THERE ARE NO ANALYTICAL STATEMENTS

analytical can not go beyond discoursive method; discoursive implies from notion to notion. We can not be allowed intuition (Anschauung) for analytical judgements.
Yet even for the simplest notion of "a" it is empty even of itself if we do not take intuition to hand; how could you expect to then make an analytical statement of something that we have learned from expereince such as body, bachelor, "5", etc. ?
> God's-eye
no idea what you are implying with this, since I am not saying it is necessary for experience to make these non-analytical actual synthetic judgements, they are very well a priori but solely possible through Visual space (Anschauung), mind you snythetic therefore.
>X = X
Take the x's as arithmetic numbers and you will see it more clearly, as X+X will be 2 X and obviously a synthetic judgement. For this first X not to be empty (such as in its notion, but better in space, since we can not comprehend non-space as anything) X itself, even the notion, has to be understood as in Visual space (Anschauung), space (and time) otherwise it would be nothing and we could not even think X before trying to make the statement "X = X"

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>Prove me wrong.
Nah

"Kantian philosophy" is A
"german turboautism" is B
A is not B, A is A and B is B. Therefore the statement A is B is false by definition.

t. Hegel gang

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Please tell me then how the analytical abstraction of a triangel of three sides is a possible analytical judgement? :)
>three
>lines
>seperate in space

triangle has 3 corners

Literally impossible without Anschauung.
>psst, if you fall in the "muh geometry" trap then the "analytical statement" of "All bodies are extended" becomes void as well :)
>body
it is a notion through experience which to comprehend we need synthetic judgements to even understand the inherent predicates
>actually you don't understand anything about anything at all
do tell me how to understand "a" (or any notion) as anything without space? You will be speaking about vapid illusions.
>Get to the Trascendental Deduction, section 15
reading this rn again: I will get back to your post. I would gladly be proven wrong btw.

>how could you expect to then make an analytical statement of something that we have learned from expereince such as body, bachelor, "5", etc. ?
Once you have synthetized them into an object they can be subjected to analysis, regardless of their origin. Kant makes this clear by repeating this point multiple times in both the Introduction and the Trascendental Deduction.
Also we don't get numbers from experience. What happens is that we use objects of experience as images for our a priori schemas.
>they are very well a priori but solely possible through Visual space (Anschauung), mind you snythetic therefore.
This just means that analysis requires a prior synthesis, which Kant states clearly in the section 15. Still, analytic judgements still exist.

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potato, pom de terre... a, b... what's the difference. they both point to the same thing. (german turboautism)

what about maths lol

>Please tell me then how the analytical abstraction of a triangel of three sides is a possible analytical judgement? :)
It depends on your notion of triangle. The point for Kant is this: if you don'y have in mind those 3 sides, then you are not thinking about a triangle (at best you're thinking about the word "triangle" as a flatus vocis).
>Literally impossible without Anschauung
Yeah, geometry is the determination of space when the latter is only related to the synthetic unity of apperception. Saying "a triangle is extended" is an analytic judgement too, and if it isn't for you, then you don't know what a triangle is.
>reading this rn again: I will get back to your post. I would gladly be proven wrong btw.
I've done so already multiple times. The main problem at the moment is that you do not seem to know what an analytic judgemnt is.

Mathematical statements and principles are oddly enough all synthetic (apart from perfect identities, i.e. 1=1; on the other hand 2-1=1 is already synthetic)

although they still require the experience (a posteriori) don't you think there is a distinction between supposed analytic statements because these don't refer to any token instances in particular) and synthetic statements which do refer to such things

The judgment "time is not space" does not take place within space. It only requires (and involves) a conception of space, not the use of space itself, even in "pure intuition." There are other such statements, for instance, "the law of non-contradiction is logical as well as spatial." To make this judgement, again, an abstract conception of physical space is required and compared against a conception of the logical. This judgment does not take place within space.

yeah and perfect identities and tautologies don't add anything to our knowledge

>There Kant gives an actual a priori argument for the primacy of synthetic judgements over analytic ones.
How did you possibly see the "primacy of synthetic over analytical" in what he wrote?
He quite clearly states the opposite:
~ We can only attempt analyticial deduction, where we have perfomred synthetic intuition.
>It's not the only way to represent external objects, you know that?
Vapid without Visual space (Anschauung), or the possibility of Visual space (Anschauung).
You are speaking of nothing.
>Literaly false, for numbers we just need the faculty of apprehension and mathematical schemas.
HA! (i laugh at this) what is your shema if it is empty? You need to have something to throw into the machine to make it turn: that is a (possible) object that can only be given in Visual space (Anschauung).
Attempt to construct (this verb alone already has space in it) 5. Impossible without Visual space (Anschauung); and same can be said of 1 or X , see>his does not imply that the concept is not analytic.
I agree the predicate is inherent in the notion of body, but we need Visual space (Anschauung) to reach to the understanding of this predicate within the notion, making it NOT analytical.
>What matters is wether I really have to think a certain property in order to think a certain object.
Because if you don't think of a (possible) object, your notion is empty and you are not actually able to draw any knowledge from it; it is nothing, not even an increment or a = X.
>Also it looks like you don't know how concepts and objects of knowledge work in Kantian philosophy.
i definetly believe he is selling himself short with what he believes to be analytical judgements, as in extension or (a+b)>a; see Frege and all later analytical philosophers who disputed Kant's analytical term:
plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/
Very good read.
>Kant's pure logic.
elaborate on what you mean, since this is obviously a judgement one would hold true for Kant to name analytical to not pure (rein) a priori ofc, since: Bachelor, unmarried, etc.

>It depends on your notion of triangle.
Baffling! THis is universal, my dear user! What is mathematics if we allow people to have "their" notions of such universalities. Were is your "necessity"?
Saying "a triangle is extended"
A triangle is NOT extended budy.... lines and points do NOT take up space in mathematics. You msut be unaware of it.
If you mean to say: Space is encircled (entriangled) by the three lines of a triangle, then I tell you: YOu are well in the relm of the empirical to make these judgements, not pure a priori.
>apart from perfect identities, i.e. 1=1
I disagree with this; see >This judgment does not take place within space.
he says after saying two times:
>It only requires (and involves) a conception of space
This is exactly what I mean, that is essential for judgements And this IS synthetic.
That's the bane of metaphysics as a sceince, not relevent as to how analytical judgement is frankly impossible. Quite frankly see this as to exactly why analytical judgement is impossible: Metaphysics is not a science and can never be.

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what the fuck are you nerds even talking about lmao post more dfw memes or gtfo.

But you say
>we cannot from the notion of a body deduce its extension
thereby differentiating the notion of a spatial entity from the spacial entity situated within space, the intuition of a spacial entity. To be consistently logical, you would have to admit that any argument that does not explicitly require the intuition of the entity would not take place within space, and thus would not be spacial, intuitive synthesis.

>Still, analytic judgements still exist.
to make your "analytical" judgements you need to first make synthetic judgements.
Exactly what he says, and you repeated:
>Once you have synthetized them into an object they can be subjected to analysis, regardless of their origin.
>This just means that analysis requires a prior synthesis, which Kant states clearly in the section 15
Each time for us to make an "analytical" judgement we really are making a synthetic one to then extract a (faux) analytical one.
This is Exactly my conundrum.
The most analytical judgement first requires Synthesis, a synthetic judgement. I desperately want to be proven wrong, and am willing to conceed my point. If you understand why I am harping on this and still believe me wrong, which I doubt you can be, I will concede a sound reputal.

>the notion of a spatial entity from the spacial entity situated within space, the intuition of a spacial entity.
the notion is empty once we do not take Visual space (Anschauung) to hand.
Correct!
>To be consistently logical, you would have to admit that any argument that does not explicitly require the intuition of the entity would not take place within space
YES, and what is something, when not in space? NOTHING! We cannot use it anyway anyhow andywhere. It is Vapid.
To give all our notions the ability to draw further notions from or perhaps form truly snythetic a posteriori judgements we will always have to add Visual space (Anschauung) to the notions or they are nothing within the judgement.

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Stop being a materialist, and it will start to make more sense. (Hint, if you come across a paradox, the conclusions which seems to contradict basic reality is the wrong answer. If that's what you're arriving at, you need to change your ideological framing.) Being itself is not synthetic.

But all notions are empty in this way. Purely logical constructions are almost completely void of content, otherwise they wouldn't function. A = B, B = C, therefore A = C is not a particularly spatial judgment. All logical variables are abstracted from space but are not themselves spatial, they are rather conceptual. And, further, the transcendental subject, being the foundation and "possessor" of space and time, cannot be represented within these forms, and while it is therefore nearly an empty conception (the more general a conception, the more empty, otherwise it couldn't embrace many particular objects within itself), we are still able to say that this subject that knows space and time a priori is therefore their foundation.

This triggers my hamiltonian.

Let V be the space of bullshit, and V* its dual, the space of arrogance.

>He quite clearly states the opposite:
>We can only attempt analyticial deduction, where we have perfomred synthetic intuition.
Which means that analysis is impossible without synthesis, which means that there is a primacy of synthsis over analysis. Here's what he says in the section I have mentioned:
>For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve, since only as having been combined (synthesis) by the understanding can anything that allows of analysis be given to the faculty of representation.

>Vapid without Visual space (Anschauung), or the possibility of Visual space (Anschauung). You are speaking of nothing.
The term visual space is anachronistic. Kant accepts the possibility of external receptivity for blind people too. I wasn't contesting space as an a priori intuition.
>what is your shema if it is empty? You need to have something to throw into the machine to make it turn
Yeah, they are called images. Too bad that without those schemas any image would be meaningless to us (and things like numbers would never come up to our attention).
> that is a (possible) object that can only be given in Visual space (Anschauung).
Not true, those images (which again, are meaningless without schemas) can also be derived from internal receptivity thanks to the faculty of apprehension, which comes prior to any knowledge of space.
>Attempt to construct (this verb alone already has space in it) 5. Impossible without Visual space (Anschauung); and same can be said of 1 or X
This is false. Read above.
>I agree the predicate is inherent in the notion of body, but we need Visual space (Anschauung) to reach to the understanding of this predicate within the notion, making it NOT analytical
If the predicate is inherent then that judgement is by definition analytic. You keep saying that we need space to think about bodies as if this was some groundbreaking discovery, but it isn't. Once the object is synthetized (and it is synthetized if I already have a notion of what a body is), then analysis (the act of dividing the concept in which this object has been unified) becomes possible.
What you're keep hammering on is something trivial: as I have said earlier, Kant accepts the primacy of synthesis over analysis
>Because if you don't think of a (possible) object, your notion is empty and you are not actually able to draw any knowledge from it; it is nothing, not even an increment or a = X.
You are not supposed to draw any nee knowledge from analytic statements, they are merely explanatory. Analysi can be applied to ANY object of synthesis that results in a concept.

>elaborate on what you mean
Synthetic principles (therefore trascendental logic) do not apply to the judgement "all bachelors are unmarried", you only the law of contradiction is relevant here to validate this judgement. It is an analytic statement, but it is also irrelevant as an example, since it does not deal with objects of intuition.

If they both point to the same thing, neither of them is the thing.

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>What is mathematics if we allow people to have "their" notions of such universalities. Were is your "necessity"?
I wasn't pushing any skeptic view, the point was, obviously, when we think about triangles we already think about properties, and if we don't them we aren't thinking about triangles.
I won't reply to the rest of your post, it's too needlessly smug for my taste. Write a more polite response and I might answer.

>Each time for us to make an "analytical" judgement we really are making a synthetic one to then extract a (faux) analytical one.
Meaningless criticism, since analytic judgments are meant to be merely explanatory. No new knowledge can be derived from them; if new knowledge is derived from a judgement, then that judgements is certainly synthetic. Your complaining about the fact that in order to explain something we need somethin to explain (or that to divide something we must have something that is unified first).

>We cannot from the notion of body deduce its extension

Cavedinheadwojak.jpg

I believe I am very much neather a materialist nor an idealist en lieu de berkley but agree with Kant's epistemology; simply not with the possibility of analytical judgements. The rest still applies unchanged.
>But all notions are empty in this way.
yes
>A = B, B = C, therefore A = C is not a particularly spatial judgment. All logical variables are abstracted from space but are not themselves spatial, they are rather conceptual.
obviously these are all synthetic but very much they are nothing without the actual objects necessary for these judgements. See Frege: All these copulas (in w/e form) are nothing but relations between (possible) objects.
Agreed.
>cannot be represented within these forms,
>we are still able to say that this subject that knows space and time a priori is therefore their foundation.
I agree entirely with Kant's elaboration of the impossibility of understanding the ratio psychology outside from the abilities it itself gives.
This is a different question though, since our logic or objectivity does not have to reflect anything outside of the universum of the phenomena (as it never even could).
The inquiry on the ratio psychology is a near seperate (sadly futile) endeavour.

>This is false. Read above.
I do not doubt, you have read the Critique (in aspects) more than once, but you seem to have a skewed interpretation.
Kan't clearly states that 5 and 7 are only possible and their sum as well, when understood in Visual space (Anschauung) (Intorduction V). [See next reply with german quote; third paragraph]
>Der arihtmetische Satz
I will fail to sway you if you hold on to this wrong belief.
>If the predicate is inherent then that judgement is by definition analytic
The Judgement is NOT though! We Have to take Visual space (Anschauung) to hand to be able to make any "analytical judgement" of an object. (see this as a response to your upper points which I would redundantly reply to)
You are speaking my language:
>Once the object is synthetized, then analysis becomes possible.
remove the braketts since what you imply as the prerequisite for a Synthesis in a Visual space (Anschauung) are nothing but void functions / categories without Visual space (Anschauung).
You are saying my point but not accepting the next step of seeing certian aspects as nothing but Kopulas or as vapid without (possible) objectivity (even if given in only pure Visual space)
>Kant accepts the primacy of synthesis over analysis
He does not state though the impossibility of being able to leap from notion within notion WITHOUT Visual space (Anschauung). He believes Deduction (from notion to notion) is possible without Intuition [ Visual space (Anschauung)]; which is not possible. ( I am refrencing your Kant here, since I belive he sees this impossibility in the dialectics very clearly though he did never take the effort to change his analytical examples in the introduction specifically.
>Analysi can be applied to ANY object of synthesis that results in a concept.
yes, an object, not a non-object (possible related notion for example).
Exactly my point, Analysis requires (possible) objects which requires synthesis, synthetic judgement.
> but it is also irrelevant as an example
the non pure analytical a priori Bachelor example is a common example applied to Kant's bifurcation of synthesis and analysis, which was already debunked by frege which is why i used it in the elaborate >inb4 to not allow strawman baiting. I am aware of this triviality for the issue i am focusing on.

>Man sollte anfänglich zwar denken daß der Satz 7+5=12 ein bloß analytischer Satz sei, der aus dem Begriffe einer Summe von Sieben und Fünf nach dem Satze des Widerspruches erfolge. Allein, wenn man es näher betrachtet, so findet man, daß der Begriff der Summe von 7 und 5 nichts weiter enthalte, als die Vereinigung beider Zahlen in eine einzige, wodurch ganz und gar nicht gedacht wird, welches diese einzige Zahl sei, die beide zusammenfaßt. Der Begriff von Zwölf ist keinesweges dadurch schon gedacht, daß ich mir bloß jene Vereinigung von Sieben und Fünf denke, und, ich mag meinen Begriff von einer solchen möglichen Summe noch so lange zergliedern, so werde ich doch darin die Zwölf nicht antreffen. Man muß über diese Begriffe hinausgehen, indem man die Anschauung zu Hülfe nimmt, die einem von beiden korrespondiert, etwa seine fünf Finger, oder (wie Segner in seiner Arithmetik) fünf Punkte, und so nach und nach die Einheiten der in der Anschauung gegebenen Fünf zu dem Begriffe der Sieben hinzutut. Denn ich nehme zuerst die Zahl 7, und, indem ich für den Begriff der 5 die Finger meiner Hand als Anschauung zu Hülfe nehme, so tue ich die Einheiten, die ich vorher zusammennahm, um die Zahl 5 auszumachen, nun an jenem meinem Bilde nach und nach zur Zahl 7, und sehe so die Zahl 12 entspringen. Daß 7 zu 5 hinzugetan werden sollten, habe ich zwar in dem Begriff einer Summe = 7+5 gedacht, aber nicht, daß diese Summe der Zahl 12 gleich sei. Der arithmetische Satz ist also[56] jederzeit synthetisch; welches man desto deutlicher inne wird, wenn man etwas größere Zahlen nimmt, da es denn klar einleuchtet, daß, wir möchten unsere Begriffe drehen und wenden, wie wir wollen, wir, ohne die Anschauung zu Hülfe zu nehmen, vermittelst der bloßen Zergliederung unserer Begriffe die Summe niemals finden könnten.

A meaningless abstraction, like the pseudo philosophy in this thread.

>Your complaining about the fact that in order to explain something we need somethin to explain
It debunks the entire analytical idea.
We are stepping outside of the notion to find what is within the notion which for a deduction can not be premitted.
This is detremental.
You accepting this, would mean you do not see the great attempt Kant makes in trying to deduce notions form further notions, trying to an apodictic science.
>I wasn't pushing any skeptic view, the point was, obviously, when we think about triangles we already think about properties, and if we don't them we aren't thinking about triangles.
I believe you are wrong. How does one come to the notion of a triangle? You want to hold that the notion of a triangle exist before any experience [better: before any Visual space (Anschauung)] That is impossible! to try to explain an arbitrary notion of an ideal (non-)object as something exisitng without an object. (not denying the object of triangles existing before I expereince them in reality, w/e that may be). Or do you want to say that after seeing a number of triangles we can induce the notion of a triangle? And therfrom the analytical aspects of it, which can stem from nowhere else from whence we got them: Visual space (Anschauung), and which is also the only way we are again going to get them to find these analytical judgements (to clarify:) through Visual space (Anschauung) again.
The deviating path of: since we can obviously form this notion of a triangle (be analytical or synthetic w/e now) the ideal of it must be possible to (even if not in our notions of experience) and therefore then again preside Before we have seen our first triangle, yet we concluded previously that we can not possibly have access to this ideal before experience [Visual space (Anschauung)].

I very much think this is not a trivial point I am arping on, but a very detremential one.
fuck you faggot. All I see is people arguing with me who actually already have agreed with what I am saying.

ok nerd

Have you considered that Kant was overly psychologistic in his analysis of true categorical judgments? The entire 19th century was spent de-psychologizing Kant (Herbart, Lotze, Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, Frege). Do transfinite cardinalities mean anything to you with your limited visual space view? Was Godel wrong that some true arithmetic sentences are unprovable by any of us? What about Fitch's paradox and the death of verificationist theories of meaning and truth?

Pic related, you're not even saying something new.

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>nerd
I am defeated.

>All I see is people arguing with me who actually already have agreed with what I am saying.
Is "agreeing with you" *truth*?

>you're not even saying something new.
I never implied this.
I have only read aspects of german idealism and the stuff I have been forced to read to pass exams.
This is a predicament I am finding myself in from reading Kant himself, not getting this from somewhere else: I am excited by the idea of being able to have actual geniuses deconstruct aspects of Kant that I havent even attempted to question.
I am still dealing with the Critique and the Prolegomena, in a setting beyond my private study of them, but beyond beyond Jacobi and Fichte now I havent Properly endeavoured into the post Kantian era, though I have had the superficial introduction to it(even quine, which I instantly noticed was way above my head). I am aware of my naivité though I havent seen anyone itt say something I havent already pondered about and believe what I have said itt to be an elaboration or a refutation to what they have said.
I will gladly take advice.

btfo'd by the Circularity of Analyticity

Your entire psychosis is dependent on the notion that the abstract is spatial, that the mere visualization of numbers means that the numbers themselves are spatial, that what is seen in the mind requires space. Not only is this undeniably materialistic, it is perhaps the most absurd attempt to materialize the ideal that I've ever come across.

>still believing in """"a priori"""

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Is this not Exactly what Kant lays out as essential or what we have to fall back on as beyond the relm of (possible) expereince we are flying in the air willfully doing w/e without?
Denying this:
>is dependent on the notion that the abstract is spatial, that the mere visualization of numbers means that the numbers themselves are spatial, that what is seen in the mind requires space.
Leaves you with non provable "things" in the vein of Locke
>materialize the ideal
not the intent; very well aware of the inherent impossibility of this

>13075060
weak

>

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Sadly not wrong

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>that was bait
You're just assuming there's the possibility of a justification prior to all experience while arguing analyticity is nonsense because knowledge requires sense.

Good on you user. You're on the right track. You know some heavy stuff, are aware of your limits, but are willing to learn more. Keep that up. Don't fall for bad advice on Yea Forums, there's plenty thrown around here. For now I'd just say, read up on 1) the turn-of-the-century finitist/intuitionist vs logicist debate in philosophy of logic/mathematics, 2) transfinite cardinalities (Cantor), 3) Godel's incompleteness theorems, 4) Fitch's paradox and what it means for verificationists, 5) Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," where he criticizes and rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction, though for reasons other than yours. Keep learning about German Idealism (Fichte is great) because I love that stuff too.

Without analysis we would not be able to dissect any synthetic concept. Synthesis builds concepts from characteristics--but if I want to discover the characteristics of an already made or given concept, how do I proceed to do this without an analytic judgment? I cannot proceed synthetically, since I don't want to add characteristics to the concept, which is to say that I do not want to synthesize anything to the concept; therefore I must use analysis. It does not matter that all concepts are originally synthesized (besides the pure categories of thought, which themselves cannot be made, since they are the condition for synthesis) or that all concepts refer to an intuition--I must be able to analyze in order to discover what is already contained in them, without putting something else inside by my act of thought. If I proceeded by only synthesis, it would be like trying to read a particular number, but by my act of reading I increased it by 1 every time. Or like the fabled slit experiment where I cannot look at something without changing it. I need a faculty whereby I can interact with something without changing it.

>non-provable things
Like I said, you are unquestioningly materialistic. Being does not require any material properties. For example, is Space itself defined by space? If not, that it, being Space, defined primarily by its emptiness and lack of quality, exists, despite the fact that it lacks even itself. If Space is defined by space, then not only do you have a self-referential set, your have the lack of physicality itself defined by a physical quality; by insisting on the material over the immaterial, you destroy the logical possibility of the material.

I've been saying it the whole thread, but pseuds will be pseuds.

Pretty sure that's an underage.

>Hegel gang
>Leibniz's law
Mate

>

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Now you've gone too far, cunt. People can't bluescreen into solipsism. The DNA will not allow it. Some language must be considered valid and usable.

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>Vapid without Visual space (Anschauung), or the possibility of Visual space (Anschauung).
You are speaking of nothing.
The blind disagree.

taking
>visual space
literal.
.
.
.

Sorry, "all bodies are extended" is an analytical statement. By nature of something being a "body" it has to have volume.
Other examples are "all bachelors are unmarried" or, how another user said, a= a

Kant's point, if you continue reading, was that analytical statements are not very useful or informative (agreeing with Hume).
However, Kant states that it is possible to gain a priori synthetic knowledge, which he claims is the source of mathematical knowledge. He uses this base of a priori synthetic knowledge to support the endeavor of metaphysics.

This is a boy, isn't it.

who is this semen demon?

autism is the crowning achievement of life

Only if you believe in secular rationalism.

no

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>sexualizing a child
kys immediately

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I know jack shit about philosophy and I think you're dumb. The perceived representation does not equate to the abstract.

What a load of bs.

>no idea what you are implying with this
omniscient

she's done lots of CP

You're post is a great analytical view. I agree.

Inna

>ah nuh ah nuh nuthin

Hegel wasn't dialectic. Read the Phenomenology.

Is it mandatory to skip Husserl to post these bizarre rants?
No visual space is needed at all, certainly not for numbers. At least certainly not set theory and numbers based on it. Formal objects don't have any content and are purely indexes of intentionality.

>Kant's point, if you continue reading, was that analytical statements are not very useful or informative (agreeing with Hume).
Kant was wrong and unironically thought that logic hadn't changed since Aristotle and didn't understand a thing about mathematics, so did hume.
Saying analytical propositions aren't informative is saying we go from zermelo's axioms to 95% of all developed mathematics and don't learn anything in the process.

>hurr durr it just works
lemme just walk across this imaginary bridge...

It's because Kant had a conceptual analysis view of analyticity, as opposed to something more de re and psychologically independent. Hence why OP should read about the development of modern logic, set theory, and axiomatized arithmetic.

specific works you would recommend?

yall psueds
revertabreeaaaa

Do you believe that 2+2=4 is an a posteriori judgement? Do you have to check everytime you add those numbers because the result might be different now? lol

not even op but since when is saying something new even possible?

>inb4 someone tries to strawman me with the strawman bait "All Bachelors are unmarried" (filthy Frege)
that was thoroughly btfo'ed by based WVO Quine

b

u

Well you maximize your chances of saying actually new things by knowing as much of what has already been said in philosophy, I'll tell you that much.

Nice blog post Ian... now take your meds.

>he needs visual space to denote a

g

How does any of this go beyond Hylomorphism in Aristotle
>Aristotle defines X's matter as "that out of which" X is made.For example, letters are the matter of syllables.
Matter, form, action, potential, is a much better frame work. Just most people misunderstand potential, and some other fiddly bits

>He needs to denote a
Get on my level

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Formerly 'application,' and considered a virtue in the sense of a power worth having