Why are modern day scientists better at philosophy than modern day philosophers?

how

>due to their lack of genuine expertise in the field
What field, neuroscience? Inquiry into the nature of consciousness and subjective experience is not the domain of neuroscience. Scientists believing otherwise is simply one of many cases of their ignorance of the historical discourse.

>It seems more and more that philosophers are being boxed out

Yes, and this is when we remember that the scientific worldview doesn't contain a means for its own propagation. Scientific insight is favored compared to the philosophical and religious equivalent for a reason that isn't itself scientific. Do scientists know what this reason is? No, they don't.

>Inquiry into the nature of consciousness and subjective experience is not the domain of neuroscience.
It is easily argued that the nature of consciousness or, in Chalmer's terms, the "hard problem" of conscious experience is indeed within the domain of the sciences, though obviously not containable in neuroscience alone.

>Scientists believing otherwise is simply one of many cases of their ignorance of the historical discourse.
the "historical discourse" has been rendered obsolete in light of modern information and studies, and to think that everything we do has to be in line with or consistent with a "historical discourse" is, idk, pointless?

it is inconsequential what preceding, less-informed generations thought. and all their endeavors were ultimately based on systems or explanations constructed upon ignorance. it'd be like trying to build cars using the tools and resources they had in 1911 rather than the intricate assembly systems we have today. this sort of retreat into the historical tradition is precisely why philosophers find themselves lagging so far behind physicists and the like.

>Yes, and this is when we remember that the scientific worldview doesn't contain a means for its own propagation.
Not clear on what you're getting at here; I'm curious where you think that "means for its own propagation" is located.

>Scientific insight is favored compared to the philosophical and religious equivalent for a reason that isn't itself scientific
Again it seems that you simply have an out-of-date conception of what science and the "scientific" encapsulates. The reasons why scientific insight is favored compared to the philosophical or religious is because the scientific is demonstrably useful, patently coherent, and yields the most veridical view of reality, not to even mention the innumerable improvements to lifestyle, health, etc.

One of the most painful experiences you can ever have is trying to discuss The Structure of Scientific Revolutions with scientists. The fact is that scientists are puzzle-solvers, and take the truth of their own puzzles for granted (and will resort to verificationism if questioned on this one). The reason most philosophers have nothing to say is that they want to play-act science, but don't have the algebra or computing skills. But this doesn't lionize scientists, it just makes modern philosophers pathetic.

>the "historical discourse" has been rendered obsolete in light of modern information and studies
Obsolete according to the scientific worldview.

>I'm curious where you think that "means for its own propagation" is located.
The scientific method reveals that a certain rock has a certain property, now what? Scientists believe that this fact about the rock is impetus for action. It isn't. Science as it is being propagated today (i.e. in the form of scientism, the scientific worldview) is being propagated for a reason that isn't itself scientific. Scientists are unwitting participants in this process.

>the scientific is demonstrably useful, patently coherent, and yields the most veridical view of reality, not to even mention the innumerable improvements to lifestyle, health, etc.
These benefits are only benefits according to the scientific worldview. "Veridical" according to the scientific worldview. "Improvements" according to the scientific worldview.

He's willfully closing himself off to changing his position. Most likely he's solely looking for people to do exactly what you're doing, just so that he can use it as a stage for performing this role of pro-scientism guy. Meaning, he's only using this discussion as a pretext to put on a show for himself in his own head. Regardless of who is right or wrong, he's arguing in bad faith. I don't think you're going to get very far beyond this point.

I thought John Horgan's polemical exchange with Krauss was interesting.

blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/is-lawrence-krauss-a-physicist-or-just-a-bad-philosopher/

Which isn't an endorsement of Horgan in general. Just the exchange.

I bet he is some kind of basic foundationalist even if he does not acknowledge it. Especially by the looks of your post, you obviously don't even dare to question the presupositons needed to do science, you take them at face value with no proof.

((you))

Any of y'all niggas want to talk about philosophy of science ITT?

Recently came across this book and it's absolutely incredible.

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I don't know what you mean. firstly, of course we need presupposition with no proof to begin logically supportive studies. you know, like from the Aristotle.
so I don't think that is what you mean, but "lack of knowledge on 'grounded knowledge'" is seems to be indirect explanation for science. for instance, they set themselves in the position of naive realism. without any philosophical implication, they do find useful on naivety.
even if when they find fault in the basis, they almost again came from such a philosophical naivety.
And this certainly affects philosophy. That makes them an ability and right to speak for it.
A math professor usually says this to his students. "Don't pay much attention to foundations of mathematics." they knew that is not a road.

Because contributing to science requires immensely more skill, intelligence and discipline than contributing to philosophy.
Not saying that philosophy can't be entertaining or nice to read, but you won't find any geniuses among philosophers.
Being a genius and writing philosophy would require either a severely damaged individual or a troll.

STEMlets are anglobrained logicians who have an autistic meltdown at any metaphysical concept and typically are completely lacking in any education of non westernized historical mysticism via “anthropology”

>like from the Aristotle
Yea exactly my point the position of Aristotle about self evident claims has been long gone(and debunked if you will) form philosophy,so if you rely on that to critique philosophy you have nothing. Profs for the assumptions can exist but you have to go outside the system to give them.
>Don't pay much attention to foundations of mathematics
So they are afraid of Gordel kek. And why would you not pay attention to the foundation when it's the most important part of anything, if you house has shit foundation it will collapse, it's the same for anything.

Thanks for the reads man, either way. Demonstrated proper understanding of philosophy and of these stupid debates that scientists have about whether philosophy should exist or not, forgetting the importance it holds to establish it as a science, and even not being aware of their own philosophical biases, which orient their results and sometimes creates stagnation in their thoughts.
The best example in the history of science, is the shift from Newtonian physics to Einstein's Relativism: How this big Spinoza fan, who wrote a love letter to Spinoza, that is to say Einstein; and his more deterministic approach to the world translated into a very different approach to the same problem, that expanded humanity's circle of knowledge thanks to his work.

Firstly, they do not afraid of Godel.
Secondly, My professor called this kind of case as "foundation virus", and he said we really should get out of this. well It seems like you have foundation virus in not only math but science and philosophy too.

I actually seen this case before. It was my cousin when he was 16 and claiming this kind of thing - he was very smart, he clearly knew how illogical foundation is, and I realized a wisdom - this is near impossible to refute. instead the attitude that mathematicians prepare for this is "insanely strange" if I say.
>It has been remarked that a system of philosophy is never refuted; it is only abandoned. (in Process and Reality)
Mathematician literally ignore this kind of refutation, and if I call it, this exact behavior is a refutation.

I'm sorry man. I cannot provide why you are wrong exactly. although I can give you a story, a metaphor.
>foundations of mathematics are best summarized in a story. On the banks of the Rhine, a beautiful castle had been stnading for centuries. In the cellar of the castle, an intricate network of webbing had been constructed by industrious spiders who lived there. One day a strong windsprang up and destroyed the web. Frantically, the spiders worked to repair the damage. They thought it was their webbing that was holding up the castle.

I've never seen antifoundationalism turned into a religious obsession before.

You are making no less of a leap than the people inquiring after epistemological or metaphysical foundations by saying that there simply aren't any. Your position is closest to certain variants of ancient scepticism and the briefly influential movement Scottish "common sense" philosophy. But in both cases, this sort of "we don't know why it works, it just does" everyday scepticism inevitably ends in Cartesian/Kantian dualism (i.e., we "know" the inside of our minds but do nt claim that this knowledge extends to the world), which is really the systematic form of Hume's indifference and throwing up his hands in despair. This is what Popkin called the crise pyrrhonienne.

It just begs the question anyway. At the end of the day you end up with the radical linguistic relativity of most major philosophies (pragmatism, deconstruction, Wittgensteinianism, hermeneutic phenomenology) these days, which is just the ultimate extension of scepticism / common sense. When you say that we are beings who are trapped in language, and language can never describe things in their true nature, the only responses that can follow are either silence & indifference, or "OK, so... what is the nature of the 'being that possesses language', then? Clearly we 'exist' in some way.. right?"

The point being: If you want to be a sceptic you have to be a radical sceptic and radically nihilist to be consistent. Scepticism ends in nihilism, as Leo Strauss says.

Because it is me who stopped the debate, I understand that it is no different from case of theologian who stopped the evaluation of a theology as "this theory is frivolous". Still, this seems to be the only way - I know there is a proof, I know there is a routine here... All I can say is I'd recommend Grothendieck's Récoltes et Semailles and La Clef des Songes. This shows math best.

Well, but philosophically I want to ask some minor issue.

A. I don't know how those theories must be ended up being Cartesian/Kantian dualism. like, what? history of philosophy always said that those two were important because it was innovative. Don't we usually call elementary thing like me as Platonism or Gnosticism or something?

So... For example, there is someone like Reichenbach, which was a naive realist. I feel ambivalence to him by how right and wrong he is... But, would you call him a Kantian? or Cartesian? Again, there is case like Sellars who was annihilating to Cartesian truth theory with the myth, but he still holds naive realism as the way of science. I cannot think about this except it is independent. I want to know how Cartesian/Kantian dualism is a natural ending to those theories.

B. I know that in philosophy, generalization even to the common-sense acceptable level is considered as extremely repugnant. and you just listed pragmatism, deconstruction, Wittgensteinianism, and hermeneutic phenomenology - this is too much (do you know transcendental phenomenolgy often criticized by how platonistic, "religious" it is).

I really need conclusive evidence on how these are the ultimate extension of skepticism and nihilism. At least tell me whose book this is said.

>People are realizing that the one principle that metaphysics (the last hold out for an exclusively "philosophic" topic) sought to explain, that is, the essence of things, is more than capable of being resolved through a scientific methodology
your cumbrain on scientism

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>It is easily argued that the nature of consciousness or, in Chalmer's terms, the "hard problem" of conscious experience is indeed within the domain of the sciences, though obviously not containable in neuroscience alone.
It is more easily argued that the hard problem of consciousness is an outgrowth out of the blindness of modern scientism and that philosophy of mind was practically solved with Aristotle already, only to be done away with Descartes, and since ignored due to nothing else but ignorance and arrogance.

Im always astounded at how even the most elementary philosophy is absolutely out of reach for even a first rate scientist. I think scientists the most narrow brained of all the mental workers, certainly they have less genius than the great poets and philosophers. Perhaps thats why a Kant or a Swedenborg could always step into science at whim while the best scientists were children in the world of philosophy, writing, paintig, economics, etc. it’s essentially fo dull but laborious men

> I can give you a story, a metaphor.
i.e. Platonism is the answer. That's what your metaphor is saying.

> philosophy of mind was practically solved with Aristotle already, only to be done away with Descartes, and since ignored due to nothing else but ignorance and arrogance.
Explain further.

Well I know it. That is the same argument as claiming Tao Te ching or Bhagavad Gita proved hard problem of consciousness. You can only say; oh please for a god's sake.

In math, I definitely agree that it's just how separate foundationalism (philosophy) is from practice (application). But I don't think this argues for math's intrinsic antifoundationalism. Math is a language like anything else, and to put it as unpretentiously as possible, a language is a tool for getting shit done, actual practical tasks that actual living human beings want done. So the deciding factor in whether a language is "correct" in how it refers to the world, or whatever subset of the world it supposedly concerns itself with, is usually whether the language "works." William James calls this the "cash value" of a language or of the ideas expressed in any given language, and what he means by this is: There will eventually come a time when your ideas and symbols about something will be applied to that something (say, a math problem) in a situation whose outcome you have a stake in. If your ideas and your language "bear fruit" in that situation, then they "cashed out," they "worked properly." This is the normal flow of life, since we're usually applying well-worn ideas to simple, familiar situations.

And that's all fine, but the problem is that this isn't itself a philosophical position. As Wittgenstein says, philosophy arises when language STOPS working. It's those moments when our reflexive, unconscious sense of what an idea or word simply "means" actually fail to cash out that we become confused. It's at that point that you start looking into the foundations, what Wittgenstein calls the grammar, underlying thing that once worked without you even needing to think about it, but suddenly doesn't work. This is also partly what Heidegger means by distinguishing the ready-to-hand from the present-at-hand. It's that moment when the reliable tool (say, a word), normally so reliable that you simply make use of it as an extension of yourself to do work, suddenly ceases to work as an unconscious extension of you, and appears before you AS a "thing."

Math, like anything else, is not immune to those moments. In fact math is highly susceptible to them because it's mostly self-relating. At least with a physical tool, when it fails to do "what it should," resort can be made to a real physical context. In math, you could spend a lifetime training your brain to think in set-theoretical jargon only to find out that set theory was a bunch of made-up horseshit with no cash value whatsoever. Language simply "working," prior to our thinking about how it works, is the miracle of language, but this should make mathematicians MORE self-conscious about the problem of foundations, not less, because it raises the possibility that mathematicians can create spirals within spirals of self-referential languages which ultimately do not relate to the world at all, and simply never notice, because they got so wrapped up in their self-referential sky-castles that the only "cashing out" the sky-castle ever had to do was in relating to itself recursively.

When Frege asked Hilbert how, in his entirely formalistic conception of mathematics, math relates back to real reality (i.e., cashes out), Hilbert basically answered "by being careful and self-conscious in how any given mathematical-formal language is applied to the world." Meaning, as long as one is self-conscious that math is merely a formal language that "works" insofar as ANY given formal language could "work," depending on the aims and assessments of its users, then math can be infinitely useful. If this extreme linguistic relativism is the kind of antifoundationalism you want, I agree with you to a good extent, but this isn't what is meant by most mathematicians. Most mathematicians unconsciously do take math to be well-founded, in the implicit physicalist metaphysics of scientism, which goes back to Newton, Locke, Descartes, and so on.

This is where the trick takes place: this metaphysics usually DOES "cash out," because it allows these mathematicians to study the universe and create machines, in a lot of useful and important ways. If it were self-conscious that that is all that it's doing, that would be fine. The problem is that it's rarely so self-conscious. The sheer usefulness and power of math in situations where only an implicit physicalist metaphysics is necessary, like engineering or basic observational astronomy, necessarily obscures all the situations in which the physicalist metaphysics is either useless or actively harmful. That's the problem with mathematized scientism.

>how those theories must be ended up being Cartesian/Kantian dualism.
>At least tell me whose book
Mainly I'm thinking of the views represented by E.A. Burtt, Alexandre Koyre, Funkenstein (mentioned above), Richard Popkin, also Heidegger's critique of "Cartesianism" (he views both Newton and Kant as simply completing Descartes' dualistic metaphysics), the Frankfurt school to a good extent. The problem of Cartesianism is essentially that it cannot account for the relationship between mind and matter, and this paradox inevitably results in the Lockean separation between primary and secondary qualities, which inevitably becomes the Newtonian phenomenalism which inspired Kant's conception of science as the mathematical description of regularities in a "physical" manifold. As Kant says, "there will never be a Newton for a blade of grass," but there COULD be, in theory - meaning, Aristotelian formal and final causes are only "regulative." Kant reduces them to Lockean secondary qualities, merely mental, merely heuristic ideas. For Descartes, Locke, and Newton, the mathematically determinate physical world is the really real, and mind is a kind of unexplained and inexplicable epiphenomenon. For Kant, the same is true except he claims scepticism about what "really underlies" the physical manifold (which becomes, in his philosophy, the world only as it appears for us, but still possessing all the regularity and determinacy of Newton's nature).

tldr: Check out Burtt. I can't 100% remember if it's him, but I think he has this great quote about how the scientific revolution squeezed the formal and final causes out into mere heuristics, so that efficient causation became the only true metaphysical. Combine that with the mathematical fixation of the early moderns and you have the (now unconsciously taken for granted) conceptual background of modern scientism.

I don't know much about Reichenbach except that he's a kind of stereotypical scientific naturalist, right? This makes him out to be a fairly typical Kantian "structural realist," with a good dose of linguistic relativism and pragmatism:
plato.stanford.edu/entries/reichenbach/#MatVie

What would you recommend reading on Sellars? I've read essays by him and I always think he's brilliant but I never know what to read for his core views.

> this is too much (do you know transcendental phenomenolgy often criticized by how platonistic, "religious" it is).
I agree with you here. I'm only talking about hermeneutic phenomenology, not transcendental phenomenology - specifically, about the move of people like Heidegger, Derrida, and Ricoeur away from Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. Derrida's critique of the "metaphysics of presence" is pretty standard - once you understand one of these critiques you understand them all, because they're all the same linguisticized, relativized critique of the possibility of extra-linguistic knowledge. Husserl's system was fundamentally predicated on Platonic noesis, direct intuition (or at least something close to it), of the categorial structures underlying cognitive acts. So was Kant's transcendental deduction. You're very correct that this was the last gasp of Platonism. Now we are taught from birth to think any Platonism is naive, any kind of metaphysics is naive, therefore Husserl's "lingering" Platonism was naive, and thank God that Heidegger came along and completed the final "move" toward radical linguistic immanence!

>I really need conclusive evidence on how these are the ultimate extension of skepticism and nihilism. At least tell me whose book this is said.
Popkin's history of scepticism is good. There is a set of articles up on JSTOR if you have access, but the book is great. I am also drawing a lot from Leo Strauss' critique although I'm not a Straussian. This mostly comes from his pre-WW2 writings, not his later American stuff.

Sorry for the gigantic posts, I have legit autism and I like this topic. Also, I hope I didn't skim over any of the things you said and fail to reply to them.

>the essence of things, is more than capable of being resolved through a scientific methodology

This is actually completely opposite to what is currently going on in physics. String theory has been a massive failure and billions of dollars were flushed down the drain just so CERN etc. could not find anything the vanguard of physics predicted it would find. Physics in its attempt to "explain the world" is in a complete dead end, stuck. Furthermore if you are not a narrowly-minded materialist like most physicians are, or dishonest (like I suspect some career-oriented physicians are) you would KNOW that physics or any science at all is by itself utterly and permanently INCAPABLE of ever explaning the "essence of things" as a simple matter of logic. Even physicists themselves are starting to admit that the times we are in are anything but exciting, physics had a naive, grandiose attempt to explain everything in light of our dominant cultural narrative of the present age being that of a secular world with naive scientisim and materialism and it has failed spectacularly to do so.

>that they want to play-act science, but don't have the algebra or computing skills.

You are pretty close to the truth if you invert what you said. The state of modern physics is physicists play-acting metaphysics with numbers but failing in the necessary simple task of examining their own pre-suppositions. Credit to them, this has gone on unchecked for decades due to public sentiment being that of excitement over the fact that we could explain everything by science. But of course now that this project is obviously a spectacular failure (physicists didn't produce anything outside of complex speculative math with no relation to any experimental verification or even the hope of it in some cases) we are indeed in exciting times as the dominant cultural narrative of the last 200 years is slowly starting to collapse.

ASS

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lol nice bait

>And why would you not pay attention to the foundation when it's the most important part of anything, if you house has shit foundation it will collapse, it's the same for anything.
Terrible metaphor, mathematics are absolutely not built from the foundations up like a house. A better analogy would be between a swimmer that knows fluid mechanics and another who doesn't. And nobody serious is afraid of Godel (who isn't the only name i foundations of mathematics), his contributions have been part of the accepted history of mathematics for a long time.

t. has never heard of Poincaré, Leibniz, Pascal and Descartes (or Goethe for an example of the opposite trend) and think Kant didn't start pretty a natural scientist
Philosophy and science are two coin faces of autism really. And that autism often leads them to ignore the other face (not to mention things outside the coin).
Also do you even imagine Nietzsche getting into algebra? Let's be real. And Nietzsche is probably still one of the most able among the philosophers of the past 200 years in this respect.

>Math is a language like anything else, and to put it as unpretentiously as possible, a language is a tool for getting shit done, actual practical tasks that actual living human beings want done.

Both very inaccurate statements.

Blocks your path

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Interesting but mathematics have a non-linguistic component and many mathematicians don't care much for reality. Math is useful because scientists work hard to use it and often conform to an implicitly mathematical mindset. More generally language is never merely a tool, it is also that by which we measure success, not only do we model our language after practical reality, we align our gestures to language, and our image of practical reality owes so much to linguistic conventions and forms as to make the line blurry.

Not arguing the physical reality doesn't exist, but even the "cash" metaphor betrays how we don't escape language: when we think we're aware of its limitations, we only replace it by a better (closely-related) language. It's not that clear a process.
Actual cash is a convention of exchange, it works because you expect it to work, you expect it to work because of your upbringing and environment, which is made up in no small part of language (and further, language being constantly weaved with gestures, behavior, facial expressions, reactions and consequences, that the distinction between language and reality starts looking like the distinction between a tapestry and a single multicolored thread that runs dozens of times through every square inch of it). And, as you very relevantly said, sometimes the language doesn't work and we're at a loss. But even that event must be recognized within a frame of language (exept perhaps in some personal situations) - the alternative being psychosis or paralysis.

On a rather cynical note, and in line with my first point, mathematicians don't work for applications unless that's explicitly their job (in the words of one of my geo diff prof "do I look like someone who cares about applications?"), they work for personal and intellectual satisfaction, fame, and pay. Habit and self-esteem also play a role, who wants to be the guy who ditched pure mathematical research for data-crunching at an investment company?
To reuse James' metaphor very literally, for a researcher mathematical language has "cash value", in the form of his salary. Whether he's building a castle in the sky or not is not always a concern if the castle is shiny and well-built. That's not only mathematicians, how many jobs are about tasks that have become ends in themselves or are traditionally thought to be useful, even though nobody in years has checked whether they actually are? Worse yet, benefices have to be weighted in scales of value (if BS Corp makes more money than Crap Inc it has value for them, but is society any better for it?).

Simply put, the problem of value definition and measurement, of ensuring healthy "feedback loops" between action, language and reality (or even knowing what constitutes health here) is not easy to disentangle from the language and context themselves in which the practice is being enacted.

Those are my disagreements with your post, you can assume I agree with everything else.

Unironically, science needs to start seriously exploring paranormal phenomena. That’s where the next big breakthroughs are going to come.

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hate to break it to you, chief, but this is more of an indictment on your retardation and the state of this board than Badiou's genius

Well both of these things are true: analytic philosophers are scientists without the math skills, and physicists are the megachurch pastors for the Reddit congregation.
One of the things I really wonder about in this thread is, how many of the posters personally know any scientists? As peers, I mean, how many people have been out drinking with scientists, or been to a scientist's wedding, or gone on a hike through the woods with a scientist?

This is what I mean. Almost nothing in Nietzsche is original, but you say he’s one of the greats because he’s easy to read and popular

I added it to my to-read list, thanks

>One of the things I really wonder about in this thread is, how many of the posters personally know any scientists? As peers, I mean, how many people have been out drinking with scientists, or been to a scientist's wedding, or gone on a hike through the woods with a scientist?

I can check off all those boxes, i was also raised by a scientist and work with at least one guy who has been a proper physics researcher, I also have at least two acquaintances who work at ESA. This thread is totally delusional w.r.t how scientists are. Threads like these give me the feeling that there is a great deal of inferiority complex on the philosophy side of this argument quite sad actually.

>On a rather cynical note, and in line with my first point, mathematicians don't work for applications unless that's explicitly their job (in the words of one of my geo diff prof "do I look like someone who cares about applications?"), they work for personal and intellectual satisfaction, fame, and pay. Habit and self-esteem also play a role, who wants to be the guy who ditched pure mathematical research for data-crunching at an investment company?

This is a legit argument until you realize that much of the tech that today is just coming into the market was figured out in theory a long time ago. Good examples of this is FE analysis and artificial neural networks things which were "invented" over 50 years before they found any practical usage. It's hard to know in advance what will prove to be useful in the future and what is a a dead end.
That said much theoretical research is just pure wankery.

>Threads like these give me the feeling that there is a great deal of inferiority complex on the philosophy side of this argument quite sad actually.
Yes, this is unfortunately true. People look at technology and say "behold! this is science," and then feel like something other than science can't be important to the world. Meanwhile, actual scientists are dumb assholes just like everyone else.
Later on in your post you talk about ANNs, which (like a lot of science wank) only appear impressive because the standards by which they're judged are self-referential, or what statisticians call "overfitting." If one is to actually understand ANNs, one must first reconcile them with things like the "single-pixel attacks" that make image classifiers produce spurious results at the drop of a hat. But more broadly, a lack of appreciation for what validation is, is the biggest problem with science today, and the biggest reason that philosophy really needs to wake up and stop prostrating themselves before scientists' feet.

What are you even talking about? Validation is the whole idea behind the scientific method. Huge amounts of time and money are spent on validation and trying to find ways to do it, especially on things like ANNs because of their black box nature, finding good methods for validation is one of the main hurdles that would have to be overcome if they're going to be used in safety critical applications.
Besided the reason i mentioned them was as an example of things that for a long time lacked any practical usage (and for the most part still does in the case of ANNs). But that is mostly an engineering problem for which it remains to be seen if it is solved. They do already have practical uses in medical applications even if they still need human supervision.

>philosophy really needs to wake up and stop prostrating themselves before scientists' feet.
And do what exactly? The age of philosophers ended in the 1800s when it was no longer possible to know all there was to know any more, since them philosophy has been a fringe interest of little importance. Rejecting science is part of the reason it has become so fringe, advances in e.g. neuroscience should be used to advance philosophy not rejected only then can it become relevant again.

Because smart people go into science now

Actually all the smartest people are dropping out of college and languishing in obscurity while working minimum wage jobs and deferring the day of their inevitable suicide which will probably come sooner than they expect

By that count nothing is original in almost any major philosopher.

Kant? An autistic ripoff of of Hume who still couldn't stop fanboying Descartes.
The german idealists? All ripoffs of Kant except Hegel who preferred to suck the dick of the occultist tradition instead.

With those kind of unfair reductory statements you can take down anyone (and as for Swedenborg he was as much a scientist as a philospher and religious thinker).

But now comes the true question mr expert of philosophy: have you ever read any Nietzsche in the original German? Are you familiar with the issues of translation? Or are you just falling for the usual "nietzsche was le edgy fedora lol" meme after reading some excerpts from an English translation of the Antichrist? Cause I've talked with people who were literally paid to read the Greeks in the original andnone of them would say Nietzsche is easy to read, or deny his contributions to the history of philosophy. It's also funny that you would jump at Nietzsche's name and not the half-dozen other examples I mentioned. Could it be that you don't know them? Are you aware that Pascal was a towering writer on top of being a scientist ? (and don't give me the "he's a writer dabbling ni science" crap, he was all about science until his later years, if anything he's a scientist turned philosopher).

Your mention of economics as if it were much more than dubious theories + badly used maths is also amusing. Economists of all people don't get to look down on natural scientists, they have most of their autism without their conceptual and predictive power.

>This is a legit argument until you realize that much of the tech that today is just coming into the market was figured out in theory a long time ago.
Sure, doesn't change most "pure" mathematicians don't care, and that it took exteme amount of work to make the theory useful. I studied mathematics for ten years, I'm well aware of the important consequences of most classical (and many modern) theories. But precisely we mathfags are very eager to forget the contribution of material scientists, chemist and engineer in making maths relevant. Maths has a lot of applications, true. We can't predict what the next big applications will be, mostly true. But don't forget how much work it took from people with a foot in both areas to make the theories into a workable tool for applications.

I'm surrounded by Phd Students. Don't hang out much with the older prof but I see their talks and sometimes chat with them in confs. Most are unpreoccupied with philosophy (though quite a few are accomplished musicians among other things) but there is a very significant proportion of philfags who will be into a variety of nonscientific metaphysics. A good friend of mine recently wrote a piece called "On Natural Theology in Literature" inspired from Augustine for instance. A lot of pure mathfags are also instinctive platonist, but that comes with the field pretty much.

philosophy has always been arrogance and careerism rather than a noble pursuit of truth.

>What are you even talking about?
To talk about ANNs specifically, since scientific validation is too broad a subject for this post (and I don't think you care enough anyway)--
ANNs not only have their internal parameters, the edge weights that are decided with stochastic gradient descent, they also have external parameters, which ANN people call hyperparameters. In short, the hyperparamaterization of an ANN controls the extent to which the internal parameters overfit the data. The actual performance results are computed with out-of-sample validation (separation of """training""" and test data) for a particular internal paramaterization, but the hyperparameters can be and are changed between validation runs. This makes the overall project of ANN calibration (or """training""") an in-sample validation exercise.
This is the reason that you get those funky results, that they fuck up in the real world even as the published data look great, and this is also the reason people call them black boxy. Not because ANNs are mysterious themselves, but because computer scientists are, by and large, too dumb to keep track of what they're doing.
This is typical for scientists' relationship with validation.

>And do what exactly?
Merleau-Ponty shows what happens when you actually take neuroscience seriously in philosophy. Needless to say, you don't arrive right back at scientism.