What are some refuation about Late Wittgenstein's key idea that "Philosophical problems are not really a problem...

Not misuse of language, per say, but the act of taking out things out of context of their usage.
To talk about "apple" we have to talk about some image of an apple, rather than the abstract idea of the apple. Socratic philosophers have a tendency to attempt the universalisation of concepts, which according to Wittgenstein is impossible.
We can not define justice, or life, not because we do not know what they are, but rather because we can not define, as it is impossible to isolate justice and life from their context.

The early Wittgenstein of the Tracatus definitely sees philosophy as a disease of language. The late Wittgenstein wants to restart philosophy rather than end it. I disagree with "quietistic" and "language therapy" readings of Wittgenstein in which he would seek to "silence" the quest for epistemology, a moral philosophy and even religion itself. Witty quit philosophy once and only once, then he came back.

The call for a new philosophy featuring anti-foundationalist thinking and a reflection on how language shapes thought is very popular in 20th century philosophy, (the early) Heidegger for continental philosophy, Wittgenstein for analytic philosophy, and Peirce for pragmatism (which I regard as a current of philosophy separate from the other two given Peirce's metaphysical interests, geography and being born before Nietzsche) in their own way (i.e.: existential phenomenology in which language is the house of Being VS philosophy of ordinary language VS semeiotics featuring pragmatics, theory of inquiry and the community as central to the functioning and meaning of signs and the fixation of scientific belief...) make anti-foundationalism fashionable after millennia of this Aristotle-derived quest for a "science of science", foundation and essences, and are central figures of their own currents of contemporary philosophy.

First of all take a minute to parse what he was actually saying. What you were describing was representative of Wittgenstien's very strong influence by logical positivism. Young Wittgenstien was very much an acolyte of logical positivism and believed much of the philosophical tradition throughout history was just excessive noise. It wasn't about anything real.

So Wittgenstien then dedicated himself to the attempt to establish what segment of philosophy actually mattered. He went through various phases, but ultimately zoned in on the idea that philosophy concerned language and particularly how language was used in relationship to human behavior and everyday activities.

How do wittgenstein react at induction problem(Russell's terkey), or mind-body problem(qualia)?

Behaviorism essentially. Wittgenstein and his close associates such as Gilbert Ryle believed that many psychological terms (such as "qualia") were indefinable. The best you could do is refer to the actions that coincided with the use of these words. For Wittgenstein this meant the concept of language games, detailed and complex systems of language and behavior that lent meaning to the words in any specific language or cluster of related speech acts.

How the hell is that an 'analytic' approach? Are you going to answer the questions that you raise or just leave them hanging in midair like a faggot? Do you just want to look smart?

Oh wow, thank's for the surprising reply. I'm glad you told me that kind of story. But what I meant in last questions are different. There are some questions seems to be philosophical enough, but it seems to be "out of context usage" concept don't work well.
Such as, How we solve induction problem, Is there a god, What is mathematics, and Does infinity exists.
Does wittgenstein really find the solution, in a language usage? Did he think giving solution to these questions are impossible, like you said?

Bro chill
Although that guy is quite strange, I saw an article that Witt is so close to a continental you can say he is a continental.

Oh not Wittgeinstien honestly had almost nothing to say about those topics. If you're looking for someone substantial out of the same school of philosophy I would highly recommend Rudolf Carnap and his magisterial book The Logical Structure of the World.

Towards the end of his life Wittgenstein became almost an epistemological nihilist, so extremely did his skepticism extend. (See On Certainty for examples.)

>Although that guy is quite strange, I saw an article that Witt is so close to a continental you can say he is a continental.
What does this have to do with anything?

>this is not like continental philosophy where we get away with "misreadings" of thinkers (because the misreading is "inevitable")
From this.

You seem really stupid to me, desu.

Can I ask Why?

You can, but I won't tell you.

>How the hell is that an 'analytic' approach?
Because you take the skeptic position and give all the credit to analytic philosophy instead.
>Are you going to answer the questions that you raise
Did it occurr to you that in the absence of actual quotes from Wittgenstein we are not in the position to see how he would reply to such objections and get a proper refutation of Wittgenstein going?

By all means if you want to convict and execute the late Wittgenstein in absentia for things he didn't even say, for fear of "just looking smart", go ahead, but do so without me.

>Because you take the skeptic position and give all the credit to analytic philosophy instead.
Is this supposed to make sense?
>By all means if you want to convict and execute the late Wittgenstein in absentia for things he didn't even say, for fear of "just looking smart", go ahead, but do so without me.
How about you post a quote, numbnuts?

He is really well-known for aphorism. I think stating quote is Harmful for showing his philosophy.

>I think stating quote is Harmful for showing his philosophy.
You're flat-out wrong. There's no way around it.

I agree that "quietism" is not a good way to understand later witt, but I strongly disagree that "language theraphy" is not a good view.

>"the Investigations points out the therapeutic non-dogmatic nature of philosophy, verily instructing philosophers in the ways of therapy."
>"Its new insights can be understood as primarily exposing fallacies in the traditional way of thinking about language, truth, thought, intentionality, and, perhaps mainly, philosophy. In this sense, it is conceived of as a therapeutic work, viewing philosophy itself as therapy."
>"The Philosophical Investigations proceeds to offer the new way of looking at language, which will yield the view of philosophy as therapy."

Rorty said in "Mirror of Nature" that there is philosophy that
a philosophy that places importance on edification, unlike others. He states wittgenstein as such. He might be misunderstood witt, but I don't think he misunderstood that hard.

>The late Wittgenstein wants to restart philosophy rather than end it. I disagree with "quietistic" and "language therapy" readings of Wittgenstein in which he would seek to "silence" the quest for epistemology, a moral philosophy and even religion itself.

Could you elaborate more on this? I've been reading James/Heidegger/Goethe/Merleau-Ponty as suggested by someone here, and now that I'm approaching Investigations it just feels like he's "quitting" where there's lots of ground for further thought.

>"The entanglement in our own rules is what we want to understand"
and the rest of 124-128 is the kind of insight that interests me, and reminds me of the previous writers I've mentioned, but there are moments where I confuse readings as either being "quietistic" as suggested, or at best, a kind of self-evident "warning" to be careful with regard to what people were already doing anyway

I also see the word "springboard" used a lot w/r/t non-quietistic readings and other writer's developments of his work, which puts me off.

>ctrl+f "family resemblance"
>0 results
You're all retards

But Rorty does what he pleases with the philosophers he reads, he has a broad historico-philosophical narrative in mind that prevents him from seeing where the anti-essentialists he reads might disagree with him and each other... He is correct in calling himself "neo-"pragmatist as he went full continental. The sizable critical scholarship on Rorty's interpretations of other philosophers cannot be reduced as the attempt to rescue some representationalism nobody cares about in the current century.
From Personal Recollections:
>Philosophy is like trying to open a safe with a combination lock: each little adjustment of the dials seems to achieve nothing, only when everything is in place does the door open.
Culture and Value:
>Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense.
>It's only by thinking even more crazily than philosophers do that you can solve their problems.
I cannot for the life of me see Late Wittgenstein the Late as advocating the ragequitting of philosophy. Push the boundaries, discover new ways of thinking, philosophy is worth the effort.

>First you have a philosophical problem and then it is claimed it is not a problem, without also claiming that it was solved.
>I for one believe than when we abstractly think about this strange situation, of a problem that is not a problem, (Houston) we have a problem, and that we're doing philosophy.

The hell? If you claim a problem is not in fact a problem that doesn't mean you have to solve it. You just have to deny that it's coherent. I have not read Houston and have no idea how this label of "problem that is not a problem" justifies itself. The following bit where you say that this problem that is not a problem is in fact... wait for it... a problem reads like a bad joke.

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>If you claim a problem is not in fact a problem
You commit dialetheism.
>You just have to deny that it's coherent
If you cared for coherence than you wouldn't have called a non-problem a problem in the first place.

Our hypothetical Wittgestein quote that doesn't exist, but somehow cares for coherence, would read like this:

"There is no such thing as a philosophical problem."

Sounds better now, doesn't it? But then the skeptic comes and asks the same questions as usual: "Are you sure about that? What made you think that? How do you know? What is the meaning of "philosophical" and "problem" there? etc.", thus to nobody's surprise we have a problem.

And to nobody's surprise, our thinking about thinking, in our search for truth and meaning and a method and a solution to this problem and an origin to this idea, makes this "problem" a problem of the "philosophical" variety, which disproves the retarded claim, and that is the point I was making in the first place.

Eventually Wittgenstein realized this was the real bad joke here, and he leveled up and evolved to the Late Wittgenstein. We just can't stop philosophizing, for we philosophize even when we try to talk ourselves into not philosophizing anymore. Rather, what we can do is try and philosophize in new ways.

>Our hypothetical Wittgestein quote that doesn't exist, but somehow cares for coherence, would read like this:
Do you want to post an actual Wittgenstein quote at some point? Nobody cares about your version of Wittgenstein. You're not Kripke.
>the skeptic
Asking someone to clarify their position =/= skepticism. You use the term improperly. Failing to automatically agree with your interlocutor does not make you a skeptic. Stop doing this. What you call 'skepticism' is the process whereby philosophical ideas move through a community of thinkers and develop among a plurality of minds.
>And to nobody's surprise, our thinking about thinking, in our search for truth and meaning and a method and a solution to this problem and an origin to this idea, makes this "problem" a problem of the "philosophical" variety, which disproves the retarded claim, and that is the point I was making in the first place.

Except that the actual Wittgy position would be more like,

"Most of the problems previously tackled are not real problems, and this is why there's been no answer to them."

Which is on no level self-contradictory, and was only ever a denial of philosophy insofar as the field is limited to circlejerking around the same inherited puzzles ad infinitum.

Late Wittgenstein's key idea was the language game. The Tractatus' argument is basically that philosophical problems only appear to be problems because of the misuse of language; its project is to try and outline a way to the proper use of language in philosophy. OP is confused.

>Do you want to post an actual Wittgenstein quote at some point?
Why? I'm arguing against an idiot, not for or against Wittgenstein.
>Asking someone to clarify their position =/= skepticism
Questioning why it is held is.
>What you call 'skepticism' is the process whereby philosophical ideas move through a community of thinkers and develop among a plurality of minds.
σkέψις means search, yes. Then again a few hermeneutic circles later you may discover that the language game in my previous post could entail a single self-contradictory retard being told to fuck off by a single person, instead of the workings of a community of experts establishing the belief that needs to be fixed for the current year through a series of symposia. I cannot think of a single analytic epistemologist that does not view skepticism and its challenges as an integral part of epistemology anyway. Speaking of which, fuck off retard.
>only ever a denial of philosophy insofar as the field is limited to circlejerking around the same inherited puzzles ad infinitum.
I never argued against such a position, but OP asked for something else, presenting a fictional "late" Wittgenstein who is has a far more radical and self-contradictory anti-philosophy, OP was wondering what could analytic philosophers living after the 60s refute it.

An analytic philosopher reads faux-Wittgenstein's claim through a skeptical lense and does not fail to unearth the self-contradiction therein. This fictional fearsome foe is defeated, the spectre exorcised, Logos restored, and analytic philosophy claims this victory against the very surmountable odds, even though skepticism did all the hard work.

You fuck off, retard--your verbose posting style just makes you look like the tryhard shitbag you are. Kill yourself, you fucking piece of shit

>got out of this
It’s really, really hard to articulate to anyone on this board how NO ONE in academic philosophy took Wittgenstein seriously at any point in their career unless they were already apart of his cult of influence. The fact that there are professionals who are now fluent in Wittgenstein or have done work on him is more of a point about history of philosophy than it is about the progress of the field. The only notable counter to this is MAYBE some of the logical positivists, who were more impressed by the linguistic turn in general more so than any move exclusive to Wittgenstein (and that would only be relevant to his early stuff anyway), and Saul Kripke who mostly used Wittgenstein’s late stuff as a jumping off point for his own thought very much like how a jazz player might improv off a rendition.
tl;dr there is no problem. open conjecture isn’t serious philosophizing, especially not in the “tradition” of analytic philosophy, and most attempts to pull a coherent view out of either the early or late Wittgenstein have failed. The man literally spoke gibberish down to the core. Soames has a lot of stuff relevant to this.

People who "refute" Witty tend to say he conflated pragmatics with semantics. Yes, it's that retarded of a critique.

How is that a retarded critique?

The partition of meaning into these distinct categories (such as done by Soames, Grice and any such "philosophers") is to be taken as pedagogic at most, not as a fine theoretical point.

Holy shit are you retarded? Or are you just really that edgy to think there’s no value in distinguishing levels of linguistic capacity? Of course it’s a fine theoretic point if a philosopher has a basic scope error. There’s no “pedagogy” in that, especially when the philosopher is simultaneously trying to make epistemic claims.

Jeepers fellas

>Push the boundaries, discover new ways of thinking, philosophy is worth the effort.
Are there any examples of what this is or what it might entail? That, or suggestions for further directed reading would be appreciated!

This comment is so different.
>academic philosophy took Wittgenstein seriously at any point in their career
Please. Do you have a proof, any article defending this?

He's been pulling things out of his ass the whole time (not the arbitrary use of the word 'continental' to describe anyone who isn't autistically invested in American analytic philosophy).

In his later writings Wittgenstein holds, as he did in the Tractatus, that philosophers do not—or should not—supply a theory, neither do they provide explanations. “Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain” (PI 126). The anti-theoretical stance is reminiscent of the early Wittgenstein, but there are manifest differences. Although the Tractatus precludes philosophical theories, it does construct a systematic edifice which results in the general form of the proposition, all the while relying on strict formal logic; the Investigations points out the therapeutic non-dogmatic nature of philosophy, verily instructing philosophers in the ways of therapy. “The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling reminders for a particular purpose” (PI 127)

BTFO every reply in this thread

If that is the case, what do you think, then?

Not in this thread. This thread is shit.

Ah yes, I too only share my thoughts among the finest gentlemen in more suitable quarters.

If you want to know what I think about Wittgenstein's work I've already posted my opinion. If you want to know my opinions on anything else I'm not going to say any more because I don't respect you. As I've said before, your posting style leads me to believe that you are an absolute piece of trash more interested in shoving your own interpretation of an idea down other people's throats (while simultaneously pointing out that the quote from which the idea was derived is in fact not real) for the purposes of demonstrating your own knowledge of the subject matter. There is no discussion to be had with you. You are a destroyer of discourse. Go fuck yourself, you arrogant little bastard. Nobody will ever care what you think--other than FAGGOTS

Hey that's cool and all but I'm this guyWasn't sure which poster in the thread you were, so I didn't exactly know what your take was, and I'm just looking to enhance my limited reading of Wittgenstein and others.

I don't care

>The late Wittgenstein wants to restart philosophy rather than end it.

However this doesn't look like what the said. Wittgenstein didn't overturned every aspect of Tractatus, and it looks like that he wanted to keep cannot be said cannot be said, and wanted to end the problems and theories in philosophy as just as Tractatus. The difference is he try to do "language therapy" in this time.

philpapers.org/rec/MCDWQ
OP here, I've come to see this writing. Here I see a man named John McDowell advocating that it's Quietism, can this be used well for conversation here?
Who is John McDowell?

FAMILY
RESEMBLANCE

LANGUAGE
GAME

PRIVATE
LANGUAGE
ARGUMENT

for fuck's sake Yea Forums what the fuck

Wittgenstein defended his position with those concept(family resemblance, language game)... So Wittgenstein proposed philosophical theory doesn't exist.
But right now, Analytical school has philosophical theory. there should be some type of refutation of wittgenstein's argument, then what is it?

OP here, I got some quote.
I've found some argument's from J.L Austin(not wittgenstein), who said "We should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us". This type was the most influential one when I made thread.
from wittgenstein, there is like "What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out
of the fly-bottle."
or 372, Consider: "The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition."
and 381, "How do I know that this colour is red?—It would be an answer to say: "I have learnt English"."

any quotes about "getting out of philosophical trap, pitfall" too.

Philosophy ended with him.and heidegger.

>I have not read Houston
is it me... or?

>open conjecture isn’t serious philosophizing
>The man literally spoke gibberish down to the core.
This is proposition 3. in by the way. Much of the real Witty was not refuted, but ignored.

Exactly, there was never a anti-theoretical anti-philosopher called Late Ludwig Wittgenstein. The real thing had theories of his own.

(Post-)analytic philosophy, inspired from the theories over language (language game theory...) of the late Wittgenstein (but quickly developing its own by incorporating contemporary discussion on logic, semeiology...) moves on into ordinary language philosophy, which is not anti-philosophical or even anti-theoretical, but it is, however, explicitly anti-essentialist and anti-speculative.

From §116 of the Philosophical Investigations:
>When philosophers use a word—'knowledge,' 'being,' 'object,' 'I,' 'proposition,' 'name,' and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself; is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?...What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.
So to answer the question in: , ordinary language philosophy became the anti-essentialist, new way of thinking as received by (post-)analytic philosophy, and what is left of Witty's influence in the history of philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. That, and Lyotard throwing the expression "language game" around in his The Postmodern Condition, one of the few French who bothered reading Witty.

In what Rorty called the Linguistic Turn, philosophers in the various traditions felt the need to understand how language works, later also taking into consideration how our communities shape it and the way we think, but the goal was always the same: that we could think about thinking (i.e.: philosophizing) better.

Wittgenstein did not end philosophy, nor did he want to.

133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.

He is an anti-philosopher. Well, in my opinion, but you should not push your own distinct interpretation when you answer that question.
What are you think about antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein, by Alain Badiou? He difined antiphilosophy just same as you, and he picked nietzsche and wittgenstein as two of it.

I have heard this from Ray Monk, that the term "philosophical theory" can never come to Wittgenstein, and most analytical philosophers today holds the opposite view. What is going on here then? Did Ray monk do a mistake?

youtu.be/XB3OwIV5oro
27:30 for the line.

>What are you think about antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein, by Alain Badiou?
I think it's an irrelevant text for the purposes of answering OP's question about analytic reactions to Witty.
>He difined antiphilosophy just same as you
Did I define it? I for one believe that the ancient skeptics, the sophists and Heraclitus are philosophers, not anti-philosophers. Badiou is still stuck in Plato's Academy, yelling at the sophists for eternity.

For me anti-philosophy reads like pic related. Instead of searching for truth, you willfully deceive yourself into believing you already possess it and even go out of your way to think as if the falsity of such claim, of which you know, isn't there. At least the propaganda minister has the final residual of decency in not believing his own lies... There's a reason philosophers preferred to call themselves lovers of wisdom instead of wise men (sophoi without the philo) or otherwise permanent proprietors of wisdom, thus having their discipline called philosophia and not sophia.

The anti-philosopher Wittgenstein that fooled himself in thinking all the problems of philosophy have been solved died, the search, the interest in philosophy resumed, and the late Wittgenstein was born.

As for Nietzsche he asks: "Who is better, they who promote truth over happiness, or happiness over truth?"
I simply believe that in every possible world where there is a philosopher that says "there is no such thing as a philosophical theory", said philosopher is contradicting himself because his stamentent does indeed contain a philosophical theory. But even if we pretend such theory, or such contradiction, isn't there, and yet our philosopher goes on to propose the language game theory in the philosophy of language, once again it becomes increasingly difficult to claim said philosopher is not contradicting himself at some point, not without going full dialetheism.

The issue for us is not whether Monk's history of Witty's philosophy "is right" or "is wrong", but that:
>most attempts to pull a coherent view out of either the early or late Wittgenstein have failed
as per is Witty coherent? Insightful? Should we care about Witty? Do we need Witty in order to be able to yell at, say, Descartes or essentialism? Do we urgently need more scholarship on Witty? Is contemporary linguistics Wittgensteinian by any metric? The answer current analytic philosophy gives is largely negative.

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>pragmatism
>analytic
The main enemy of Pragmatism is Positivism.

If you knew most attempts to pull a coherent view out of either the early or late Wittgenstein have failed, then why are you so sure about here?
Especially "there was never a anti-theoretical anti-philosopher called Late Ludwig Wittgenstein. The real thing had theories of his own." Part.

Why should anybody privilege your definition of philosophy over competing definitions?

>The answer current analytic philosophy gives is largely negative.
[citation needed]

Wittgenstien is useless. Which is saying something! I rub my head asking why he exerted such a strong influence over philosophy. I pin it on the increased 'departmentalization" of academic philosophy and his charisma. Who thought it was a good idea to eviscerate the discipline of all its motivating content and character and reduce it to the analysis of grammar or at best sociolingustics.

The result has been a neglect of everything that made the discipline interesting and help it provide prescient and penetrating insights into the most profound questions of existence.

While there certainly is value in the analysis of language, there is absolutely no reason why it should be the principle concern of philosophy. That itself is an assumption which should be subjected to philosophical scrutiny, but the premise is so designed that this very action would be rendered invalid. Which, frankly, is dumb.

Without a coherent view to pull out of the guy, his incoherence is on display.
No two philosophers agree on the answer to the question: "What is philosophy?", so I'll answer yours as: "One of those anybodies might happen to be me."
It's very easy to test: ask the professors of philosophy in the nearest department whether they stopped doing their job forever after reading the proposition 7 of the Tractatus. The answer will surely surprise you.

Ahh yes, Wittgenstein’s influence can only be measured by the disappearance of philosophy departments. You’re a genius.
Kill yourself you vicious fucking bastard

Butthurt cultist.