How do you refute him?

god I wish I was german just so I can read this motherfucker

The english translation can't come fast enough.

>How do you refute him?
By not reading his suicide note (his book).

He looks like a latino twink

This “God’s suicide” metaphor was blown completely out of proportion with the anglo Mainlander rediscovery. His stated mission was to clean out the metaphysical underpinnings of Schopenhauer. It is very common for people that never read Mainlander to assume that this suicide thing is a metaphysical doctrine, akin to the Will in Schoppy (ironically).
I think that people in the pessimism sphere tend to get carried over “impactful”, over the top, gloomy imagery. Mainlander is very analytical and pragmatic (which isn’t to his detriment, his prose can be quite beautiful sometimes).
Also, if you are not used to Kantian schizobabble, you will have a lot of homework to do before reading Mainlander.

>We do therefore not proceed on a forbidden path, if we comprehend the deed of God, as if it was a motivated act of volition, and consequently provisionally, merely for the judgement of the deed, assign will and mind to the essence of God.
>That we have to assign him will and mind, and not will alone, is clear, for God was in absolute solitude, and nothing existed beside him. He could not be motivated from outside, only by himself. In his self-consciousness his being alone was mirrored, nothing else.
>From this follows with logical coercion, that the freedom of God (the liberum arbitrum indefferentiæ) could find application in one single choice: namely, either to remain, as he is, or to not be. He had indeed also the freedom, to be different, but for this being something else the freedom must remain latent in all directions, for we can image no more perfected and better being, than the basic unity.
>Consequently only one deed was possible for God, and indeed a free deed, because he was under no coercion, because he could just as well have not executed it, as executing it, namely, going into absolute nothingness, in the nihil negativum2 , i.e. to completely annihilate himself, to stop existing.
>Because this was his only possible deed and we stand before a totally different deed, the world, whose being is a continual becoming, we are confronted with the question: why did God, if he wanted non-existence, not immediately vanish into nothing? You have to assign God omnipotence, for his might was limited by nothing, consequently, if he wanted not to be, then he must also immediately be annihilated. Instead, a world of multiplicity was created, a world of struggle. This is a clear contradiction. How do you want to solve it?
>The first reply should be: Certainly, on one hand it is logically fixed, that only one deed was possible for the basic unity: to annihilate itself, on the other hand, the world proves that this deed has not taken place. But this contradiction can only be an apparent one. Both deeds: the only logically possible one, and the real one, must be compatible on their ground. But how?
>It is clear, that they are compatible only then, if we can verify, that somewhere an obstacle made the immediate annihilation of God impossible.

>In the case above it was said: “you have to assign God omnipotence, for his might was limited by nothing.” This sentence is however false in general. God existed alone, in absolute solitude, and it is consequently correct, that he was not limited by anything outside of him; his might was thus in that sense omnipotence, that it was not limited by anything lying outside of him. But he had no omnipotence towards his own might, or with other words, his might was not destructible by himself, the basic unity could not stop to exist through itself.
>God had the freedom, to be how he wanted, but he was not free from his determined essence. God has the omnipotence, to execute his will, to be whatever he wants; but he had not the might, to immediately become nothing.
>The basic unity had the might, to be in any way different, than it was, but it had not the might, to suddenly become simply nothing. In the first case it remains in existence, in the latter case it must be nothing: but then it itself obstructed the path; because even if we cannot fathom the essence of God, then we nevertheless know, that it was a determined over-essence, and this determined over-essence, resting in a determined over-being, could not through itself, not be. This was the obstacle.

>The theologians of all times have without second thoughts assigned God the predicate of omnipotence, i.e. they gave him the might, to be able to do, everything, which he wanted. In doing so, not one of them had thought of possibility, that God could also want, to become nothing himself. This possibility, none of them had considered it. But if one considers it in all seriousness, then one sees, that this is the only case where God’s omnipotence, simply by itself, is limited, that it is no omnipotence towards itself.
>The single deed of God, the disintegration into multiplicity, accordingly presents itself: as the execution of the logical deed, the decision to not be, or with other words: the world is the method for the goal of non-existence, and the world is indeed the only possible method for the goal. God recognized, that he could go from over-being to non-existence only by becoming a world of multiplicity, through the immanent domain, the world.
>If it were not clear by the way, that the essence of God was the obstacle for him, to immediately dissolve into nothingness, then our ignorance of the obstacle could in no way trouble us. Then we would simply have to postulate the obstacle on the transcendent domain; because the fact, that the universe moves from being into non-being, will show itself clearly and completely convincingly for everyone. –
>The questions, which can be raised here, namely, why God did not want non-existence sooner, und why he preferred non-existence over existence at all, are all without meaning, because regarding the first question, “sooner” is a time-concept, which is without any sense regarding eternity, and the second question is sufficiently answered by the fact of the world. Non-existence must very well have deserved the preference over over-being, because otherwise God, in all his perfected wisdom, would not have chosen it. And all this the more, if one contemplates all the torments known to us of the higher Ideas, the animals standing close to us and our fellow humans, the torments by which non-existence alone can be bought.

>We have only provisionally assigned Will and Mind to the essence of God and comprehended the deed of God, as if it was a motivated act of volition, in order to gain a regulative principle for the mere judgement of the deed. On this path also, we have reached the goal, and the speculative reason may be satisfied.
>We may nevertheless not leave our peculiar standpoint between immanent and transcendent domain (we are hanging on the small thread of existence above the bottomless pit, which separates both domains) in order to re-enter the solid world, the safe ground of experience, before having loudly declared one more time, that the being of God was neither a connection of Will and Mind, like that of humans, nor an intertwinement of Will and Mind. The true origin of the world can therefore never be fathomed by a human mind. The only thing which we can and may do – a right which we have made use of – is to make the divine act accessible for us by analogy, but while always keeping the fact in mind, that
>now we see through a glass darkly (1. Corinthians 13)
>and that we are dissecting according to our apprehension an act, which, as unitary act of a basic unity, can never be comprehended by the human mind.
>The result of does nevertheless satisfy. Let us meanwhile not forget, that we could be equally satisfied, if it were barred to us, to darkly mirror the divine deed; for the transcendent domain has vanished without trace in our world, in which only individual wills exist and beside or behind which nothing else exists, just like how before the world only the basic unity existed. And this world is so rich, answers, if fairly questioned, so distinctly and clearly, that every considerate thinker lightheartedly turns away from the “shoreless ocean” and joyfully dedicates his whole mental power to the divine act, the book of nature, which lies at every moment open before him.

At the bottom, this sperg's suicide more often than not is what's at bottom of any credibility ascribed to his philosophy. Of course it shouldn't need to be mentioned--but apparently it does--that his suicide isnt a validation of his thought. If he'd lived until he was 105 years old his philosophy would be no less right or wrong, though I suspect almost none of the obsessives here would take it seriously. In any case, having the courage of one's convictions doesn't make them more or less true philosophically.

Just invalidate everything he says by calling him out on not having a degree

Retroactively btfo by Spinoza

He's already refuted by future me

His detailed perspective on the entire chain of German ideology is given in the beginning of his book, I consider him a very good writer just for willing to be so clear and save everyone the "homework".

I’ll never forget the faggot I talked to on discord who said his philosophy was absolutely sublime and that his only goal in life was to reenact his and therefore take his own life. It was the biggest whimpering baby beta speech I’d ever heard.

Schopenhauer fanboy here. Mainlander removing transcendental idealism and the metaphysical aspects from Schope's system and calling it "purification" infuriates me so much. It's like tearing up all pages of a book and holding the mere cover and calling it an improvement. Literally why?

Yeah the "immanent philosopher/determinist" thing is a little bit funny considering his insistence on closed, individual wills.