Name a philosopher with a better definition of reality

Me.

But to be fair, I don’t know what Hegels definition is. No one seems to know how to define it. Is that why you like it?

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>What is concretely actual is not something spatial, such as is treated of in mathematics. With unrealities like the things mathematics takes account of, neither concrete sensuous perception nor philosophy has anything to do. In an unreal element of that sort we find, then, only unreal truth, fixed lifeless propositions. We can call a halt at any of them; the next begins of itself de novo, without the first having led up to the one that follows, and without any necessary connection having in this way arisen from the nature of the subject-matter itself. So, too – and herein consists the formal character of mathematical evidence because of that principle and the element where it applies, knowledge advances along the lines of bare equality, of abstract identity. For what is lifeless, not being self-moved, does not bring about distinction within its essential nature; does not attain to essential opposition or unlikeness; and hence involves no transition of one opposite element into its other, no qualitative, immanent movement, no self-movement, It is quantity, a form of difference that does not touch the essential nature, which alone mathematics deals with. It abstracts from the fact that it is the notion which separates space into its dimensions, and determines the connections between them and in them. It does not consider, for example, the relation of line to surface, and when it compares the diameter of a circle with its circumference, it runs up against their incommensurability, i.e. a relation in terms of the notion, an infinite element, that escapes mathematical determination.
Immanent or so-called pure mathematics, again, does not oppose time qua time to space, as a second subject-matter for consideration. Applied mathematics, no doubt, treats of time, as also of motion, and other concrete things as well; but it picks up from experience synthetic propositions – i.e. statements of their relations, which are determined by their conceptual nature – and merely applies its formulae to those propositions assumed to start with. That the so-called proofs of propositions like that concerning the equilibrium of the lever, the relation of space and time in gravitation, etc., which applied mathematics frequently gives, should be taken and given as proofs, is itself merely a proof of how great the need is for knowledge to have a process of proof, seeing that, even where proof is not to be had, knowledge yet puts a value on the mere semblance of it, and gets thereby a certain sense of satisfaction

Pfftt HAHA, can you believe this guy? Pure autistic idealism against material chads as always, see how he cries about it
>The evidence peculiar to this defective way of knowing – an evidence on the strength of which mathematics plumes itself and proudly struts before philosophy – rests solely on the poverty of its purpose and the defectiveness of its material
Pic related, Hegel thinking he understands space time and matter.

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>he read Marx without understanding Hegel first
retard

>The Real is Rational

What’s difficult to understand?

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The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics is the best definition of reality, so whichever philosopher got closest to that.

Literally nobody has beaten Hobbes yet

>It does not consider, for example, the relation of line to surface, and when it compares the diameter of a circle with its circumference, it runs up against their incommensurability, i.e. a relation in terms of the notion, an infinite element, that escapes mathematical determination.
There might be some value to that passage but saying 3.14 "escapes mathematical determination" is brainlet tier.

"reality is real"
t. me

give me the last digit then nerd

Heidegger but nobody is ready to accept it

That’s not Marx, ya dweeb.

Umm. I guess I’m in concurrence

Explain though

What is it?

>real numbers aren't real
>only unreal numbers are real
Is this what he's saying? How is he wrong.
You can post one example of the materialisation of math to refute.

Dogen

Heidegger is totally interconnected from top to bottom, so this is all going to very paraphrased, because I can't explain everything at once without doing a text wall that nobody wants to read. In brief, Heidegger thinks that the problem of external reality, or the notion that this is something we have to (or even COULD) "prove" is misguided, and based on unclear premises. The main premise of historical metaphysics that he takes issue with is the Cartesian self/world distinction. Asking what is "real" implies that we, the asker, somehow occupy an ontologically remote position from which to even pose the question. We don't. We are already in the world, and the world is constituted by our being in it. Asking what is "real" becomes a fairly straightforward proposition, defining reality as the totality of the entities and concerns we are always already involved in.

Doesn’t this discount the fact that man can perceive entities from outside of this world. And by world I refer to the “reality” which common man experiences (where we ride the bus, see the trees, and count stones). Does the very existence of religion not prove that man has the capacity to place his perception of life from a perspective that is outside of the material plane? Or am I misunderstanding the proposition here. I won’t mind if you just copy and paste a large text user, you’ve paraphrased it interestingly and now I want the source.

To elaborate further against “we are already in the world”, but again, does this not refer to the material plane which our body alone occupies? This doesn’t account for the soul, aura, or any metaphysical component of our being. Now if he denies their existence then the argument if useless. But if one does acknowledge man to be composed of elements not wholly material, and therefore is able to be in commune with entities outside of this shared, material world, then does this not prove that man IS in a position to ask that question? As he can comprehend myriad planes of existence.

Lacan

>last digit
there is no such thing

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The nice part about Heidegger is that he is very VERY accommodating as to what we might consider to be an entity within the world. In no way does he try to limit the world to a numerical collection of material objects which can be observed empirically. I'm not as familiar with his theology, so I will not speak past this point on that issue, but I do know that he has a functional theology based on his metaphysics. The key is this: reality isn't taken to be some free-standing baseline which precedes our existence, it is actual a derivative phenomenon based on our interactions with the world, the world taken as the totality of our projects and involvements and available entities which comes into existence with us. "Reality" is a secondary concept, not a foundational one.

>does this not refer to the material plane which our body alone occupies
Not to beat a dead horse here but to be totally clear, no it does not refer to this at all. In fact, in his treatment of spatiality and what it means to be "in" the world, he qualifies that the way we are in the world is different from one object being "in" another, like a tool in a toolbox or a cigarette in a pack. Our being "in" the world is not a spatial relationship, it is an existential one. Beyond this, even the material/spiritual (or psychical, or mental, or whatever you want to call it) distinction is nullified by Heidegger's ontology. We aren't a meat body inhabited by a mind which then extends into a pre-existing "material" world.

>does this not prove that man IS in a position to ask that question
We are actually, as Dasein (his way of defining individuals without grounding them in their body, their mind, their spirit, or any of the other commonly used factors) uniquely qualified to ask the question, but his point is that if we actually understood what we were asking, we would see external world problems as nonsensical. Ontology is the issue, not material existence, and as Dasein, we are the type of being for whom being is an issue. Our asking this type of question is literally what makes us what we are (among other things), which is why he is so concerned with getting the starting terms right.

My thinking is also very Heideggerian but I don't think Heidegger answers or dispels the real problems of metaphysics and the facticity of the "physical world" (however the fuck you want to phrase this, and yes I know the very idea of "physical" is a historically contingent determination by Dasein). I think it's irresponsible and shallow when Heideggerians and others like them claim to have solved the Cartesian problem of mind-body interaction, the Lockean problem of primary and secondary qualities, the Kantian problem of the thing in itself, the Fichtean problem of the Anstoß, etc., again whatever you want to fucking call it, the problem of dualism and of the world's facticity, simply by immanentizing all facticity to the world-constituting subject (AND YES, I KNOW "SUBJECT" IS A HISTORICALLY CONTINGENT DETERMINATION BY DASEIN).

At the end of the day, the facticity of the world stands unsolved and we haven't moved beyond Kant. At least Kant had the decency to be agnostic with regard to the world. Fichte and Hegel turn it into the metaphysical correlate of a super-subject, Descartes turns it into reified extension, and Heideggerians (not so much Heidegger himself, I think - he speaks of the world's facticity perfectly conventionally here and there) reduce it to a constructed epiphenomenon of language similar to a pragmatic reading of Fichte. That is all to say, at the end of the day the world is still unexplained, and therefore the connection of our soul to it is still unexplained. We are clearly interacting with something real and external to Dasein when we manipulate "physical" reality. Post-positivist self-awareness of the fact that we are thereby reducing it to mere Cartesian reified extension, a la the dialectic of Enlightenment, does not somehow dispel the fact that we were interacting with it (somehow) in its facticity. It only warns us against the danger of reducing it SOLELY to that one ASPECT of its facticity.

But isn't that why he later introduces Ereignis and Geviert as that ever-elusive (to calculative-totalizing thinking; not at all to poitecal dwelling) worlding of the world (or realising of the reality).

Thanks

you are a tripfag, I know you sperg about Marx all the time. also, Stirner is a fucking young Hegelian, so you should be ashamed of that too

Absolutely Christological, it sounds like Pistis Sophia.

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