my consciousness (any consciousness) was highly improbable. There will of course be lots of things in the universe that are in improbable. But out of all those improbable things, it's even more improbable that the one thing that is able to assess the probability of its existence is improbable in itself.

>You're getting confused. The multiverse and the many-worlds interpretation are two different things. The multiverse is a metaphysical style assumption while the many-worlds interpretation is an interpretation of an empirically verified physical law.

In my OP I presented the multiverse hypothesis as being contingent on the validity of the many worlds hypothesis, and so simply referred to it as many worlds. Probably a mistake, but I am aware of the distinction.

>If there were no possible worlds besides this one there would no question about why the physical constants were the way they are.

Why would there be no question about the way they are?

>Why would there be no question about the way they are?

Because changing the physical constants means there is a different possible universe. If there are not different possible universes you can't change the physical constants. To ask why they are one way and not another relies on the existence of the possibility of them being another way.

>In my OP I presented the multiverse hypothesis as being contingent on the validity of the many worlds hypothesis, and so simply referred to it as many worlds. Probably a mistake, but I am aware of the distinction.

From the same wikipedia page you linked from

Although philosophers have discussed related concepts for centuries, in the early 1970s the only genuine physical theory yielding a multiverse of sorts was the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. This would allow variation in initial conditions, BUT NOT IN THE TRULY FUNDAMENTAL CONSTANTS. Since that time a number of mechanisms for producing a multiverse have been suggested: see the review by Max Tegmark.[34] An important development in the 1980s was the combination of inflation theory with the hypothesis that some parameters are determined by symmetry breaking in the early universe, which allows parameters previously thought of as "fundamental constants" to vary over very large distances, thus eroding the distinction between Carter's weak and strong principles. At the beginning of the 21st century, the string landscape emerged as a mechanism for varying essentially all the constants, including the number of spatial dimensions

Note in particular the capitalized part

>Conscious matter is seemingly far rarer than unconscious matter. Unless of course we assume panpsychism.

Conscious matter is one of those biased categorizations we were talking about. Why privilege conscious matter over any other equally rare physical phenomena?

You really only observe through consciousness. Its impossible to observe consciousness as matter. It leads to the fact that matter as we imagine it is less possible than consciousness.

Huh? I thought you were arguing that humans were improbable compared to rocks. Now it seems like you're saying that rocks are improbable compared to humans.

Not him but yes unconsciousness stemming from consciousness is as absurd as the other.

other way around*

Meh it's clear that consciousness comes from your brain. If you don't think so go stick a nail in your head and find out.

That is it, isn't it though. You very well could be, but don't rely on the prose/aesthetic in order to convey that; the content itself (of what you have to say) should be from where we get that sense. That is the ideal. Once you are, in your boundless profundity, an established leader of thought you can have fun with the language.

I did. Im still conscious just confused.

So you're saying that a physical event had an effect on your consciousness? How could that be? I thought consciousness and matter were unconnected?

I think the 1st paragraph needs to be rewritten. If your point is something like:
>There are probably many Universes with different properties, and we just happen to live in one that allows for human life. Physical theories must conform to this, and we call this requirement "the anthropic principle".
you should try to combine the 2nd and 3rd sentences into a single one, so the relation with the 1st is clearer.
While we are at it:
>The reality is that there are probably other Universes that don't have such properties
Firstly, citation needed - it's not evident at all. Secondly, later you say:
>questions of probability aren't relevant
so why bring it up in the first place? Are you referring to different probabilities? I think this is an awkward way to end the paragraph, and am not sure what you mean by it.
>Very neatly answers questions about the probability
It really doesn't. The weak anthropic principle is little more than a truism. The strong anthropic principle is unhinged metaphysics. Either way, it lacks explanatory power.
>In doing so refutes explanations that involve hypothesising a God who fine-tunes the Universe.
Only in combination with a belief in the multiverse. You can admit that the Universe we know must be able to support human life without making any assumptions on other potential Universes. I'd say you're either starting from a flawed premise or you need to state what you mean by anthropic principle more clearly - it's a rather vague term (admittedly, I might just be dumb). Which leads me to:
>The principle relies on the many-world hypothesis
I don't see why this is the case at all. In fact, the MWH presumes that other Universes (at least some of them, and why not all of them?) follow the same quantum-mechanical Laws as our own, since every possible result of a measurement that we can conceive using the Physics we know is actually realized in them. You'd actually make a stronger case against fine-tuning if you just concocted a model of the multiverse where the initial conditions of inflation were distributed randomly among the different Universes (meaning that in some of them matter would just be blown away and never get structured) without making any assumption on which interpretation of QM is correct.

>it is highly improbable that it ended up this way
This is just nonsense, and you say it yourself a couple of lines earlier. Gauging how likely it is for a sick horse to die before it reaches the finish line requires you to: (1) have seen healthy horses before, in order to realize that it's sick (2) have seen sick horses before, to know how it's body will react when put under strain. Events that may seem counterintuitive or unlikely could, in fact, be completely necessary, and we'd have no way of finding out without looking at other Universes.